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Senate

The Senate met at 10 a.m. and was called to order by the President pro tempore (Mr. HATCH).

PRAYER

The Chaplain, Dr. Barry C. Black, offered the following prayer:

Let us pray.

Eternal God, Sovereign of this planet, give us the wisdom to surrender to Your will.

Lord, guide our lawmakers to trust You with all of their challenges and opportunities, as they strive to please You in their thoughts, words, and actions. Provide them with the discernment they need to tackle the problems of these critical times. When they feel overwhelmed, sustain them as they give You their burdens. As they seek to be totally dependent on You for their guidance and strength, free them from the chains of anxiety and fear. May Your sovereign might abound in their lives.

We pray in Your loving Name. Amen.

PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE

The President pro tempore led the Pledge of Allegiance, as follows:

I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.

RECOGNITION OF THE MAJORITY LEADER

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SASSE). The majority leader is recognized.

SANCTIONS LEGISLATION

Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, yesterday, the Republican Senate took another step to advance key sanctions legislation to hold Iran accountable. The Iranians are pursuing a regional strategy intent on empowering Shia

militias, Hezbollah, their Houthi proxies, and other groups. After years of the Obama administration's willingness to ignore Iran's malign activities and failure to address Iran's provocations, we finally have an administration that shares our desire to take a stronger approach to keep the American people safe.

This legislation will enhance our ability to hold Iran accountable, which is of great importance given Iran's continued testing of ballistic missiles, its harassment of U.S. vessels at sea, and its support of terrorism across the region.

At a time when we face many challenges both at home and abroad, we must do everything we can to enable our country to counter threats where they exist and protect the American people. That is why we will keep working to pass this Iran sanctions legislation and, with it, additional sanctions on Russia.

I again want to commend Senator CORKER and the ranking member on the Foreign Relations Committee and Senator CRAPO and the ranking member on the Banking Committee, who worked to craft this bipartisan agreement.

This is a signal. Russia's attempt to influence our elections last year was the result of 8 years of a failed foreign policy. The Obama administration's efforts to draw down our conventional capabilities and commitments made it clear to aggressive states such as China, Russia, and Iran that America would watch passively as they increased their respective spheres of influence. This bipartisan amendment should represent the first step in crafting a policy response to cyber attacks against our country.

Now, two things must follow from this small step. First, our Department of Defense and intelligence community must develop a warfighting doctrine and strategy that recognizes cyber attacks, active measures, and support of

proxies as asymmetric, unconventional attacks on the United States. Our response needs to be tied to the escalatory ladder and an overwhelming response. No nation-state should be able to attack our sovereignty without suffering an unacceptable response. Sanctions represent only one facet of our foreign policy tools.

Second, Senators coming together to impose additional sanctions against Iran and Russia should work toward providing the Defense Department with the force structure and combat readiness necessary to restore deterrents against these aggressor states. Again, sanctions are only one foreign policy tool.

We must also restore both our foreign presence and our full-spectrum warfighting capability as well. Doing so will send a message to those nations that wish us harm, and it will reassure our allies.

RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL

Mr. McCONNELL. Last, Mr. President, as it concerns our allies, later today the junior Senator from Kentucky will move to discharge a resolution of disapproval against American arms sales to Saudi Arabia. It is important to note that our Sunni Arab allies are engaged in two important struggles. The first is against ISIL and the extremist ideology it espouses and the attacks it pursues. The second is against Iran's efforts to expand its sphere of influence and revolution across the broader Middle East. In Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are fighting against the Iranian proxy Houthi forces. As we know, some have raised the issue of the Saudi conduct of that war, but blocking this arms sale will diminish Saudi capability to target with precision.

The complete arms sales package to Saudi Arabia includes munitions, professional military education, training, air and missile defense systems, and air

● This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by a Member of the Senate on the floor.



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force modernization. Part of the training provided to Saudi Arabia will be on subjects such as avoiding civilian casualties.

More important, as the counter-ISIL coalition continues to make gains in Mosul and Raqqa, Iranian-supported militias in Iraq are posturing to create a land bridge through Iraq and into Syria. This land bridge could ultimately extend to Lebanon and improve Iran's support for Hezbollah. So now is not the time to undermine one of our critical allies in the Arab world by disapproving part of an arms sales package that will improve Saudi capabilities.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS ACCOUNTABILITY AND WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION ACT

Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, now, on another matter, the House of Representatives will vote later today on the Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017, which would give the Department of Veterans Affairs more of the tools it needs to hold bad actors accountable. Last week, the Senate passed this bipartisan legislation on a voice vote, and once the House weighs in, the bill will go to the President's desk for his signature.

Throughout our country, VA facilities have been plagued by widespread dysfunction. Our veterans deserve the timely and effective care they were promised, and I am committed to continue working with colleagues in Congress and in the administration to make sure they get it. This sensible approach has been a top priority of this Congress, and I am proud that we came together to continue addressing the problems in our VA system.

Representing Kentucky veterans is one of the greatest privileges I have had as a Senator. Through their selfless service, America's veterans have earned our admiration and our gratitude. This legislation is just one example of how Congress and the administration are working to keep our commitments to our Nation's veterans.

I would like to thank Senator RUBIO and Chairman ISAKSON for their work on this measure on behalf of our Nation's veterans. I look forward to the House voting later today to send this bill to the President.

THE ECONOMY AND TAX REFORM

Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, now, on one final matter, after 8 years of sluggish economic growth under the Obama administration, I was pleased to see some positive numbers out of last month's jobs report. Now, following so many years of failed leftwing policies that held Americans back, a new administration and a pro-growth Congress have been working together to move our economy and job creation in a positive direction. We have already

undertaken what has been described as the most ambitious regulatory rollback since Reagan, and we are working hard in a number of other areas as well.

In fact, this month the administration is redoubling those efforts on the economy, kicking off with an emphasis on workforce development. These initiatives are a top priority for many States like mine, who are proud to have a Governor who has been a staunch advocate for expanding apprenticeship programs and preparing a workforce that can fill current employment gaps while also attracting new businesses and job opportunities to our State.

I have also been proud to play a role in supporting these efforts, and I have worked to secure Federal funds for workforce development programs in Kentucky. Specifically, I have been proud to help secure funding for training and employment services for laid-off coal miners in an effort to help them find new job opportunities.

Efforts like these are critical in preparing American workers for success in today's global economy, but we know there is more we can do to help. One way the Republican Senate is working to do that is through tax reform. It has been more than 30 years since we last passed comprehensive tax reform legislation, and since then, the international economy has only grown more competitive. That is why it is imperative that we do what we can to modernize our tax structure, as we also better prepare America's workforce for the many challenges and the global competition that face us in today's economy.

Over the past three decades, our tax system has grown increasingly convoluted and punitive, making it harder for individuals and businesses to succeed. In fact, according to the National Taxpayer Advocate's annual report to Congress, "if tax compliance were an industry, it would be one of the largest in the United States." It is not hard to see why, considering that our Internal Revenue Code is made up of about 4 million words, which, to give some context, is nearly seven times longer than Leo Tolstoy's notoriously lengthy "War and Peace."

It goes on to say that "a simpler, more transparent tax code will substantially reduce the estimated six billion hours and \$195 billion that taxpayers spend on income tax return preparation; reduce the disparity in tax liabilities between sophisticated or well advised taxpayers and other taxpayers; enable taxpayers to understand how their tax liabilities are computed and prepare their own returns; improve taxpayer morale and tax compliance . . . and enable the IRS to administer the tax system more effectively and better meet taxpayer needs."

In short, as that report observed, when it comes to our Tax Code, there is no doubt simpler is better.

So how do we get a simpler Tax Code? With tax reform. But that is just

one of the numerous benefits that would come from a revised tax system.

For instance, instead of inadvertently incentivizing companies to go overseas, as our current Tax Code does, a revised system would encourage businesses to keep jobs right here in the United States. Instead of restricting businesses' ability to expand, create jobs, and increase wages, as our current Tax Code does, a revised system would open up more opportunities for workers. Instead of deterring the type of growth that boosts the economy and puts more people back to work, as our current Tax Code does, a revised system would actually promote American investment.

These are just the types of solutions middle-class families need right now, and they are the types of policies that the Republican Senate will continue to pursue as we work to reform our tax system. Fortunately, we now have an administration that is actually interested in making our Tax Code simpler for families and American businesses alike, without demanding \$1 trillion in tax hikes for more government spending.

Respective committees in the House and Senate have been working for some time to move our tax reform efforts forward, and the Speaker and I recently had a productive meeting with the President about this very issue. I appreciate the good work my colleagues are doing on this matter, especially the Finance Committee chairman, Senator HATCH, who has long been an advocate for simplifying our Tax Code. He has been working closely with committee members and Chairman BRADY to advance the tax reform our economy simply demands.

This is not an easy process. There are difficult issues that must be navigated, particularly with respect to business reform, but I am confident we can arrive at solutions that will be good for American workers and the businesses that employ them. We have made progress already, and we will keep moving forward as Members offer their input for consideration.

I hope our friends across the aisle will come together in support of these bipartisan objectives as well, but either way, we have to keep working on this issue because we know the benefits tax reform can have for the American people who, after 8 long years of sluggish economic growth under the Obama administration, deserve a lot more.

RECOGNITION OF THE MINORITY LEADER

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Democratic leader is recognized.

RUSSIA SANCTIONS

Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, last night Senators reached a bipartisan agreement on a package of Russia sanctions for the Senate to vote on as an amendment to the pending Iran sanctions.

It was the result of several days of negotiations and hard work. The Republican leader and I spent a lot of time on this, and I thank him for that, as did Senators CRAPO, BROWN, CARDIN, CORKER, SHAHEEN, DURBIN, and MENENDEZ. I thank each of them for their efforts and their expertise in getting this done.

In particular, I thank Senator CARDIN, ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, who is one of the most trusted voices in our caucus on this issue. He did an excellent job of forging a bipartisan consensus on this committee with little regard for the credit he would receive. I also want to thank Senator BROWN, our ranking member on Banking, who has been steadfast in making sure we would get a good, effective sanctions bill done. We wouldn't have done this also without Senators SHAHEEN, DURBIN, MENENDEZ, and their staffs. I thank all of them.

The final result of these negotiations is a good result for our country. By codifying the existing sanctions and requiring congressional review of any decision to weaken or lift them, we are ensuring that the United States continues to punish President Putin for his reckless and destabilizing actions. I believe it is particularly significant that a bipartisan coalition is seeking to reestablish Congress as a final arbiter of sanctions relief, no matter what the administration does, particularly, considering that this administration has been too eager to put sanctions relief on the table. These additional sanctions will also send a powerful and bipartisan statement to Russia and any other country that might try to interfere in our elections that they will be punished, and Congress will stand firm in making sure they are punished, Democrats and Republicans.

Again, I thank my Republican and Democratic colleagues for putting party aside, for doing what is best for the country. I hope this agreement quickly passes both the House and Senate, and we hope the President will sign this legislation as well, even though it cedes the power to Congress.

SPECIAL COUNSEL MUELLER

Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I am frankly disturbed by the new strategy on the hard right to discredit Special Counsel Mueller and sully his reputation. Their strategy is clear. They know or suspect that facts might not be good for the President so they are trying to vilify the man who is in charge of finding them, but they have chosen the wrong man. Anyone who engages in these baseless attacks about Mr. Mueller's character is only heaping dishonor upon themselves.

Mr. Mueller is known for his service to America and for his integrity. He is a straight arrow. He is a Republican. Only a few weeks ago, these same hard-right commentators and pundits were praising Mr. Mueller. They were

lauding his qualities. Even Attorney General Jeff Sessions has unequivocally praised Mr. Mueller in the past for his service and credibility. Sessions said, Mueller's "integrity is undoubted . . . his experience and love of country is undoubted."

To these hard-right commentators who are attacking this honorable man who is trying to do a job for our country and see that the rule of law is obeyed, read what Attorney General Sessions has said.

Now, because Director Comey's testimony has made President Trump's actions less and less defensible, these hard-right commentators have turned tail. They have started an ad hominem, nasty assault on a career public servant and a very fine man.

A close associate of the President, Mr. Christopher Ruddy, has even insinuated that the President might fire Special Counsel Mueller. I can't think of a worse move for the President at this time. I would have him look back in history and see what happened to a President who tried to do the same thing.

I have one question. What are these people who are attacking Mueller afraid of? Are they afraid of what Mr. Mueller is going to find? Is the White House afraid of what Mr. Mueller is going to uncover?

It seems pretty obvious that if they were not worried, they would let Mueller proceed because they would be confident he would find nothing. I find no other legitimate reason why the critics would flip so quickly to attack a man of integrity unless they were worried about what he might find. Again, if the White House truly has nothing to hide, they ought to encourage Special Counsel Mueller to investigate. They should let him do his job.

When people say "where there is smoke, there is fire," they are pointing to actions like this, and it makes the American people distrustful of the White House and their allies.

I know these attacks probably don't bother Mr. Mueller. He has a very strong spine, and he will go after the facts regardless of the noise around him, but they are bothersome, they are wrong, and they are nasty.

One of the most important things in our democracy is a bedrock faith in the rule of law; that no person is above the rule of law. The President's allies are going to attack every single law enforcement agent involved in the Russia investigation. If the White House ever joins in those attacks, it will greatly erode the American people's faith in the rule of law and do significant damage to our democracy at a time when it seems somewhat more fragile than it has in the past. This is not a game. This is not fun.

This is a very serious investigation that is headed by one of the most trusted men in Washington. It is about foreign interference in our elections, something that eats at—that corrodes the very roots of our democracy, the

very wellspring of our being, and pride as a nation. I would urge that these attacks on Mr. Mueller be ceased and that my friends on the other side join me in defending his reputation. They have gone a little too far.

HEALTHCARE LEGISLATION

Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, finally on healthcare, there are only 11 calendar days of Senate business left before the July 4th recess, and yet Republicans are looking to vote on a final healthcare bill before the deadline, and not a soul outside the Republican caucus has seen the bill. I am not sure that every Member of the Republican caucus inside has seen it.

To everyone in America, this should be a red alert. This should be a red alert for doctors, hospital administrators, and patient groups, groups that represent older Americans, groups that fight for children's healthcare, groups that fight for better treatment for substance abuse and mental health. This should be a red alert for working families across this country whose lives depend on affordable healthcare and yet have no earthly idea what their representatives in Congress might pass in just 2 short weeks.

They might never know. The Republicans have not scheduled a single committee hearing—not one—not a single committee hearing on a bill that would reorganize one-sixth of the American economy, touch the lives of millions of Americans—a life-and-death issue for some—not a single committee hearing or public debate on a bill that would potentially change drastically the way Medicaid is funded, the way women are treated in our healthcare system, the way we treat older Americans and those with preexisting conditions.

Why on Earth haven't we had a single committee hearing on a bill of this magnitude? Why on Earth is this bill being hidden from public view?

There is only one reason. The Republican majority is afraid of the American people learning what is in their healthcare bill. They don't want the American people to know how much they cut and destroy Medicaid or how fat of a tax break they give to the wealthiest few because they know the backlash would be severe. In short, by their actions, it seems our Republican colleagues are ashamed of this bill, and they know their chances of passing the Republican healthcare bill would plummet if they release a bill that looks anything like the House healthcare bill, which only a tiny sliver of Americans support—17 percent in the last poll. The majority of Republicans and the majority of Trump voters are opposed to TrumpCare.

So our Republican colleagues have made a calculation, which is ultimately self-defeating, to keep their healthcare bill hidden from view under lock and key until the last possible moment. Maybe this is the only strategy to pass a bill as unpopular as this

bill is going to be. Maybe it will shield their bill from criticism in the short term, but make no mistake, there will be a reckoning if this bill is passed.

Passing a bill of this scale, with so many consequences for the American people, without telling them what is in it, without telling them how they would fare, the political retribution will be swift. It will be a catastrophe for the Republican Party. I am afraid, worse, this bill will be a catastrophe for the American people.

I yield the floor.

RESERVATION OF LEADER TIME

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the leadership time is reserved.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Morning business is closed.

Under the previous order, the Senator from Kentucky or his designee will be recognized.

The Senator from Kentucky.

MOTION TO DISCHARGE—S.J. RES. 42

Mr. PAUL. Mr. President, pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, I move to discharge the Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration of S.J. Res. 42, relating to the disapproval of the proposed foreign military sale to the Government of Saudi Arabia.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the time until 12:30 p.m. will be equally divided between the proponents and opponents of the motion to discharge.

Mr. PAUL. Mr. President, today is an extraordinary day. Today is an auspicious day, for we will be discussing issues of war and peace.

Believe it or not, we rarely discuss such important issues. We have been at war for 15 years. There have been a handful of debates—most of them indirect, most of them forced only under duress, and most of them would have been avoided if the leadership of both parties could avoid them, but today they cannot avoid this debate because this is what is called a privileged motion.

Today we will discuss the involvement of the United States in the Middle East, and we will also discuss whether we should engage in a new war in Yemen. Today we will discuss an arms sale to Saudi Arabia that threatens the lives of millions of Yemenis, but we will discuss something even more important than an arms sale, we will discuss whether we should be actively involved. Should the United States be actively involved with refueling the Saudi planes, with picking targets, with having advisers on the ground? Should we be at war in Yemen?

If you remember your Constitution, it says no President has that authority—only to repel imminent attack—but no President alone has the unilateral authority to take us to war. Yet here we are on the verge of war.

What will war mean for Yemen? Seventeen million folks in Yemen live on the brink of starvation. I think to myself, is there ever anything important that can happen in Washington? Is there anything I can do to save some of the millions of children who are dying in Yemen? This is it. This is this debate today.

It isn't about an arms sale, it is about children like Ali, who died. Why are they dying? Because the Soviets have blockaded the ports. Ninety percent of Yemen's food comes in from the ocean and they can get no food and they are starving and dying of cholera because of war. We think of famine being related to the weather. Sometimes it is, but more often than not famine is related to man, is manmade, and the most common cause is war.

How bad is it in Yemen? Seventeen million people live on the edge of starvation. Some, like Ali, have already died. What are people saying about it? They say that the humanitarian crisis in Yemen may be worse than Syria.

Let me repeat that because nobody in America is listening to this. Everybody is paying attention to some silly show trials and silly stuff going on in committees. Nobody is talking about this at all. They say it is worse than Syria. Millions of people have fled Syria. Hundreds of thousands have died, and people are now predicting Yemen may be worse.

One refugee group said this: The impending famine in Yemen may reach Biblical proportions. Think about that. It is astounding what is going on there, and it is being done without your permission but with your weapons.

Today I will force a vote with the help of Senator MURPHY, who has been a prime mover in this, to tell you the truth, and has done a great job in bringing people together, but we will force this vote for these children in Yemen because we have a chance today to stop the carnage. We have a chance to tell Saudi Arabia we have had enough.

The question is, Should we give money or arms to Saudi Arabia at all? What has Saudi Arabia done over the last 30 years? They have been the No. 1 exporter of jihadist philosophy, the No. 1 exporter of let's hate America, let's hate the Judeo-Christian ethic, let's hate the Judeo-Christian tradition. It is coming from Saudi Arabia. They teach it in the schools in our country. They teach it in the schools in Indonesia. They corrupt the religion of Islam throughout the world, and we are going to give them weapons? I think it is a huge, huge mistake.

If you say: Well, I doubt that. There is no way they are that bad. Don't they share intelligence with us? Don't they help us in the war on terror?

Yes, every time they help us, they hurt us twofold worse. I will give you an example directly from Hillary Clinton. When she is writing honestly and not talking to the public, she sends an email to John Podesta. This is one that was leaked through WikiLeaks. Writing to John Podesta, Hillary Clinton said: We must put pressure on Saudi Arabia and Qatar because they are supplying logistical and financial support to ISIL.

ISIS is the group we are fighting in the Middle East again, and Saudi Arabia was supplying them. This is according to Hillary Clinton, not indirectly but directly.

Who in their right mind would give money, arms, or share our technology with a country that has been supporting ISIS? Who would do that? Who would think that is a good idea? Yet they will come here and say that it is about Iran, and we have to combat Iran everywhere.

Guess what. This may make the situation with Iran worse. What do you think Iran thinks when Saudi Arabia gets weapons? They think to themselves, well, if the Saudis are getting more, we need more.

What do you think Israel thinks? If the Saudis get more, we need more.

Have you ever heard of an arms race? That is what this is. We are fueling an arms race in the Middle East. Every side wants more. You say: Well, we have to do this. We have to combat Iran.

Do you know how much the Gulf sheikhdoms, Saudi Arabia, and all their allies—the ones who are bombing the hell out of Yemen—do you know how their military spending compares to that of Iran? It is 8 to 1. All of the money is in the Gulf. All of the power, all of the weapons are in the Gulf sheikhdoms. They have more weapons and spend more on weapons—8 to 1—than Iran.

We are going to vote on Iran sanctions this week, and they say that they don't want ballistic missiles Iran. Well, I don't either. The best way to do that is to put pressure on Saudi Arabia.

How would you put pressure on Saudi Arabia? Maybe we wouldn't sell them arms. Maybe we would withhold the sale of arms until they come to the table and we get a ballistic agreement with Iran. It is a naive and foolish notion to think that Iran is going to give up on their ballistic weapons. They are never giving up on their ballistic weapons unless Saudi Arabia did the same thing.

People don't talk about this, but Saudi Arabia has ballistic missiles. They have Chinese missiles. They are called the Dongfeng-21 N-3. They have dozens of these. Do you know where they are pointed? Tehran and Tel Aviv.

Saudi Arabia is no friend of Israel. Do they cooperate with Israel some? Yes, but their missiles are pointed at Tel Aviv, Israel. Saudi Arabia's other missiles are pointed at Tehran. Are these missiles nuclear capable? Yes.

They are not thought to be nuclear tipped, meaning they haven't been armed with nuclear missiles, but everyone who is in the arms community acknowledges that these missiles could carry a nuclear payload if they were altered. They have the ability to do it.

Should we send arms to Saudi Arabia? Here is another quote from Bob Graham, and this is a paraphrase. He says that there is an abundance of evidence that the Saudis were complicit in 9/11.

Have we forgotten that 15 out of the 19 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia? Have we forgotten the missing 28 pages that they kept from the American public for over a decade? When you read those missing 28 pages, which have now been released, they tend to implicate Saudi Arabia. They tend to indicate that the attackers, particularly in San Diego, were befriended by a government agent for Saudi Arabia.

There is an abundance of information that implicates Saudi Arabia in 9/11. In fact, less than a year ago, this very Congress voted unanimously or virtually unanimously to let American citizens—the victims of 9/11, their families—sue Saudi Arabia. This is an extraordinary thing. We almost never let people sue governments, particularly foreign governments, but we voted nearly unanimously. Why? Because people still have sympathy for the 9/11 victims and their families and because people obviously believe there is some information that may implicate Saudi Arabia.

You say: Oh, no, they have changed. Well, how much could they have changed? It was only a year or two ago Hillary Clinton was writing that email saying that the Saudis are giving financial and logistical support to ISIL. Who in their right mind would sell arms to Saudi Arabia under those circumstances?

If it doesn't persuade you that the Saudis are supporting ISIL and terrorism and may have been part of 9/11, perhaps we should look not only at the humanitarian disaster in Yemen—what they are doing to the public and that their goal basically is famine, to bring them to submission—but perhaps we should also look at Saudi Arabia as a country. Perhaps we should look at the human rights record of Saudi Arabia.

I will give you a couple of instances of what it is like to live in Saudi Arabia. There was a young girl who was 19 years old. They haven't named her because her story is so traumatic. She was 19 years old. They call her the Girl of Qatif. She was 19 years old, and she was raped by 7 men.

The men were punished, a couple of years in prison. You know what happened? They arrested the victim because, you see, in Saudi Arabia it is your fault if you are raped. In Saudi Arabia, rape victims are arrested, put in prison, and publicly whipped. She was given 6 months in prison and 200 lashes. That was her sentence.

Ultimately, it did not come to the fore. Do you know why? Partly because

the United States stood up and said it was wrong and partly because, perhaps behind the scenes, we said: Maybe we are not going to sell you weapons if you behave like a bunch of barbarians.

I will tell you another story about Ali al Nimr, a Shiite. The Middle East is somewhat divided between Sunni and Shia. He is a Shiite. They are about 10 percent of the public in Saudi Arabia. They are the minority. They are treated like dirt. His uncle was a sheikh. And by all accounts, he was one who called for peaceful elections, who wasn't an advocate of violence. He never was known or seen to have a weapon but was executed by the Saudis for leading protests. He was executed for standing up in front of people and saying: We should have elections. We should not have this authoritarian government that lords it over us and does not allow us even to practice our religion in public.

Ali's uncle was beheaded. Ali was 17 at the time. It was the beginning of the Arab Spring, and Ali got excited and motivated. If you see the pictures of him, it is heartbreaking. You see pictures of him in western clothing. He liked poetry. He liked music. He was, by all means, the kind of person that we wish would come to leadership in Saudi Arabia.

At 17, he went to a rally and he chose to be part of the Arab Spring to say: We don't want authoritarianism. We don't want despots. We don't want Kings and all of their lording over us. We want elections.

For that, he was arrested and put on death row. Death row in Saudi Arabia, being Saudi Arabia, includes beheading and crucifixion. That will be his sentence—beheading and crucifixion.

This is the regime that you are being asked to send weapons to. People say: Oh, they are buying them.

The technology is ours. It is American technology that was developed for the defense of this country, and the companies would never have the technology had we not paid them to have it. The American taxpayer has a right to that technology, and while for almost every other good in the marketplace the government has no right to tell you how who to sell it to, arms are different because they are all developed by the U.S. taxpayer.

I do believe there should be rules about who gets our arms. I don't think we should sell them to Saudi Arabia if they might wind up in the hands of ISIS. I don't think we should sell them to Saudi Arabia if they punish people for protests, if they punish people for speaking out by beheading them and crucifying them.

I am not for selling them a rifle, much less precision-guided missiles. Some will say: Oh if we give them more accurate missiles, they will kill civilians. That presumes they are not targeting civilians.

Do you think it was a mistake? Do you think they accidentally bombed a funeral procession? Do you think their

intelligence was so bad they didn't know it was a funeral procession? They killed 125 people at a funeral. They wounded 500. We wonder about why we have so much terrorism. Yes, maybe some hate us inherently, but some of it is blowback to policy.

Do you think the people who died or the people who survived or the relatives of those who died in that funeral procession will ever forget it? They will remember it 100 years from now.

The problem we face is that terrorism goes on and on as long as we keep supporting despots who treat their people like crap, who sentence them to beheading and crucifixion, who are starving their neighboring country, which is one of the poorest nations on the planet Earth.

We are not getting better. We are not getting any closer to peace by supporting the Saudis. It is a huge mistake. The Girl of Qatif, a rape victim, was sentenced to prison and 70 lashes. Ali al Nimr, still on death row, was sentenced to beheading and crucifixion. Raif Badawi, who is he? I don't know much about him, but he is an outspoken blogger. He is somebody who writes his opinion and may have opinions that may not be orthodox. For that, the Saudis arrested him, and he is in jail for 10 years, and he is sentenced to a thousand lashes.

I don't think you can survive a thousand lashes, so the Saudis—in their great humanity—are dividing his treatment into 10 doses. He has already had 100 publicly applied. He has 900 more to go.

Shouldn't we think a little bit about supplying arms to this country? If the human rights aspect of this is not enough, I think we should probably think about the region. There is a problem in the Middle East. There is conflict. Some of it goes very deep.

Those who live in the Middle East member the Battle of Karbala in 680 A.D., when a grandson of Muhammad and Khalifa came together and had a battle. They still remember, and they are still unhappy about a battle from 680 A.D.; they have long memories.

I am reminded of what one Afghan told a reporter or a soldier recently. He said: You have all the watches, but we have all the time. They live there and have for centuries and will be there when we are gone. They have to fix their own problems. We can occasionally say that we are going to help some people destroy an evil empire or an evil group like ISIS, yes, but the people fighting—the people on the ground—need to be the people who live there. It cannot be foreigners, and it cannot be people whom they consider to be pagans or it is never going to work. Yet we are foolish if we do not look at the repercussions of what it means to sell arms to Saudi Arabia.

How will Iran react?

I was in a committee hearing the other day, and one of the Senators said: We do not care how Iran reacts. We do not care what it thinks.

By golly, we ought to if we are going to put sanctions on them. Doesn't that mean we care enough that we are trying to modulate and change their behavior? The whole idea of sanctions means that we do care about what Iran thinks. It does not mean we agree with it, it does not mean we condone it, and it does not mean we say Iran is right. But, certainly, we do care about what it thinks. What do you think Iran thinks about supplying arms to Saudi Arabia? It thinks: We need more.

Saudi arms alone are the third biggest in the world now. It is the United States, which is as big as the next 10 combined. Then, it is China. Then, it is Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has these other gulf sheikhdoms, despots. They are all allies of ours. There are about five or six of them, and, altogether, they have eight times more weapons than Iran. So we are complaining—I think, justifiably so—because we worry about the mischief of Iran in the Middle East. We are complaining about that, and we want them to change their behavior.

What do you think is the prime reason they create weapons and are creating the ballistic missiles?

Some of it is because they fear our invasion, like in Iraq, but I think a great deal of why Iran develops weapons is its fear of Saudi Arabia. In fact, when you look back at Iraq and the whole weapons of mass destruction that never existed, one of the interesting stories is that—it may be a theory, but I think it has some evidence—Saddam Hussein pretended, valiantly, that he had weapons of mass destruction not to deter us but to deter Iran. Here is Saddam Hussein, sending all of these smoke signals up that he has weapons of mass destruction because he wants to keep Iran at bay.

We think everything is about us, and we never acknowledge that maybe some of it is about the regional politics. When we give weapons or sell weapons to Saudi Arabia, there will be, for every action, a reaction. There will be significantly more pressure for Iran to come forward and have more weapons.

What does it do to our ally Israel?

There have been at least a few reports that say Israel believes that, every time we give a dollar to Saudi Arabia, they need to respond with a dollar and a half. There was a quote from one of their government ministers on this, which reads that he worries about their qualitative edge.

I have a quote here from a colleague of mine—a friend of mine—who is a rabbi and a friend of the Constitution.

Rabbi Nate Segal writes:

While I understand the President's intentions, we must proceed with great caution due to the challenges and the history of the region. At this time, I don't see the benefits of the arms deal for the United States or Israel.

This is coming from someone who believes, with every fiber of his being, that Israel should be defended. He is

worried that, by giving weapons to Saudi Arabia, it detracts from the qualitative edge that Israel currently has.

Imagine what would happen if the Government of Saudi Arabia were overthrown. They have billions and billions of dollars of weapons. Many of these weapons are the most sophisticated weapons we have. Is there a chance that they could be overthrown? I don't know. They behead their citizens and crucify them. Do you think anybody who lives in Saudi Arabia might have some pent-up anger for the regime?

William Wilberforce once said of slavery: "In having heard all this, you can choose to look the other way, but you can never say that you didn't know."

I love that statement because so many people at the time of slavery looked away. They just said: It is something we do. It is part of our time. It is part of our age.

So many people knew the horror of slavery. So many people knew the horror of what was happening to a people, and they looked away.

I think, in having heard of the impending famine in Yemen, in having seen Ali, and in having heard of the impending famine, you can choose to look away. Many in this body will, today, choose to look away.

They will say: Do you know what? Saudi Arabia gives us some benefit sometime, and we hate Iran more. So let's just give some more weapons to Saudi Arabia.

They will be looking away from the human rights tragedy that is central to Saudi Arabia's whole being. They will be looking away from the fact that Saudi Arabia was supporting ISIS in the Syrian civil war. They will be looking away from the fact that the Saudi blockade is starving Yemeni children.

Do you know what? I choose not to look away. Today I stand up for the thousands of civilians who are being killed in Yemen. Today I stand up for the millions of voiceless children in Yemen who will be killed by the Saudi blockade. Today I stand up for saying that we, the United States, should no longer be fueling the arms race in the Middle East. It has come to no good. The wars and the rage and the anger are thousands of years old. We will never get to the bottom of it. We should defend ourselves at all costs. We should be very careful as to whom is admitted into the country, and we should not get involved in every civil war in every misbegotten part of the planet.

It is my hope and my prayer that enough Americans will wake up and say that we are tired of war, that we are tired of funding every war on the globe, and that we are tired of sacrificing our young in every civil war.

Today this will be a bipartisan vote. There will be a large contingent from the other side of the aisle and a small contingent from this side. This is important. This is a rare day in Senate

history, when we actually have the chance to stop an evil, but we will stop this evil by sending a loud message to the President and a loud message to Saudi Arabia that we are not going to blindly support the arms race.

We are not going to be blind to your human rights transgressions, and we are not going to blindly give you weapons in the face of beheading your citizens and crucifying them.

Today I take a stand for those who do not have a voice, and I hope the Senate will think long and hard and will vote against this arms sale to Saudi Arabia.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The assistant Democratic leader.

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, let me say at the outset that I support the position from the Senator from Kentucky. I believe that what he has said about the situation between the United States and Saudi Arabia is timely and needs to be heard. People across the United States and around the world should be aware of the fact that we are witnessing four famines across this world. One of them is in Yemen, and three others are on the continent of Africa. This is a famine that is created not by drought, not by national defense, but by human disaster—by a war that has been created and is one that has been pushed largely by the Saudis at the expense of the people—the innocent people—who live in the country of Yemen.

What the Senator from Kentucky is basically calling on all of us to do is to ask: What role is the United States playing in Saudi Arabia's aggressive activities? Should we be more vigilant in our knowing that what we are selling them is being used in ways that are inconsistent with the values of the United States of America? We know the record of the Saudi monarchy when it comes to human rights, and the Senator from Kentucky has spoken to that quite eloquently. We know what they have done to their own people, to the people who live in their country, and to those who seek to have the basic freedoms that we take for granted in America.

We also know that, when it comes to the Saudi activity of promoting their version—the most extreme version—of Islam, they have been guilty of promulgating Wahhabism, which has led to extreme forms of the Muslim faith in some places in the world. Those are realities.

We know the reality of 9/11. When we traced the origins of those who came and killed 3,000 innocent Americans, too many roads led back to Riyadh; too many roads led back to Saudi Arabia. So why can't we be more open and honest in our relationship with this country?

The Senator from Kentucky has told us this morning that the amendment that will be offered shortly by him and by Senator MURPHY is one that calls on the Senate to take an honest look at Saudi Arabia today and its relationship with the United States.

May I add one other element on a personal basis?

It is so rare on the floor of the Senate to see what we have just seen this morning—a proposal for an amendment to be debated and an amendment to be voted on on the floor of the Senate. I can count on one hand how many times that has happened this year in the Senate. What used to be the most deliberative body in America—the great debating society and so forth—has turned into a place of rubberstamps and unanimous consents. I am glad—win or lose in our effort here on this amendment—that the Senator is bringing this important issue to the floor. I thank him for making it a bipartisan effort in the process.

HEALTHCARE LEGISLATION

Mr. President, what I have come to the floor to speak to is another issue that really calls on the Senate and asks the basic question: Why are we here?

I think we know that we were elected to make America a better nation and to help families across this Nation realize the great opportunity and goodness of this Nation.

One of the issues that most people worry about the most in their daily lives is healthcare. They should. Many times, I have said on the floor that, if you have ever been in a position in your life as a father of a seriously sick child and have had no health insurance when that has happened, you will never forget that as long as you live. I know. I have been there. I went through a period of time with my wife, in raising our daughter, when she needed the best medical care in America, and we did not have any health insurance. It was frightening to think what would happen to our little girl because we did not have the protection of health insurance and the quality care that everybody wants for themselves and for the people they love.

At this moment in time, we are in a debate about the future of healthcare in America—the future of health insurance in America. I cannot think of a more serious topic. People say: Well, it is one-sixth of the American economy—our healthcare system. That is critically important. Even more so, this is such a personal matter for every individual.

The Affordable Care Act, which was passed 6 or 7 years ago, I was proud to vote for. We couldn't get any support from the other side of the aisle—not one single vote, not one Republican vote in support of it. Our goal, of course, with the Affordable Care Act was to reduce the number of Americans who were uninsured when it came to health insurance. We achieved a major part of our goal. The rate of uninsured in health insurance in America was cut in half by the Affordable Care Act. We expanded opportunities for health insurance through the Medicaid Program, as well as through private insurance exchanges, which were moved in the right direction.

We also said something else in that we wanted to build into the health insurance system of America protections for families. We wanted to make sure that you could not be discriminated against in buying health insurance simply because someone in your family had been sick. Think of how many of us—one out of three, I might add—have preexisting conditions or of someone in our family who has a preexisting condition. It happens—a child surviving cancer, a child with diabetes, somebody in the family who has a heart condition. Those are the realities of life for families across America.

Before the passage of the Affordable Care Act, the health insurance companies could say not only no to you but, really, no when it came to coverage, or they could charge you premiums that were way beyond what people could afford to pay. We eliminated that in the Affordable Care Act—eliminated it. You cannot discriminate against an American on the basis of his having a preexisting medical condition.

The insurance companies went wild in defining what a preexisting condition was that might raise your premiums or to deny you coverage. Having had acne in your adolescence was a preexisting condition. The fact that you were a woman who might give birth to a child was a preexisting condition. The list went on and on. We eliminated that and said that you cannot discriminate against Americans because of those things.

We have people on the other side who have said that we have to get rid of that protection. If we do, what will happen to all of these people?

On Saturday, I went to a march in Chicago, in Lincoln Park. It was the Children's Heart Foundation and the congenital heart defect alliance. Of course, it speaks for itself. The No. 1 birth defect among children in America is a heart defect, and 1 out of 100 babies born has a heart problem. These are kids with preexisting conditions. You should have seen the families show up in big, big numbers, supporting little kids—some of them just babies. They were proudly wearing T-shirts, standing up, and saying that we are going to fight for this little boy or little girl. They were trying to promote medical research to save their lives.

It is something that really touched me as I looked at 600 people on that hot Saturday afternoon, marching in Lincoln Park in Chicago. I said to them: When it gets down to the basics in life, the most important thing in your life is your baby. The next most important thing is your family, whom you have standing behind that baby. Then there is the doctor—that doctor whom you are counting on to do everything in his power or her power to make sure your baby survives. But you need to bring into this conversation another group—politicians, Senators, and Congressmen—because we are making decisions right here in Washington that will decide whether the families who marched

in Lincoln Park in Chicago on Saturday and families like them all across America will have access to affordable health insurance, real health insurance that will cover them. That is what the debate is about.

It was just a few weeks ago that the House of Representatives passed a measure to repeal the Affordable Care Act and to replace it. At the end of the day, not a single Democrat voted for the measure. It passed by two votes—two votes—in the House of Representatives.

When they came back and analyzed what the Republicans had voted for in the House of Representatives when it came to healthcare, here is what they found: Their proposal to eliminate the Affordable Care Act—the one that passed the House of Representatives several weeks ago—according to the Congressional Budget Office—a non-partisan, expert group—according to the CBO, 23 million Americans will lose their health insurance under the plan that passed the House of Representatives. In my State of Illinois, with 12.5 million people in our population, 1 million people would lose their health insurance.

I will just tell my colleagues, I don't see how any Member of Congress can stand before us and say: I have a great solution for healthcare in America. We are going to take health insurance away from 23 million people. But that is what the vote did. And their vote, sadly, eliminated the protection against discrimination because of preexisting conditions.

So what has been the reaction to the House repeal bill that was passed? I can tell my colleagues that in my State there is not a single group, not one medical advocacy group, who supports what the House of Representatives did.

I am from downstate Illinois, outside the city of Chicago. I have a congressional district down there in smalltown America, great people. If you went into that part of Illinois and said to them "I am going to vote for a measure that is going to put in jeopardy the future of your local hospital," the people would literally rise up to resist it.

The Illinois Hospital Association tells us that the Affordable Care Act repeal passed by the House of Representatives endangers hospital services all across our State but especially in small towns and in rural America. They estimate that we are going to lose 60,000 jobs at these hospitals in our State. I can tell you what those hospital jobs are in smalltown America, in rural America. They are the best jobs in the community. These are medical experts, doctors and nurses and supervisors and administrators who keep these hospitals operating, and they are paid well to do it, and they should be. Those are the jobs at risk of being eliminated by the vote in the House of Representatives.

One million people in our State could lose health insurance, and our hospitals are threatened with closure.

That is why the Illinois Hospital Association opposes what the Republicans did in the House of Representatives, and that is why the Illinois State Medical Society—our doctors—and the Chicago Medical Society have come out against what happened in the House of Representatives. That is why the nurses have opposed what was passed in the House of Representatives as well. Not a single medical advocacy group supports what happened in the House of Representatives. Not one in my State. Can't find one of them.

So now we remember from basic civics that after it passes the House, it is our turn in the Senate. What are we going to do with healthcare reform? Well, I wish I could tell you. We are told we are going to vote on it. Maybe as soon as 2 weeks from now, we will come to the floor and vote on changing the healthcare system of the United States of America.

What is the proposal of the Republicans in the Senate when it comes to the future of our healthcare system in America? I don't know, and the reason I don't know is it is being done in secret. There have been no committee hearings, no opportunity to offer amendments. In fact, we haven't even seen the measure we are going to be asked to vote on in 2 weeks.

The Congressional Budget Office, which is supposed to analyze it, hasn't published any analysis of the Republican plan. Yet they are moving forward at a breakneck pace to have us vote on it, up or down, before we leave for the Fourth of July recess. It is a frightening prospect.

They will do it under what is known as reconciliation. I won't bore people with Senate procedure, but what it basically means is they can move it through with a simple majority vote in the U.S. Senate. Amendments will be considered on what they call a vote-arama basis. And if it sounds like some kind of a game, it is almost a game. You offer an amendment and you get perhaps 1 minute to explain your amendment on changing healthcare in America, and the other side gets 1 minute to explain their opposition, and off you go to a vote and then another one and another one. Your head is spinning, trying to figure out what in the world each of these amendments and each of these votes is going to mean. Those are the measures to be taken by the Senate when it comes to healthcare.

This is exactly the opposite of what happened when the Affordable Care Act was passed. We adopted 160 Republican amendments to the Affordable Care Act. None of them voted for final passage, but 160 amendments were offered by Republicans to change it, and they were adopted. It was a bipartisan process on the amendments.

How many amendments will we be able to offer to the Republican Senate proposal that is going to come before us in 2 weeks? The answer is that we don't know because we have never seen

the Republican proposal. It has been done in secret. Thirteen Republican Senators were chosen by the majority leader to sit in private and come up with this bill. There was no open committee hearing, no open discussion. Some Republicans were invited in, and some were not. We don't know what the ultimate product will look like, but I can tell you this: Whatever the Republican Senators come up with, it is going to have a dramatic impact on each and every single American, every one of us in our communities back home.

I know this idea of repealing the Affordable Care Act in 2 weeks is a solemn political promise that many Republicans made, but they also made a promise to the people they represent to do what they can to help these families through their difficult times. That is why we need to make sure the product that is passed by the Republicans in the Senate is one that serves the needs of people across the United States of America.

If this product coming from the Republicans is like the House measure that takes away health insurance for 23 million Americans, then I can understand why the Republicans want to do this in secret. I can understand why they don't want us to see it until the very last minute and then vote on it and get out of town as fast as they can, because it is an embarrassment to think that the U.S. Senate and the House, for that matter, would vote to take away health insurance from 23 million Americans. That is a dereliction of duty, and from where I am sitting, it is just flat immoral to take away health insurance from that many people.

What if we end up with a product like the House of Representatives' that jeopardizes rural hospitals and hospitals in the inner cities, that closes down these community healthcare clinics, reduces access. Well, I will tell you what will happen. People without health insurance will still show up at the hospital sick, in the emergency room, and they will still be treated, but they won't be able to pay for it. Who will pay for their care? We will pay for their care. Everyone else with health insurance will pay more because people who are uninsured will receive free medical care. That is the reality. And, of course, if you don't have a regular doctor or a regular medical home, as they call it these days, what started off as a minor problem could turn into a major problem, even life-threatening. That is why the Affordable Care Act builds into it community healthcare clinics and opportunities to create a medical home.

When I met with the Chicago Medical Society at a convention they had in Chicago this last week, I was surprised by a few things. First, I was surprised to learn that out of the 5,000 physicians in the Chicago Medical Society, they received responses back from over 1,000 who said they thought the measure

that passed the House of Representatives—the Republican repeal bill—was the worst news they had heard when it came to the future of healthcare. They preferred the Affordable Care Act. But they went on to say something that may surprise people. These doctors—over 1,000 of them responding to the survey—said they thought it was time for us to talk about very significant changes to our healthcare system in America. They are tired of fighting the private insurance companies. What they suggested is that we look at a plan like Medicare for all.

Right now, Medicare serves 50 million or 60 million Americans. People can't wait to turn 65 and finally qualify for Medicare, with no exclusions for preexisting conditions, and they know that Medicare is going to give them quality care, and it is not going to bankrupt them as individuals.

These doctors in the Chicago area have said it is now time for America to seriously look at Medicare for all, and I agree with them. I think it is time to look at it because the private health insurance system, even as we have tried to save it, salvage it, remake it through the Affordable Care Act, has real shortcomings.

I hope those on the other side who are considering changes in our healthcare system will actually listen to doctors, listen to hospital administrators, and listen to the families they represent. Why they are doing this in secrecy, why they are refusing to give us a chance for committee hearings and amendments I can't tell you, other than the obvious: Clearly, what they have come up with is something they don't believe the American people will accept, so they need to push it through without disclosure at the last minute and get out of town in the hopes that people won't blame them.

Well, when it comes to healthcare, people don't forget. I won't forget, and the people of Illinois won't forget the votes that were cast in the House of Representatives which threaten to take away health insurance from 1 million people in my State.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. FLAKE). The Senator from Vermont.

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished senior Senator from Illinois for his comments. Certainly we hear those same things in town meetings in Vermont.

RUSSIA INVESTIGATION

Mr. President, on another matter, this afternoon, Attorney General Sessions will return to the Senate for the first time since his confirmation hearing. It has been more than 3 months since the press revealed that the Attorney General gave false testimony in response to questions from both myself and from Senator FRANKEN about his contact with Russian officials; yet the Attorney General has made no effort to come back before the Judiciary Committee to explain these actions—actions that some could construe as perjury.

There are now countless new and troubling questions swirling around the Attorney General. In fact, he was scheduled to appear before the Appropriations Committee this morning—a committee that would have to vote on his request for a budget—but, for the second time in as many months, he abruptly canceled. Neither I nor Senator FRANKEN sit on the Intelligence Committee, so we are not going to have the opportunity to follow up with the Attorney General in person. I am not going to be able to ask him why he hid his contacts with the Russian Ambassador, including a reported third meeting at the Mayflower Hotel, nor will I be able to ask about the timing of his recusal or his involvement with the Russia investigation both before his recusal and after. I will not be able to ask whether the President ever suggested he intervene in the Russia investigation in any way. And especially I will not be able to ask how the Attorney General can justify violating his recusal from the Russia investigation by working to fire its lead investigator.

The American people deserve answers to each of these questions—not only answers, they deserve truthful answers. That is why I shared my questions for Attorney General Sessions on these topics. But I also shared them with members of the Intelligence Committee.

So, at least, on the plus side, Attorney General Sessions will finally face some serious questions, but I am still concerned he is not going to be the most forthcoming witness. We saw last week that Trump administration officials have invented a brand new claim of privilege to insulate themselves from congressional oversight—and to protect themselves from giving answers that would be embarrassing or damaging to the President.

I asked the Congressional Research Service to provide me with a list of valid reasons to refuse to answer a question from a Senator. There is executive privilege, of course, but it has to be invoked by the President, and it is not absolute. Of course, there are also constitutional privileges, such as the Fifth Amendment right to not incriminate oneself. Even in my days as prosecutor, I strongly protected the rights of people, no matter what crime they were charged with, to take the Fifth Amendment if they wanted to, but there is no “I would rather not answer” privilege. That is not in the Fifth Amendment. That is not an executive privilege. Unless it necessarily involves disclosing classified information, the answer “I would rather discuss this behind closed doors” is not a valid response either. That is really not a valid response. That is just trying to get out of answering questions.

The Attorney General’s spokesperson said yesterday that Attorney General Sessions “believes it is important for the American people to hear the truth directly from him and [he] looks forward to answering the committee’s

questions.” Yet it was also reported yesterday he plans to invoke executive privilege in response to some inquiries. If true, the Attorney General is speaking out of both sides of his mouth.

I hope the Attorney General is not going to allow President Trump to follow the precedent of Richard Nixon and go down the path of invoking executive privilege to stop an inquiry into illegal or unethical conduct. These questions need to be answered. The American people deserve the truth. They deserve an Attorney General who is held accountable for his leadership of the Justice Department, not one who is embroiled in controversy and hides from the congressional committee of oversight jurisdiction of his Department.

We must not lose sight of the fact that our democracy was attacked. It was attacked by a country that has no respect for us. If we do not take this seriously, we will be attacked again. We must know exactly how that happened so we can protect our democratic institutions and protect our country. This goes way beyond the Republican or the Democratic parties. That includes knowing whether members of the Trump campaign enabled Russian interference.

Russia is not a friend. Just as they have tried to interfere with elections in some of the NATO countries in other parts of the world, we know they have tried to interfere with ours. The American people also deserve to know whether the President or his administration have attempted to interfere in the Russia investigation, knowing it was improper. Any such attempt would amount to obstruction of justice.

Attorney General Sessions needs to answer critical questions today. He needs to answer for his leadership of the Justice Department in both the Senate Appropriations and the Judiciary Committees. He can keep ducking the questions, but sooner or later, the Attorney General must answer for his actions.

We deserve to know whether he is acting in the public interest—which is what an Attorney General should do—or in Donald Trump’s personal interest. If he cannot decide between those interests, if he cannot distinguish between the public’s interests and Donald Trump’s interests, well, he is not fit to serve as Attorney General.

I pointed out, when Deputy Rosenstein came before the Appropriations Committee this morning, all the things the administration were cutting out of the budget—money for victims of crime, money to go after the opioid epidemic in this country, large cuts in the FBI. I could go on and on. However, there is one place they did put in money for more lawyers. They put in money for lawyers to work taking private property of people in Texas and Arizona and elsewhere to build this wall of the President’s. So we will take out money for victims of crime or for fighting the opioid epidemic, but we will sure learn how to get money to

hire private lawyers to go after people’s private property along the Rio Grande to build a wall which will not really accomplish anything, other than to fulfill part of a campaign promise—a campaign promise to build a \$40 billion wall. The other part, of course, was to have Mexico pay for it. The check is in the mail—very, very, very slow mail.

I see—speaking of Attorneys General and people from Texas—my friend, the former attorney general of Texas, the distinguished senior Senator from Texas on the floor so I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Republican whip.

Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I thank the senior Senator from Vermont for his kind words. We do agree, occasionally, about a few things. We are, in some ways I think, the odd couple when it comes to things like open government and freedom of information. We agree on those things, somebody, I would say, from the left end of the political spectrum and somebody like me from the right end of the political spectrum, which I find particularly gratifying, but there are a lot of other things we have different views on. That is not unusual or to be unexpected, but I enjoy working with him when we can find those areas of common ground to work on.

IRAN SANCTIONS BILL

Mr. President, last night, the Senate voted to move forward with tough, new sanctions to hold Iran accountable for its continued support of terrorism. The unanimous vote we had is a strong message to the world that the United States will not tolerate Iran’s complicity on terror and a clear indicator of just how important this legislation is.

Just last month, Secretary of State Tillerson noted that “Iran remains a leading state sponsor of terror.” I would amend that slightly and say it is “the” leading state sponsor of terror.

The Secretary said he would be undertaking a review of the success or failure of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—what we know as the lopsided nuclear deal President Obama inked with Iran—because, unfortunately, as we have seen, the Obama administration’s deal, relative to Iran’s nuclear aspirations, did zero—zero—to stop Iran’s investment in terrorism around the world. As a matter of fact, it generated quite a bit of new cash which Iran could use to pay for acts of terrorism around the world. So the JCPOA, the Iran nuclear deal, all but cemented the status of the state sponsor of terrorism as a future nuclear power.

I remember being in the House Chamber when Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel talked about this paving the way to Iran achieving a nuclear weapon, albeit some 10 years hence, which may seem like a long time to us, but if you are the nation of Israel, 10 years is right around the corner if you are living in that neighborhood and going to be in its crosshairs.

Part of the JCPOA, the Iran nuclear deal, released billions of dollars to the Iranian regime and empowered our adversary—our avowed enemy—to engage in even more terrorist activities abroad. Instead of weakening Iran, it actually bolstered Tehran's hostile capabilities. On top of that, President Obama pushed aside our strongest ally in the region—I mentioned Israel—in order to lay a gift at the feet of one of greatest antagonists of the United States, with little or no benefit to our Nation. That is why it is no surprise Iran continues to violate international restrictions against ballistic missile testing and illicit arms transfers, flying in the face of any promises that were made in the agreement.

Last year, then-Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee, confirming what we had all feared: “Iran’s ballistic missiles are inherently capable of delivering [weapons of mass destruction], and Tehran already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East.”

Under President Obama’s nuclear deal, their conventional inventory and capability are essentially free to grow, and grow they have.

So what kind of deal was the JCPOA, the Iran nuclear deal? It was a lopsided deal. More importantly, it was a dangerous deal as well.

Of course, Iran’s reach goes far beyond their own border. They support the Assad regime in Syria and the Houthi rebellion in Yemen, two groups which have continually encouraged violence against Americans and even murder of their own citizens.

Last month, on his way to Saudi Arabia, Secretary of Defense James Mattis confirmed that Iranian-supplied missiles were being fired by the Houthis into Saudi Arabia. So not only is Iran breaking the nuclear deal but also U.N. Security Council resolutions as well.

In Syria, Iran continues to prop up and shield the Butcher of Damascus, Bashar al-Assad, even after he has brutally used chemical weapons against his own people. Some 400,000 Syrians, at last count, have lost their lives in the Syrian civil war, supported by Iran, supported by Russia, propping up this butcher who is head of the regime.

So last night’s show of bipartisan support is more than just a message of unity against terrorism; it is a sign the Senate will fight to stop Iran from tightening its grip on power. The legislation we will pass this week introduces new sanctions and embargoes on Iran.

First, it imposes new restrictions on persons who transact with and support Iran’s ballistic missile programs, giving our President authority to impose sanctions on their weapons providers.

The legislation also makes clear that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps bears responsibility for destabilizing activities and terrorism in the region by extending new sanctions to them as well.

This bill also addresses Iran’s human rights abuses by directing the Secretary of State to submit a list of people who are guilty of human rights violations so we can take further action against them.

Lastly, it reaffirms the arms embargo by allowing the President to block the property of any person or entity involved in the supply, sale, or transfer of prohibited arms and related materiel to and from Iran.

I also submitted yesterday an amendment to this Iranian sanctions legislation that targets Mahan Air, which is Iran’s largest commercial airline. As a transporter of terrorists and weapons, Mahan Air is nothing more than a commercial coverup for terrorist activities, and, with routes in and out of Europe, it is essential for us to stop their continued expansion and to understand how their activities bear on the safety of American lives.

I am thankful for Chairman CORKER’s leadership on the Iran and now Russia sanctions bill, and the expediency in which we are moving forward. While we can’t, in this bill, undo all of the harm caused by the foreign policy of the Obama administration, we can work to correct course, and I am glad we are doing so in a bipartisan way. Last night’s vote was a sign of unity, and I am looking forward to getting this legislation through the Senate and onto the President’s desk.

Mr. President, I wish to take a moment and talk about the Saudi arms sale, which we will be voting on this afternoon at about 2:30 or in that timeframe. We know Saudi Arabia remains under threat from the violent ambitions of Iran, which I just got through speaking about, but that is not just a threat to us, it is a threat in the region, particularly to Sunni allies like Saudi Arabia.

A stronger Saudi Arabia will provide a powerful deterrent to Iranian aggression. This particular sale of weapons, announced by the President when he was in Saudi Arabia a couple weeks ago, will help provide greater regional stability to pushing back the advancing tide of Iranian-backed terrorism. It will help against Iranian-backed Houthis’ weak government control, which allows terrorism to flourish in the region.

Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula has been described by U.S. officials as the most active and dangerous affiliate of al-Qaida today, with several thousands of adherents and fighters inside of Yemen supported by the Iranian regime. AQAP, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, has continued to take advantage of the political and security vacuum. This arms sale will also bolster the kingdom’s ability to provide for its own security and continue contributing to counterterrorism operations across the region, thereby reducing the burden on the United States and our own military forces by equipping them to do their own security and not depend on us.

The sale will also help deter regional threats and enhance the kingdom’s ability to protect its borders, contribute to coalition counterterrorism operations, and target bad actors more precisely.

Finally, it will improve the kingdom’s defensive military capabilities. Since 2015, Saudi Arabia has intercepted more than 40 missiles fired at the kingdom by Iranian-backed Houthi militias. Nine of these missiles have struck Saudi territory itself.

I look forward to voting in the 2:30 timeframe this afternoon against the resolution of disapproval filed by our colleague. I think it is important for us to help our allies defend themselves, to fill a power vacuum left that would otherwise be filled by U.S. forces and military effort.

I think it sends a strong message to Iran and their affiliates in the Middle East that we will not stand quietly or stand silently in the face of the continued growth of their terrorist activities and support for terrorist activities around the world.

I yield the floor.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. President, I come to the Senate floor today to express my support for S.J. Res. 42 and my opposition to the transfer of specific defense articles to the Government of Saudi Arabia. I have arrived at this decision after extensive research and careful deliberation. I would like to state very clearly for the record why I have come to this decision. I have decided to support S.J. Res. 42 and oppose the transfer of specific defense articles to Saudi Arabia primarily because of the Saudi Government’s refusal to take specific steps that I repeatedly requested to alleviate the horrible humanitarian suffering in Yemen.

Before I further explain that decision, I would like to explain what is not informing my decision. I am not reflexively opposed to arms sales in general or to Saudi Arabia specifically. On the contrary, after a series of questions are satisfactorily addressed, I believe arm sales to key partners and allies can enable them to more effectively defend our common interests and oppose common threats. After all, the United States cannot and should not employ U.S. military forces in every instance. When the United States and our partners confront common threats, we should encourage and empower regional allies and regional partners to play prominent roles wherever possible. When our partners are defending our common interests, we want them to be as well-equipped and well-trained and effective as possible.

I recognize that despite our differences, the Saudi Government is an important regional security partner for the United States of America. However, when we work through our allies and partners, we shouldn't set aside our national security interests, and we certainly shouldn't set aside our support for universal humanitarian principles. That principle certainly applies to the Saudis and to the situation in Yemen.

My decision today is based neither on an opposition to arms sales in general nor an opposition to arms sales to the Saudis in particular. Instead, my decision today is based primarily on the persistent and misguided refusal of the Saudi Government to take specific steps that I have requested to alleviate some of the humanitarian suffering in Yemen.

My decision should come as a surprise to no one. As I have said on the Senate floor before, the United Nations calls the situation in Yemen the largest humanitarian crisis in the world. According to the U.N.—which, incidentally, our intelligence resources rely on for much of their information—Yemen has almost 19 million people. Two-thirds of the population is in need of humanitarian or protection assistance, including approximately 10 million who require immediate assistance to save or sustain their lives—two-thirds of their population. If that is not a recipe for instability in a dangerous region of the world, I don't know what is. So 17 million people are food-insecure, while 7 million people don't know where their next meal is coming from, and they are at risk of famine.

In addition, according to the U.N. as of yesterday, the World Health Organization reports a cumulative total of over 124,000 suspected cases of cholera and over 900 associated deaths. Cholera is impacting the most vulnerable. In fact, children under the age of 15 account for 28 percent of all deaths.

The situation is growing far worse. An NGO with personnel on the ground in Yemen tells my office that the large majority of these cholera cases have taken place since late April. Perhaps the most heartbreaking statistic is that a child under the age of 5 dies of preventable causes every 10 minutes in Yemen.

Throughout this process, rather than just mourning this terrible situation, I have tried to identify tangible steps that can save lives, that can lead to a political settlement in Yemen, and that can enhance both regional and national security interests of the United States. In the case of Yemen, it became clear quickly that there were specific steps the Saudis could take to help alleviate the horrible humanitarian situation in Yemen.

Based on that realization back in April—April 27, I led a nine-member, bipartisan letter to the incoming Saudi Ambassador, noting the important security partnership between the United States and the Government of Saudi

Arabia and Saudi Arabia's role as a regional leader. I asked Riyadh to take some specific steps related to Yemen that would prevent thousands or even millions of additional people from dying there. Among several requests, I asked the Saudis to permit the delivery of U.S.-funded cranes to the Port of Hodeidah that would dramatically improve the ability to offload humanitarian supplies there. That is important because the Port of Hodeidah processes roughly 70 to 80 percent of all of the food and other critical imports that come into the country of Yemen. This is the port that supplies people who are in the most desperate need of food and medical attention.

I also asked Riyadh to address unnecessary additional delays that the Saudi-led coalition was causing for humanitarian and commercial supplies going into that port. Not receiving a satisfactory response, I subsequently raised these issues directly with the Saudi Foreign Minister when he met with me and other Senators here on Capitol Hill. Still not receiving a satisfactory answer, we have continued to raise these requests repeatedly with the Saudi Embassy. As recently as yesterday, the Saudis have refused to be responsive on the cranes. Further, in the face of clear evidence from the United Nations to the contrary, the Saudis have even denied a role in causing delays of humanitarian and commercial shipments into Yemen. So for almost 2 months, the Saudis have failed to take my requests seriously.

For those who are new to this issue, perhaps this discussion of cranes and delays at ports seems a bit wonkish—maybe in the weeds. Yet in a humanitarian situation as dire as Yemen—with a child under 5 dying of preventable diseases every 10 minutes—every shipment of food or fuel, every day of delay can have life-and-death implications. The Saudis know this, yet they have been unresponsive to my requests.

There is no doubt that the Iranians and the Houthis are up to no good in Yemen. There is no doubt that Saudi Arabia has the right to defend its borders, and there is also no doubt that this situation in Yemen is complex. But it is a false choice to suggest that we have to choose between opposing Iran and helping the millions of suffering people in Yemen. I believe we have a moral responsibility and a national security imperative to do all we can to help the people in Yemen who are starving, who need medicine, who are dying.

The longer this war in Yemen continues, the more we will drive the Houthis into the arms of the Iranians. The more leverage the Iranians and the Russians will gain in Yemen, the more terrorist groups like al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula will thrive.

Perhaps the Saudi Government isn't concerned about my vote. Perhaps they think this issue will just blow over, that attention will wane, that Senators will lose interest. I recognize I am just

one Senator with just one vote, but I would caution the Saudi Government against such a view. I am not going to be losing interest in this issue anytime soon.

To the Saudis I say this: When I make a request and your government is unresponsive—at least as far as I am concerned—there will be consequences for that decision. My vote demonstrates that fact.

To my colleagues, I respectfully say that America's support should never be unconditional. It is in our interests and it is consistent with the humanitarian values that we profess to demand that the Saudis take some of these steps to alleviate humanitarian suffering in Yemen. For this reason, I am going to vote in support of S.J. Res. 42 today, and I urge my colleagues, Republican and Democrat, to do the same.

Thank you, Mr. President.

I yield the floor.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.

MR. SANDERS. Mr. President, I rise to speak in support of the Murphy-Paul-Franken resolution of disapproval and to outline my concerns about the unfettered sale of arms to Saudi Arabia. The Saudi-led war in Yemen has created a humanitarian disaster in one of the region's poorest countries. Many thousands of civilians have been killed, many more made homeless, and millions are at risk of starvation, according to the United Nations refugee agency. The chaos in Yemen has also been strategically disastrous for the United States, providing fertile ground for extremist groups like al-Qaida and ISIS and creating new opportunities for Iranian intervention.

In addition to being morally indefensible and strategically shortsighted, the Trump administration's unconditional support for the Saudi coalition, including billions of dollars in arms sales, risks dragging the United States into yet another war in the Middle East.

These are the reasons I strongly support the resolution of disapproval offered by my colleagues and their effort to block some of these arms sales to Saudi Arabia.

I also think it is long past time that we begin to take a very hard look at our relationship with Saudi Arabia. This is a country that is run by a hereditary monarchy in which women are treated as third-class citizens.

I would like to mention for a moment the case of Loujain Alhathloul, a Saudi Arabian human rights activist who was arrested at King Fahd International Airport on June 4. She has been an advocate for women's rights in Saudi Arabia.

In 2014, she was arrested for defying the country's ban—are you ready for this—on women drivers and imprisoned for 73 days.

In 2015, she ran as a candidate in a local council election—the third in the nation's modern history and the first in which women were allowed to both

vote and run—even though her name was never added to the ballot.

More recently, Alhathloul criticized a Saudi Government-sponsored women's empowerment summit, which was attended by Ivanka Trump, for its lack of inclusiveness.

While she has now been released from jail—and I am very glad to hear that—this is no way to treat a peaceful dissident. The human rights organization Amnesty International reported that during her detention, Alhathloul was not allowed access to an attorney, nor was allowed to speak to her family.

Finally and perhaps more significantly, it is important that here on the floor of the Senate, we begin to discuss the decades-long effort by Saudi Arabia to export an ultra-reactionary form of Islam throughout the world.

A recent piece in the *Boston Globe* by Stephen Kinzer, a journalist who has covered the Middle East for many years—Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have his article printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the *Boston Globe*, June 11, 2017]

SAUDI ARABIA IS DESTABILIZING THE WORLD

(By Stephen Kinzer)

Just a few months ago, the governor of Indonesia's largest city, Jakarta, seemed headed for easy reelection despite the fact that he is a Christian in a mostly Muslim country. Suddenly everything went violently wrong. Using the pretext of an offhand remark the governor made about the Koran, masses of enraged Muslims took to the streets to denounce him. In short order he lost the election, was arrested, charged with blasphemy, and sentenced to two years in prison.

This episode is especially alarming because Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim country, has long been one of its most tolerant. Indonesian Islam, like most belief systems on that vast archipelago, is syncretic, gentle, and open-minded. The stunning fall of Jakarta's governor reflects the opposite: intolerance, sectarian hatred, and contempt for democracy. Fundamentalism is surging in Indonesia. This did not happen naturally.

Saudi Arabia has been working for decades to pull Indonesia away from moderate Islam and toward the austere Wahhabi form that is state religion in Saudi Arabia. The Saudis' campaign has been patient, multi-faceted, and lavishly financed. It mirrors others they have waged in Muslim countries across Asia and Africa.

Successive American presidents have assured us that Saudi Arabia is our friend and wishes us well. Yet we know that Osama bin Laden and most of his 9/11 hijackers were Saudis, and that, as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton wrote in a diplomatic cable eight years ago, "Donors in Saudi Arabia constitute the most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide."

Recent events in Indonesia shine a light on a Saudi project that is even more pernicious than financing terrorists. Saudi Arabia has used its wealth, much of which comes from the United States, to turn entire nations into hotbeds of radical Islam. By refusing to protest or even officially acknowledge this far-reaching project, we finance our own assassins—and global terror.

The center of Saudi Arabia's campaign to convert Indonesians to Wahhabi Islam is a

tuition-free university in Jakarta known by the acronym LIPIA. All instruction is in Arabic, given mainly by preachers from Saudi Arabia and nearby countries. Genders are kept apart; strict dress codes are enforced; and music, television, and "loud laughter" are forbidden. Students learn an ultra-conservative form of Islam that favors hand amputation for thieves, stoning for adulterers, and death for gays and blasphemers.

Many of the students come from the more than 100 boarding schools Saudi Arabia supports in Indonesia, or have attended one of the 150 mosques that Saudis have built there. The most promising are given scholarships to study in Saudi Arabia, from which they return fully prepared to wreak social, political, and religious havoc in their homeland. Some promote terror groups like Hamas Indonesia and the Islamic Defenders Front, which did not exist before the Saudis arrived.

Eager to press his advantage, King Salman of Saudi Arabia made a nine-day trip to Indonesia in March, accompanied by an entourage of 1,500. The Saudis agreed to allow more than 200,000 Indonesians to make the hajj pilgrimage to Mecca each year—more than come from any other country—and sought permission to open new branches of their LIPIA university. Some Indonesians are pushing back against the Saudi assault on their traditional values, but it is difficult to deny permission for new religious schools when the state is not able to provide decent secular alternatives. In Indonesia, as in other countries where the Saudis are actively promoting Wahhabism—including Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bosnia—the weakness and corruption of central governments create pools of rootless unemployed who are easily seduced by the promises of free food and a place in God's army.

The surging fundamentalism that is transforming Indonesia teaches several lessons. First is one that we should already have learned, about the nature of the Saudi government. It is an absolute monarchy supported by one of the world's most reactionary religious sects. It gives clerics large sums to promote their anti-Western, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic brand of religious militancy abroad. In exchange, the clerics refrain from criticizing the Saudi monarchy or its thousands of high-living princes. Saudis with close ties to the ruling family give crucial support to groups like Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and ISIS. This fact should be at the front of our minds whenever we consider our policy toward the Middle East—including when we decide whether to side with the Saudis in their new dispute with neighboring Qatar.

Saudi Arabia's success in reshaping Indonesia shows the importance of the global battle over ideas. Many in Washington consider spending for cultural and other "soft power" projects to be wasteful. The Saudis feel differently. They pour money and resources into promoting their world view. We should do the same.

The third lesson that today's Indonesia teaches is about the vulnerability of democracy. In 1998 Indonesia's repressive military dictatorship gave way to a new system, based on free elections, that promised civil and political rights for all. Radical preachers who would previously have been imprisoned for whipping up religious hatred found themselves free to spread their poison. Democracy enables them to forge giant mobs that demand death for apostates. Their political parties campaign in democratic elections for the right to come to power and crush democracy. This is a sobering reality for those who believe that one political system is best for all countries under all circumstances.

The Saudi campaign to radicalize global Islam also shows that earth-shaking events often happen slowly and quietly. The press, focused intently on reporting today's news, often misses deeper and more important stories. Historians of journalism sometimes point to the northward "great migration" of African-Americans after World War II as an epochal story that few journalists noticed because it was a slow process rather than one-day news event.

The same is true of Saudi Arabia's long campaign to pull the world's 1.8 billion Muslims back to the 7th century. We barely notice it, but every day, from Mumbai to Manchester, we feel its effects.

Mr. SANDERS. Mr. President, this article by Mr. Kinzer used the example—this is just one example—of Indonesia to demonstrate the incredibly negative impact Saudi financing has had in many places around the world.

I will quote from his article:

Saudi Arabia has been working for decades to pull Indonesia away from moderate Islam and toward the austere Wahhabi form that is state religion in Saudi Arabia. The Saudis' campaign has been patient, multi-faceted, and lavishly financed. It mirrors others they have waged in Muslim countries across Asia and Africa.

Successive American presidents have assured us that Saudi Arabia is our friend and wishes us well. Yet we know that Osama bin Laden and most of his 9/11 hijackers were Saudis, and that, as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton wrote in a diplomatic cable eight years ago, "Donors in Saudi Arabia constitute the most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide."

Recent events in Indonesia shine a light on a Saudi project that is even more pernicious than financing terrorists. Saudi Arabia has used its wealth, much of which comes from the United States, to turn entire nations into hotbeds of radical Islam. By refusing to protest or even officially acknowledge this far-reaching project, we finance our own assassins—and global terror.

That is the end of a quote from that excellent article from the *Boston Globe*.

We all understand that there are times when we must work with problematic governments in order to advance our security goals, but for far too long, we have been giving a pass to a government in Saudi Arabia that supports ideas and policies that are fundamentally at odds with American values and that have led to extremely negative consequences for American security.

I think the time has come for the Congress to take a very hard look at this relationship and assess whether it is actually serving the interests and values of the American people.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. RUBIO). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I take the floor to strenuously argue against

the proposition being pushed by Senators PAUL, MURPHY, and others to deny arms sales of about \$500 million to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The package they are trying to exclude from the \$110 billion arms deal is precision-guided munitions that would be used by the F-15s, a package of Joint Direct Attack Munitions, Paveway laser-guided bombs for Saudi Tornado and Typhoon aircraft. The bottom line is, the package we are talking about are precision weapons the Saudi Air Force and military could use in operations against Iran's proxy in Yemen and other threats that continue to plague us.

The flaws of the Saudi Government are real. They are known to me. My friends on the other side, particularly Senator PAUL, constantly put Saudi Arabia and Iran on the same footing. I think that is a very unwise analysis.

To suggest that Saudi Arabia is as bad as Iran is just missing the point, big time. The Iranian bureaucracy is the most destabilizing force in the Mideast. They have aggressively pursued military action through proxies and have been directly involved in military actions in Syria. Iran's efforts to dominate Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and now Yemen have to be pushed back.

Here is what Secretary Mattis said about this proposal when I asked him the question: How would Iran view passage of this proposal limiting precision-guided weapons to the Saudis by Congress? He stated: "I believe Iran would be appreciative of us not selling these weapons to Saudi Arabia."

That is pretty direct. Iran would be really happy.

On September 21, 2016, 71 U.S. Senators supported a tank sale to Saudi Arabia. The vote was 71 to 27. In other words, 71 U.S. Senators rejected RAND PAUL's proposal to stop the sale of tanks. I would argue that a tank is not nearly as much of a precision weapon as the weapons we are talking about here to be given to the Saudi Air Force. If we are worried about collateral damage in Yemen, I understand the concern. Precision weapons would help that cause, not hurt it.

We have to understand whom we are dealing with in Yemen. We are dealing with Iran. Saudi Arabia has a border with Yemen. The Iranians are backing a force called the Houthis to bring down a pro-Western government in Yemen. From a Saudi perspective, everywhere you look you see Iran encroaching throughout the Mideast.

The bureaucracy in Iran is the biggest threat to the world order, and that is saying a lot, given the way the world is. I say that with confidence because what Iran is doing is trying to destabilize the Mideast in an unprecedented fashion. Our Arab allies are tired of it, and now is the time to stand with them—with their imperfections—against Iran and their hostilities.

This \$500 million chunk of the \$110 billion weapons sale is absolutely essential to the Saudi Air Force to get

these weapons, not only to minimize casualties but to win the fight against the aggressive nature of Iran in Yemen and other places.

I don't know where we are going with Iran, but the President has said the current nuclear deal is absolutely a terrible deal. He is right. This deal locks in a march toward a nuclear weapon by the Iranians if they don't cheat. They don't have to cheat. In 10 or 15 years, the agreement allows them to enrich and reprocess without limitation, so this deal has to be replaced.

I hope we don't go to war with anyone, but if we go to war, I want allies that are capable to help us in the fight. We complain about our Arab allies not doing enough. When they want to do more, we say no to them. Guess what. No wonder people believe America is an unreliable partner. We say one thing and do another.

To my Democratic colleagues: You were OK with voting to help President Obama increase the capability of the Saudi Army at a time when it was in our national security interest. What has changed between September 21 and today? What geopolitical situation has changed that all of a sudden Iran is no longer the threat they were in September of last year and Saudi Arabia is less reliable? Nothing, other than the election of Donald Trump. I have been a critic of Donald Trump—President Trump—when I thought it was necessary for the good of the country, but all I can say is, this wholesale defection by Democrats really is disturbing. It is undermining, I think, our national security interests when it comes to containing Iran. It is sending the worst possible signal we could be sending to our Arab allies at a time when we need them the most. I don't question people's motives; I question their judgment.

Here is my problem. I had no problem helping President Obama because I believe Saudi is the bulwark against Iranian expansion. Our allies in Saudi Arabia are imperfect, but they do share intelligence with us, they are in the fight, and we need to help them because it is in our interest to help them. You had absolutely no problem helping them when it was President Obama's idea. Everything Trump you seem to be against. That is absolutely disappointing, and quite frankly despicable.

To my Republican colleagues: RAND PAUL has been consistent. I respect his consistency. I just completely disagree with him. If you think containing Iran and keeping them from toppling Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon is not in our national interest, you are making a huge mistake. The last thing we want is the Iranian Ayatollah to march through the Mideast and start spreading his form of radical Shi'ism in the backyards of all of our Arab allies.

So I cannot urge this body more to reject this ill-conceived idea. It is \$500 million out of a \$110 billion package. It is the kind of weapons that will matter

on the battlefield. It will lessen civilian casualties, which is a noble goal, and will also give capabilities to the Saudis to more effectively contain Iran that is marching through Yemen, through their proxies, the Houthis.

General Mattis—Secretary Mattis has it right. Iran would be appreciative of our not selling those weapons to Saudi Arabia.

We are going to sanction Iran this week, I hope, for what they have done outside of the nuclear agreement. Since the nuclear agreement was passed, they have humiliated our sailors. They captured them on the high seas and humiliated them. I don't remember Saudi Arabia doing that. They are test-firing missiles in the violation of a U.N. resolution that could destroy Israel and one day reach us and our allies throughout the Mideast and Europe. They are spreading their form of radical Shi'ism all through the world, all through the Mideast. The money they received from the Iranian nuclear deal is not going to build roads, bridges, and hospitals, it is increasing the lethality of the IRG and other Iranian combatant units.

What we are trying to do and what President Trump is trying to do is give our allies the ability to contain the threat which is in our interest. Sanctioning Iran and denying Saudi Arabia the weapons they need to defend themselves and others against Iran is pretty inconsistent.

There is a military necessity for these weapons. It will change the equation on the battlefield. It is in our interest that Iran lose this effort to take over Yemen and destabilize the Mideast at large. You have to remember that these are the same people—the Iranians—who built lethal IEDs and injected them into Iraq—IEDs that killed many, many American soldiers. This is the same regime that took over our Embassy years ago, humiliated our sailors, and chants "death to America and Israel" on a regular basis. Yet here we are, sitting as a legislative body, contemplating our not helping an ally who is willing to fight the threat that is posed by Iran in the Mideast. All I can say is that on September 21, 2016, almost every Democrat saw this as a good move to help Saudi Arabia.

Now almost all of you are voting against an arms package that is more necessary today than it was in 2016. The only change is that we have a new President whom you hate.

I was not a big fan of President Obama's, but when I thought it was right, I stood with him. President Trump is right to increase the capability of the Saudi military to deal with the Iranian aggression. There is no bigger threat to the Middle East and America, I believe, than this Iranian regime in the hands of an ayatollah who is really a religious Nazi.

So I hope you will vote for what is best for America, which is to empower our allies to contain threats that we commonly enjoy. We enjoy the experience of being in the crosshairs of the

Ayatollah. They want to destroy the royal family in Saudi Arabia. They want to destroy Israel, and they want to destroy us. So the idea that we are not going to help an ally that is willing to fight is just inconceivable, and the idea that we are going to vote no for an arms package because Trump is President—and all of you over there voted yes before—is disappointing.

To my Republican colleagues, if you really think Iran is a threat, do not vote with Senator PAUL because you are sending the wrong signal.

I yield the floor.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, while my friend's remarks on the motives of Democrats are fresh in people's minds, let me address this directly. There is a new President today, but there is a different policy, and that is what this resolution is about. Let me be very clear about what we are talking about today.

Senator GRAHAM would have you believe that we are about to vote on the entirety of the \$110 billion in arms sales that was proposed—that was unveiled—by President Trump during his visit to Saudi Arabia. That is not the case. We are voting today on \$500 million of that \$110 billion sale. You can still be friends with Saudi Arabia and sell it \$109.5 billion worth of arms rather than \$110 billion worth of arms. The specific set of arms that we are talking about—precision-guided munitions that are going to be used to perpetuate the Saudi bombing campaign in Yemen—was the specific set of weapons that the Obama administration refused to transfer to the Saudis at the end of 2016. We did not take a vote on this in 2016. We took a vote on a different arms sale.

It is not simply that there is a new President and that Democrats are objecting to the arms sale that President Trump is moving forward with. It is that we have a new policy. This specific set of munitions that President Trump is asking us to consent to is one that President Obama would not sell. The policy is different, not just the personnel. Let's talk about why the policy is different.

What is happening today in Yemen is a humanitarian catastrophe of epic proportions. There are four famines that exist in the world today. One of them is in Yemen, and only one of those four is caused, in part, by the United States. The United States supports the Saudi-led bombing campaign that has had the effect of causing a humanitarian nightmare to play out in that country such that 8 million people right now in Yemen are in starvation or are on the brink of starvation. Last week, we received word that 100,000 people in Yemen now have cholera. Cholera? All of this is directly a result of the civil war.

The reason that the Obama administration decided not to transfer the precision-guided munitions to the Saudis is that the Saudis were using the weap-

ons we were giving them in order to deliberately target humanitarian infrastructure and civilian infrastructure inside Yemen. The Saudis have made it pretty clear that time is on their side, that they can wait out the Yemeni population and drive it to the negotiating table. They suggest that this humanitarian catastrophe, ultimately, accrues to their benefit because it eventually will push the Houthis into supporting a better deal than they would have otherwise for the Saudis.

Let me give you some direct evidence of how this bombing campaign is leading to the humanitarian crisis.

This cholera outbreak, which has been covered in the news, began, in part, because the Saudi airstrikes were targeting water treatment facilities inside Sanaa. This is independent reporting from relief agencies that operate on the ground inside Yemen that tell us that the Saudi bombing campaign that has targeted civilian infrastructure—in this case, water treatment facilities—has led to the cholera outbreak.

It continues. The bombing campaign that is leading to this catastrophe continues. The reason the Obama administration would not sell them this specific set of arms is that it did not have confidence that the arms would be used to hit purely military targets.

What we are asking for is to hold off on selling these precision-guided munitions until we get some clear promise—some clear assurance—from the Saudis that they are going to use these munitions only for military purposes and that they are going to start taking steps—real steps, tangible steps—to address the humanitarian crisis.

Senator YOUNG has been very articulate on the things that the Saudis are doing to stop—to halt—to slow the flow of relief supplies into Yemen today. There are some proactive things the Saudis could do, which they are not, that could save millions of lives inside Yemen today.

More broadly, I think this is an important moment for U.S. policy in the Middle East. The Saudis are our friends. They are an important, stabilizing presence in the Middle East. They have helped to broker a kind of detente between Sunni nations and Israel, our sacred ally. They cooperate with us on counterterrorism measures. They share intelligence with us. Clearly, we have an important economic relationship, but they are an imperfect partner.

This body should have a debate as to whether it is in the national security interests of the United States to get drawn more deeply into the set of proxy wars that is playing out in the region between the Sunnis and the Shia. That proxy battle plays out in Yemen; it plays out in Syria; and it plays out in other ways in places like Lebanon. Just because you have a friend does not mean that you have to back every single one of your friend's fights. If my friend asks me to hand him a rock to throw at the neighbor-

hood kids, I am not going to do it, but if he wants me to help him stand up to the neighborhood bully, then maybe I will be there for him. Even with your friends you decide what fights you join them in and what fights you don't.

In Yemen, it is not just I who is making the argument that the civil war is accruing to the detriment of U.S. national security interests; it is a broad swath of foreign policy experts and Middle East experts in this city and across this country and across the globe. Why? It is that this civil war is radicalizing the Yemeni people against the United States. They do not perceive this bombing campaign that is killing thousands of civilians as a Saudi bombing campaign. They perceive it as a U.S.-Saudi bombing campaign.

Just get your intelligence briefing, and look at the difference in the amount of space that AQAP controls today versus what it controlled before the civil war began. AQAP, which is the arm of al-Qaida that has the most capability to hit the United States, has grown exponentially in terms of the territory it controls. ISIS has grown as well. These extremist groups take advantage of the civil war, and if our priority in the region is really about defeating these organizations, then this civil war is not helping in that effort. Civilians are dying; extremist groups are growing; and the Yemeni population is being radicalized against us.

To exacerbate matters, the Trump administration has walked away from the political process. Secretary Kerry was actively involved in trying to bring the Houthis and the Saudi-backed government together. He got close to an agreement, but it fell apart. This administration has not restarted that process. For those who want to throw more arms into this contest, I think it is hard to believe that, ultimately, it will lead to any cease-fire or any peaceful transition to a new government if the United States is totally absent from the negotiating table as we are today.

This is not about objecting to the entirety of the sale, and this is not about delivering a broader message to the Saudis. This is about saying that this specific conflict in Yemen is not going well and is hurting the United States. Until we get some real assurances from the Saudis that they are going to pay attention to the "no strike" list, until we get some commitments from the Saudis that they are going to let relief supplies flow into Yemen to address the famine and address the cholera outbreak, then let's press pause on this small slice of this arms sale.

I am proud to join with Senator PAUL and others, and I hope that my colleagues will see fit to support it when we vote in about an hour and a half.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, before we recess for the caucus lunches, I wish to comment on the upcoming vote on a resolution of disapproval regarding a portion of President Trump's recent arms sales to Saudi Arabia. I have announced that I am in favor of the resolution of disapproval for several reasons.

First, the human rights and humanitarian concerns have been well documented with respect to Yemen. Yemen's story in the Middle East is a tragic one. Yemen's previous President ruled the country for decades with an iron fist and fleeced the country of its resources for his personal gain. He also allowed terrorist groups to enjoy safe haven in Yemen in the days after 9/11.

Today, Yemen remains a country in dire straits. It is on the verge of a famine, and there have been over 100,000 cases of cholera.

To make matters worse, the current conflict in Yemen, which includes the Saudi military, has worsened the humanitarian situation. Selling the kingdom precision weapons in this deal could further exacerbate the crisis.

Second, and of equal concern to me, is an area that hasn't been talked about much in this debate; that is, that the Saudi Government continues to aid and abet terrorism via its support and funding of schools that spread extremist Wahhabi propaganda. Saudi Arabia's support for these Wahhabi madrassas goes back decades. It is responsible for much of the radicalization of Muslim youth in the Middle East and North Africa.

In the past several months, we have witnessed lone-wolf attacks in London and in Tehran and elsewhere around the globe. Though the nature of terrorism has changed, many of the sources are the same. The propagation of Wahhabism, an extreme ideology, continues to fuel radicalism and terrorism around the globe. So if we want to get serious about cracking down on terrorism, the United States should focus—one of the focuses should be—on countering the spread of Wahhabism.

The White House has not clearly articulated how the United States will put pressure on Saudi Arabia to end their support of Wahhabi schools, even as it claims that President Trump's recent visit to Riyadh was focused on curtailing terrorism. Furthermore, the administration has not sufficiently assured Congress that these weapons will not fall into the wrong hands.

Look at Pakistan. It has become a radical place—it wasn't 15 years ago—in good part because of Saudi funding—Saudi individuals who are a good part of the government, some who are friends with the government—of these madrassas, which taught radicalism to the Pakistani people.

Look at Indonesia, one of the largest countries in the world. It had usually

practiced a form of Islam that was mild and tolerant. The Wahhabi schools are now flourishing in Indonesia, and it is becoming a radical place of danger to us.

We have to send a message to Saudi Arabia.

They do some good things. I support their putting pressure, for instance, on the Palestinian Authority to finally make peace with Israel. But they do a lot of bad things. It seems there has almost been a rotten deal between the Saudi monarchy and the Wahhabi clerics to work together. It has to end.

My vote for this resolution of disapproval hopefully can send a message to the Saudis that their behavior in regard to Wahhabism must change. It is hurting the world and eventually will hurt them.

I yield the floor.

RECESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate stands in recess until 2:15 p.m.

Thereupon, the Senate, at 12:33 p.m., recessed until 2:15 p.m. and reassembled when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. STRANGE).

MOTION TO DISCHARGE—S.J. RES. 42—Continued

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there will now be 10 minutes of debate remaining on the motion to discharge S.J. Res. 42, equally divided between Senator PAUL or his designee and the opponents of the motion.

Who yields time?

The Senator from Arizona.

Mr. MCCAIN. Mr. President, I rise to speak in opposition to the resolution before us.

It has obviously been tried before, and I think there is no doubt that if it were to pass, this could pose a very dangerous threat to our relationship with Saudi Arabia at a time when the Iranians have now achieved a peninsula all the way across from Tehran all the way to Baghdad, and there is no doubt that the Iranians have continued their aggressive behavior.

If we vote down this arms sale to Saudi Arabia, it would have a devastating effect on our standing in the Middle East and a long-term impact on our ability to counter what is clearly Iranian aggressive behavior. So I strongly urge my colleagues to vote against this resolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I wish to join with Senator MCCAIN very quickly.

At 71 to 27, on September 21 of last year, we voted to approve tank sales to Saudi Arabia because they need more weapons and equipment to counter the Iranian aggression in Yemen and other places.

Most of the people who are now going to vote against precision-guided weap-

ons that will reduce civilian casualties voted for tank sales. This \$500 million carved out of this package gives Saudi Arabia a qualitative edge on the battlefield against Iranian proxies who could care less about civilian casualties. It is the most upside-down thinking I have ever seen, and many of you over there actually approved this because it was worked on before President Trump became President. So it is really disheartening to see you support President Obama's tank sales but that you are not going to support President Trump's selling weapons, which gives us an advantage over Iran in Saudi Arabia and actually reduces civilian casualties.

Secretary Mattis said it the best: Iran would appreciate killing this deal and taking these weapons off the table. I urge everybody in here, if you are serious about standing up to Iran, stand with Saudi Arabia, as imperfect as they are.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. PAUL. Mr. President, the question is, Should we sell arms to Saudi Arabia—a country that many suspect was involved in 9/11; a country that many suspect gave weapons to ISIS, the people we are fighting in the Middle East; a country that imprisons the victims of rape because it is apparently or presumably the fault of the woman who is raped in Saudi Arabia?

One woman, the girl of Qatif, was given a sentence of 70 lashes and 6 months in jail. They increased her penalty to 200 lashes, and finally, only when we protested, was it reversed.

They sentenced a poet to 1,000 lashes. Sometimes you don't survive 1,000 lashes. So they gave him 100 at a time. He is going to be imprisoned for 10 years.

They are not the kind of persons we should be sending your weapons to. These weapons were funded and supported by the American taxpayer, and we should not be willy-nilly giving them to people who imprison their people for protesting.

Currently, a young man, 17 years old, named Ali al-Nimr is on death row. But it is not enough just to kill him for protesting for free speech and free press. They will behead him and crucify him.

This barbaric nation should not be getting our weapons. We should not sell them weapons.

Currently, there is a blockade of Yemen, and 17 million people risk starvation. We should not be supporting this effort.

There is probably no greater purveyor of hatred for Christianity and Judaism than Saudi Arabia. We should not be giving them weapons. They have madrassas across the world teaching hatred of us, preaching hatred of the West, hatred of Christianity, hatred of Judaism, and these people want to give them weapons. I don't get it. It makes no sense.

Some will argue that it is a jobs program. Well, isn't that swell. We are

going to give money to people who behead you and crucify you to create jobs. That should never be the way we make a decision about arms sales in our country.

A famous Republican and general, General Dwight Eisenhower, said he worried that someday we would make decisions not based on our defense but based on the military industrial complex.

I am embarrassed that people are out here talking about making us some money and making a buck, while 17 million people live on a starvation diet and are threatened with famine. I am embarrassed that people would bring up trying to feather the nest of corporations in order to sell these weapons. This should be made, pure and simple, on our national defense.

Saudi Arabia is not a reliable ally. Saudi Arabia should not get these weapons. For every supposed good thing they do, they do five things that are bad for America. They are the biggest purveyor of hatred of Christianity and Judaism.

I request a "no" vote, and I reserve the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. PORTMAN). The Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I respect my friend from Kentucky. We work together on the Foreign Relations Committee. I could not disagree more on this issue, and I will give a brief outline.

The Houthis are an Iran-backed entity that overthrew a Western-backed government in Yemen. Last year on the floor, with a vote of 71 votes, this body voted to support the selling of tanks to Saudi Arabia.

Foreign policy partisanship generally stops at the shores. I know Senator PAUL has been very consistent on this, but I am afraid this vote is somewhat about some Members wanting to get a piece of President Trump's hide on an issue that is far more important than something like that. I am fearful that this is what is happening today on the floor.

A lot of people don't realize that Saudi Arabia already has the bombs. What we would be selling to them is the precision-guided weaponry systems that allow these bombs to be smart bombs and not dumb bombs.

Most people have been concerned about Saudi Arabia when they have been involved in pushing back the Houthis, who, by the way, are firing weapons into their country from the southern border. It would be no different than if Mexico were doing that to ours. I know that is not going to happen. But, obviously, we would be firing back. So what is happening here is that they bought the bombs from Italy, and what they want to buy from us is these precision systems that allow them to not kill civilians. It is to protect civilians.

Think about this. Here in the Senate we want to protect civilians in Saudi

Arabia, and in our wisdom we are looking at blocking the sale of the very mechanisms that would allow that to happen—in some cases, I am afraid, just to make a point against the Trump administration.

Actually, their policies here have been very sound. The meeting they had in Saudi Arabia was very beneficial. Saudi Arabia has flaws, but they have been an ally. This would show us as stepping away from an ally in a way that is cutting our nose off to spite our face by not allowing them to have the precision mechanisms to keep them from killing civilians.

We have taken Senators down in the SCIF. There is absolutely no evidence that Saudi Arabia tried to kill civilians—none. As a matter of fact, there is evidence to the contrary. So, please, let's be rational. I know there are disagreements over some foreign policy issues. This should not be one of them. I urge defeat of this proposal.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. PAUL. Mr. President, Saudi Arabia bombed a funeral procession. There was no mistake here. There was no cloud cover. There was no growth or coppice of trees and they accidentally bombed a funeral procession. They bombed them and killed 125 civilians in a funeral. They wounded 500. This was no mistake. This was no error. This was them, pointedly dropping bombs on civilians.

They put protestors in jail. They have a 17-year-old—he is now 20—who has been in jail for 3 years. He will be beheaded and then crucified. We should not be giving these people weapons. They supported ISIS. They are on the wrong side of the war. They are the greatest purveyor of hatred for Christianity and Judaism. They do not deserve your weapons. They are going to give your weapons. They belong to the American people. They are going to give them to people who behead and crucify protestors.

You can't take a Bible into Saudi Arabia. You can't visit their major cities.

We can't make them be like us, but we don't have to encourage their behavior by giving them weapons that may well fall into the hands of people who are our enemies.

I urge a "no" vote. I think we should not be selling arms to Saudi Arabia.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired.

The question is on agreeing to the motion to discharge.

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. I ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There appears to be a sufficient second.

The clerk will call the roll.

The senior assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

The result was announced—yeas 47, nays 53, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 143 Leg.]

YEAS—47

Baldwin	Harris	Paul
Bennet	Hassan	Peters
Blumenthal	Heinrich	Reed
Booker	Heitkamp	Sanders
Brown	Heller	Schatz
Cantwell	Hirono	Schumer
Cardin	Kaine	Shaheen
Carper	King	Stabenow
Casey	Klobuchar	Tester
Coons	Leahy	Udall
Cortez Masto	Lee	Van Hollen
Duckworth	Markey	Warren
Durbin	Menendez	Whitehouse
Feinstein	Merkley	Wyden
Franken	Murphy	Young
Gillibrand	Murray	

NAYS—53

Alexander	Fischer	Nelson
Barrasso	Flake	Perdue
Blunt	Gardner	Portman
Boozman	Graham	Risch
Burr	Grassley	Roberts
Capito	Hatch	Rounds
Cassidy	Hoeven	Rubio
Cochran	Inhofe	Sasse
Collins	Isakson	Scott
Corker	Johnson	Shelby
Cornyn	Kennedy	Strange
Cotton	Lankford	Sullivan
Crapo	Manchin	Sullivan
Cruz	McCain	Thune
Daines	McCaskill	Tillis
Donnelly	McConnell	Toomey
Enzi	Moran	Warner
Ernst	Murkowski	Wicker

The motion was rejected.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.

ORDER OF PROCEDURE

Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the McConnell second-degree amendment No. 233 be withdrawn; that the pending cloture motion with respect to amendment No. 232 be withdrawn; that the amendment be modified with the technical changes at the desk; and that at 2 p.m., Wednesday, June 14, the Senate vote on adoption of the McConnell for Crapo amendment No. 232, as modified, with no intervening action or debate and no second-degree amendments in order to amendment No. 232 prior to the vote; finally, that following leader remarks on Wednesday, June 14, the time until 2 p.m. be equally divided in the usual form.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I will not object, but I reserve the right to object.

First, I want to thank the majority leader, as well as Senators CORKER, CARDIN, CRAPO, and BROWN. This is another example of how we can work together on issues we agree on. I am very proud of this bill. I think it will do a lot of good in both directions—in the Iran direction and particularly in the Russia direction. The lack of trust of Mr. Putin on both sides of the aisle here is paramount. Now this says that these sanctions will stay in place unless Congress disapproves them and adds some new sanctions—both good things. I hope the House will pass the bill without change and send it to the President's desk.

With that, I withdraw any objection and again thank the majority leader for the cooperation we have had.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment (No. 232), as modified, is as follows:

On page 33, line 7, strike “subsection (a)” and insert “subsection (b)”.

On page 33, line 15, strike “subsection (a)” and insert “subsection (b)”.

On page 47, line 18, strike “The President” and insert “Except as provided in subsection (b), the President”.

On page 47, line 22, insert “(other than subsection (b))” after “this Act”.

At the end, add the following:

TITLE II—SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND COMBATING TERRORISM AND ILLICIT FINANCING

SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the “Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017”.

Subtitle A—Sanctions and Other Measures With Respect to the Russian Federation

SEC. 211. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) On March 6, 2014, President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13660 (79 Fed. Reg. 13493; relating to blocking property of certain persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine), which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to impose sanctions on those determined to be undermining democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine or threatening the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine. President Obama subsequently issued Executive Order 13661 (79 Fed. Reg. 15535; relating to blocking property of additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine) and Executive Order 13662 (79 Fed. Reg. 16169; relating to blocking property of additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine) to expand sanctions on certain persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine.

(2) On December 18, 2014, the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 was enacted (Public Law 113-272; 22 U.S.C. 8921 et seq.), which includes provisions directing the President to impose sanctions on foreign persons that the President determines to be entities owned or controlled by the Government of the Russian Federation or nationals of the Russian Federation that manufacture, sell, transfer, or otherwise provide certain defense articles into Syria.

(3) On April 1, 2015, President Obama issued Executive Order 13694 (80 Fed. Reg. 18077; relating to blocking the property of certain persons engaging in significant malicious cyber-enabled activities), which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of State, to impose sanctions on persons determined to be engaged in malicious cyber-hacking.

(4) On July 26, 2016, President Obama approved a Presidential Policy Directive on United States Cyber Incident Coordination, which states, “certain cyber incidents that have significant impacts on an entity, our national security, or the broader economy require a unique approach to response efforts”.

(5) On December 29, 2016, President Obama issued an annex to Executive Order 13694, which authorized sanctions on the following entities and individuals:

(A) The Main Intelligence Directorate (also known as Glavnoe Razvedyvatel'noe

Upravlenie or the GRU) in Moscow, Russian Federation.

(B) The Federal Security Service (also known as Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti or the FSB) in Moscow, Russian Federation.

(C) The Special Technology Center (also known as STLC, Ltd. Special Technology Center St. Petersburg) in St. Petersburg, Russian Federation.

(D) Zorsecurity (also known as Esage Lab) in Moscow, Russian Federation.

(E) The autonomous noncommercial organization known as the Professional Association of Designers of Data Processing Systems (also known as ANO PO KSI) in Moscow, Russian Federation.

(F) Igor Valentinovich Korobov.

(G) Sergey Aleksandrovich Gizunov.

(H) Igor Olegovich Kostyukov.

(I) Vladimir Stepanovich Alexseyev.

(6) On January 6, 2017, an assessment of the United States intelligence community entitled, “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections” stated, “Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the United States presidential election.” The assessment warns that “Moscow will apply lessons learned from its Putin-ordered campaign aimed at the U.S. Presidential election to future influence efforts worldwide, including against U.S. allies and their election processes”.

SEC. 212. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that the President—

(1) should engage to the fullest extent possible with partner governments with regard to closing loopholes, including the allowance of extended prepayment for the delivery of goods and commodities and other loopholes, in multilateral and unilateral restrictive measures against the Russian Federation, with the aim of maximizing alignment of those measures; and

(2) should increase efforts to vigorously enforce compliance with sanctions in place as of the date of the enactment of this Act with respect to the Russian Federation in response to the crisis in eastern Ukraine, cyber intrusions and attacks, and human rights violators in the Russian Federation.

PART I—CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF SANCTIONS IMPOSED WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

SEC. 215. SHORT TITLE.

The part may be cited as the “Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017”.

SEC. 216. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF CERTAIN ACTIONS RELATING TO SANCTIONS IMPOSED WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS OF PROPOSED ACTION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, before taking any action described in paragraph (2), the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership a report that describes the proposed action and the reasons for that action.

(2) ACTIONS DESCRIBED.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—An action described in this paragraph is—

(i) an action to terminate the application of any sanctions described in subparagraph (B);

(ii) with respect to sanctions described in subparagraph (B) imposed by the President with respect to a person, an action to waive the application of those sanctions with respect to that person; or

(iii) a licensing action that significantly alters United States' foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation.

(B) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions described in this subparagraph are—

(i) sanctions provided for under—

(I) this title or any provision of law amended by this title, including the Executive Orders codified under section 222;

(II) the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8901 et seq.); or

(III) the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8921 et seq.); and

(ii) the prohibition on access to the properties of the Government of the Russian Federation located in Maryland and New York that the President ordered vacated on December 29, 2016.

(3) DESCRIPTION OF TYPE OF ACTION.—Each report submitted under paragraph (1) with respect to an action described in paragraph (2) shall include a description of whether the action—

(A) is not intended to significantly alter United States' foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation; or

(B) is intended to significantly alter United States' foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation.

(4) INCLUSION OF ADDITIONAL MATTER.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Each report submitted under paragraph (1) that relates to an action that is intended to achieve a reciprocal diplomatic outcome shall include a description of—

(i) the anticipated reciprocal diplomatic outcome;

(ii) the anticipated effect of the action on the national security interests of the United States; and

(iii) the policy objectives for which the sanctions affected by the action were initially imposed.

(B) REQUESTS FROM BANKING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES COMMITTEES.—The Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate or the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives may request the submission to the Committee of the matter described in clauses (ii) and (iii) of subparagraph (A) with respect to a report submitted under paragraph (1) that relates to an action that is not intended to achieve a reciprocal diplomatic outcome.

(b) PERIOD FOR REVIEW BY CONGRESS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—During the period of 30 calendar days beginning on the date on which the President submits a report under subsection (a)(1)—

(A) in the case of a report that relates to an action that is not intended to achieve a reciprocal diplomatic outcome, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives should, as appropriate, hold hearings and briefings and otherwise obtain information in order to fully review the report; and

(B) in the case of a report that relates to an action that is intended to achieve a reciprocal diplomatic outcome, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives should, as appropriate, hold hearings and briefings and otherwise obtain information in order to fully review the report.

(2) EXCEPTION.—The period for congressional review under paragraph (1) of a report required to be submitted under subsection (a)(1) shall be 60 calendar days if the report is submitted on or after July 10 and on or before September 7 in any calendar year.

(3) LIMITATION ON ACTIONS DURING INITIAL CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW PERIOD.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, during the period for congressional review provided for under paragraph (1) of a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2), including any

additional period for such review as applicable under the exception provided in paragraph (2), the President may not take that action unless a joint resolution of approval with respect to that action is enacted in accordance with subsection (c).

(4) **LIMITATION ON ACTIONS DURING PRESIDENTIAL CONSIDERATION OF A JOINT RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL.**—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval relating to a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2) passes both Houses of Congress in accordance with subsection (c), the President may not take that action for a period of 12 calendar days after the date of passage of the joint resolution of disapproval.

(5) **LIMITATION ON ACTIONS DURING CONGRESSIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF A JOINT RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL.**—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval relating to a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2) passes both Houses of Congress in accordance with subsection (c), and the President vetoes the joint resolution, the President may not take that action for a period of 10 calendar days after the date of the President's veto.

(6) **EFFECT OF ENACTMENT OF A JOINT RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL.**—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval relating to a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2) is enacted in accordance with subsection (c), the President may not take that action.

(c) **JOINT RESOLUTIONS OF DISAPPROVAL OR APPROVAL DEFINED.**—In this subsection:

(1) **JOINT RESOLUTION OF APPROVAL.**—The term “joint resolution of approval” means only a joint resolution of either House of Congress—

(A) the title of which is as follows: “A joint resolution approving the President’s proposal to take an action relating to the application of certain sanctions with respect to the Russian Federation.”; and

(B) the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is the following: “Congress approves of the action relating to the application of sanctions imposed with respect to the Russian Federation proposed by the President in the report submitted to Congress under section 216(a)(1) of the Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017 on _____ relating to _____”, with the first blank space being filled with the appropriate date and the second blank space being filled with a short description of the proposed action.

(2) **JOINT RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL.**—The term “joint resolution of disapproval” means only a joint resolution of either House of Congress—

(A) the title of which is as follows: “A joint resolution disapproving the President’s proposal to take an action relating to the application of certain sanctions with respect to the Russian Federation.”; and

(B) the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is the following: “Congress disapproves of the action relating to the application of sanctions imposed with respect to the Russian Federation proposed by the President in the report submitted to Congress under section 216(a)(1) of the Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017 on _____ relating to _____”, with the first blank space being filled with the appropriate date and the second blank space being filled with a short description of the proposed action.

(3) **INTRODUCTION.**—During the period of 30 calendar days provided for under subsection (b)(1), including any additional period as applicable under the exception provided in sub-

section (b)(2), a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval may be introduced—

(A) in the House of Representatives, by the majority leader or the minority leader; and

(B) in the Senate, by the majority leader (or the majority leader’s designee) or the minority leader (or the minority leader’s designee).

(4) **FLOOR CONSIDERATION IN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.**—

(A) **REPORTING AND DISCHARGE.**—If a committee of the House of Representatives to which a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval has been referred has not reported the joint resolution within 10 calendar days after the date of referral, that committee shall be discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution.

(B) **PROCEEDING TO CONSIDERATION.**—Beginning on the third legislative day after each committee to which a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval has been referred reports the joint resolution to the House or has been discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution, it shall be in order to move to proceed to consider the joint resolution in the House. All points of order against the motion are waived. Such a motion shall not be in order after the House has disposed of a motion to proceed on the joint resolution. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the motion to its adoption without intervening motion. The motion shall not be debatable. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is disposed of shall not be in order.

(C) **CONSIDERATION.**—The joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval shall be considered as read. All points of order against the joint resolution and against its consideration are waived. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the joint resolution to final passage without intervening motion except 2 hours of debate equally divided and controlled by the sponsor of the joint resolution (or a designee) and an opponent. A motion to reconsider the vote on passage of the joint resolution shall not be in order.

(5) **CONSIDERATION IN THE SENATE.**—

(A) **COMMITTEE REFERRAL.**—A joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval introduced in the Senate shall be—

(i) referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs if the joint resolution relates to a report under section 216A3 that is described as an action that is not intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation, and

(ii) referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations if the joint resolution relates to a report under section 216A3 that is described as an action that is intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect to the Russian Federation.

(B) **REPORTING AND DISCHARGE.**—If the committee to which a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval was referred has not reported the joint resolution within 10 calendar days after the date of referral of the joint resolution, that committee shall be discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution and the joint resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar.

(C) **PROCEEDING TO CONSIDERATION.**—Notwithstanding Rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, it is in order at any time after the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs or the Committee on Foreign Relations, as the case may be, reports a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval to the Senate or has been discharged from consideration of such a joint resolution (even though a pre-

vious motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) to move to proceed to the consideration of the joint resolution, and all points of order against the joint resolution (and against consideration of the joint resolution) are waived. The motion to proceed is not debatable. The motion is not subject to a motion to postpone. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order.

(D) **RULINGS OF THE CHAIR ON PROCEDURE.**—Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the rules of the Senate, as the case may be, to the procedure relating to a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval shall be decided without debate.

(E) **CONSIDERATION OF VETO MESSAGES.**—Debate in the Senate of any veto message with respect to a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval, including all debatable motions and appeals in connection with the joint resolution, shall be limited to 10 hours, to be equally divided between, and controlled by, the majority leader and the minority leader or their designees.

(6) **RULES RELATING TO SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.**—

(A) **COORDINATION WITH ACTION BY OTHER HOUSE.**—If, before the passage by one House of a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval of that House, that House receives an identical joint resolution from the other House, the following procedures shall apply:

(i) The joint resolution of the other House shall not be referred to a committee.

(ii) With respect to the joint resolution of the House receiving the joint resolution from the other House—

(I) the procedure in that House shall be the same as if no joint resolution had been received from the other House; but

(II) the vote on passage shall be on the joint resolution of the other House.

(B) **TREATMENT OF A JOINT RESOLUTION OF OTHER HOUSE.**—If one House fails to introduce a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval, a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval of the other House shall be entitled to expedited procedures in that House under this subsection.

(C) **TREATMENT OF HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION IN SENATE.**—If, following passage of a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval in the Senate, the Senate receives an identical joint resolution from the House of Representatives, that joint resolution shall be placed on the appropriate Senate calendar.

(D) **APPLICATION TO REVENUE MEASURES.**—The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply in the House of Representatives to a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval that is a revenue measure.

(7) **RULES OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE.**—This subsection is enacted by Congress—

(A) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, and as such is deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in that House in the case of a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval, and supersedes other rules only to the extent that it is inconsistent with such rules; and

(B) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.

(d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AND LEADERSHIP DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees and leadership” means—

(1) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Speaker, the majority leader, and the minority leader of the House of Representatives.

PART II—SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

SEC. 221. DEFINITIONS.

In this part:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

(2) GOOD.—The term “good” has the meaning given that term in section 16 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 4618) (as continued in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)).

(3) INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term “international financial institution” has the meaning given that term in section 1701(c) of the International Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(c)).

(4) KNOWINGLY.—The term “knowingly”, with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that a person has actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result.

(5) PERSON.—The term “person” means an individual or entity.

(6) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term “United States person” means—

(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or

(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.

SEC. 222. CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) CODIFICATION.—United States sanctions provided for in Executive Order 13660 (79 Fed. Reg. 13493; relating to blocking property of certain persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine), Executive Order 13661 (79 Fed. Reg. 15535; relating to blocking property of additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine), Executive Order 13662 (79 Fed. Reg. 16169; relating to blocking property of additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine), Executive Order 13685 (79 Fed. Reg. 77357; relating to blocking property of certain persons and prohibiting certain transactions with respect to the Crimea region of Ukraine), Executive Order 13694 (80 Fed. Reg. 18077; relating to blocking the property of certain persons engaging in significant malicious cyber-enabled activities), and Executive Order 13757 (82 Fed. Reg. 1; relating to taking additional steps to address the national emergency with respect to significant malicious cyber-enabled activities), as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act, including with respect to all persons sanctioned under such Executive Orders, shall remain in effect except as provided in subsection (b).

(b) TERMINATION OF CERTAIN SANCTIONS.—Subject to section 216, the President may terminate the application of sanctions described in subsection (a) that are imposed on

a person in connection with activity conducted by the person if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees a notice that—

(1) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and

(2) the President has received reliable assurances that the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to sanctions described in subsection (a) in the future.

(c) APPLICATION OF NEW CYBER SANCTIONS.—The President may waive the initial application under subsection (a) of sanctions with respect to a person under Executive Order 13694 or 13757 only if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

(1) a written determination that the waiver—

(A) is in the vital national security interests of the United States; or

(B) will further the enforcement of this title; and

(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian Federation has made significant efforts to reduce the number and intensity of cyber intrusions conducted by that Government.

(d) APPLICATION OF NEW UKRAINE-RELATED SANCTIONS.—The President may waive the initial application under subsection (a) of sanctions with respect to a person under Executive Order 13660, 13661, 13662, or 13685 only if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

(1) a written determination that the waiver—

(A) is in the vital national security interests of the United States; or

(B) will further the enforcement of this title; and

(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian Federation is taking steps to implement the Minsk Agreement to address the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, signed in Minsk, Belarus, on February 11, 2015, by the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany, the Minsk Protocol, which was agreed to on September 5, 2014, and any successor agreements that are agreed to by the Government of Ukraine.

SEC. 223. MODIFICATION OF IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 13662.

(a) DETERMINATION THAT CERTAIN ENTITIES ARE SUBJECT TO SANCTIONS.—The Secretary of the Treasury may determine that a person meets one or more of the criteria in section 1(a) of Executive Order 13662 if that person is a state-owned entity operating in the railway, shipping, or metals and mining sector of the economy of the Russian Federation.

(b) MODIFICATION OF DIRECTIVE 1 WITH RESPECT TO THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ECONOMY.—The Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control shall modify Directive 1 (as amended), dated September 12, 2014, issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control under Executive Order 13662, or any successor directive, to ensure that the directive prohibits the conduct by United States persons or persons within the United States of all transactions in, provision of financing for, and other dealings in new debt of longer than 14 days maturity or new equity of persons determined to be subject to the directive, their property, or their interests in property.

(c) MODIFICATION OF DIRECTIVE 2 WITH RESPECT TO THE ENERGY SECTOR OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ECONOMY.—The Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control shall modify Directive 2 (as amended), dated September 12, 2014, issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control under Executive Order 13662, or any successor directive, to ensure that the directive prohibits the conduct by United

States persons or persons within the United States of all transactions in, provision of financing for, and other dealings in new debt of longer than 30 days maturity of persons determined to be subject to the directive, their property, or their interests in property.

(d) MODIFICATION OF DIRECTIVE 4.—The Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control shall modify Directive 4, dated September 12, 2014, issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control under Executive Order 13662, or any successor directive, to ensure that the directive prohibits the provision, exportation, or reexportation, directly or indirectly, by United States persons or persons within the United States, of goods, services (except for financial services), or technology in support of exploration or production for deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects—

(1) that have the potential to produce oil; (2) in which a Russian energy firm is involved; and

(3) that involve any person determined to be subject to the directive or the property or interests in property of such a person.

SEC. 224. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO ACTIVITIES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION UNDERMINING CYBERSECURITY.

(a) IN GENERAL.—On and after the date that is 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall—

(1) impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to any person that the President determines—

(A) knowingly engages in significant activities undermining cybersecurity against any person, including a democratic institution, or government on behalf of the Government of the Russian Federation; or

(B) is owned or controlled by, or acts or purports to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, a person described in subparagraph (A);

(2) impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section 235 with respect to any person that the President determines knowingly materially assists, sponsors, or provides financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services (except financial services) in support of, an activity described in paragraph (1)(A); and

(3) impose 3 or more of the sanctions described in section 4(c) of the of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8923(c)) with respect to any person that the President determines knowingly provides financial services in support of an activity described in paragraph (1)(A).

(b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions described in this subsection are the following:

(1) ASSET BLOCKING.—The exercise of all powers granted to the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of a person determined by the President to be subject to subsection (a)(1) if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(2) EXCLUSION FROM THE UNITED STATES AND REVOCATION OF VISA OR OTHER DOCUMENTATION.—In the case of an alien determined by the President to be subject to subsection (a)(1), denial of a visa to, and exclusion from the United States of, the alien, and revocation in accordance with section 221(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(i)), of any visa or other documentation of the alien.

(c) APPLICATION OF NEW CYBER SANCTIONS.—The President may waive the initial application under subsection (a) of sanctions with respect to a person only if the President

submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

(1) a written determination that the waiver—

(A) is in the vital national security interests of the United States; or

(B) will further the enforcement of this title; and

(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian Federation has made significant efforts to reduce the number and intensity of cyber intrusions conducted by that Government.

(d) **SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES UNDERMINING CYBERSECURITY DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “significant activities undermining cybersecurity” includes—

(1) significant efforts—

(A) to deny access to or degrade, disrupt, or destroy an information and communications technology system or network; or

(B) to exfiltrate, degrade, corrupt, destroy, or release information from such a system or network without authorization for purposes of—

(i) conducting influence operations; or

(ii) causing a significant misappropriation of funds, economic resources, trade secrets, personal identifications, or financial information for commercial or competitive advantage or private financial gain;

(2) significant destructive malware attacks; and

(3) significant denial of service activities.

SEC. 225. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO SPECIAL RUSSIAN CRUDE OIL PROJECTS.

Section 4(b)(1) of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8923(b)(1)) is amended by striking “on and after the date that is 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President may impose” and inserting “on and after the date that is 30 days after the date of the enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017, the President shall impose, unless the President determines that it is not in the national interest of the United States to do so.”.

SEC. 226. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO RUSSIAN AND OTHER FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

Section 5 of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8924) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)—

(A) by striking “may impose” and inserting “shall impose, unless the President determines that it is not in the national interest of the United States to do so.”; and

(B) by striking “on or after the date of the enactment of this Act” and inserting “on or after the date of the enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017”; and

(2) in subsection (b)—

(A) by striking “may impose” and inserting “shall impose, unless the President determines that it is not in the national interest of the United States to do so.”; and

(B) by striking “on or after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act” and inserting “on or after the date that is 30 days after the date of the enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017”.

SEC. 227. MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SIGNIFICANT CORRUPTION IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

Section 9 of the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8908(a)) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)—

(A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking “is authorized and encouraged to” and inserting “shall”; and

(B) in paragraph (1)—

(i) by striking “President determines is” and inserting “President determines is, on or

after the date of the enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017.”; and

(ii) by inserting “or elsewhere” after “in the Russian Federation”;

(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e);

(3) in subsection (c), by striking “The President” and inserting “except as provided in subsection (d), the President”; and

(4) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:

“(d) **APPLICATION OF NEW SANCTIONS.**—The President may waive the initial application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a person only if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

“(1) a written determination that the waiver—

“(A) is in the vital national security interests of the United States; or

“(B) will further the enforcement of this Act; and

“(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian Federation is taking steps to implement the Minsk Agreement to address the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, signed in Minsk, Belarus, on February 11, 2015, by the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany, the Minsk Protocol, which was agreed to on September 5, 2014, and any successor agreements that are agreed to by the Government of Ukraine.”.

SEC. 228. MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH FOREIGN SANCTIONS EVADERS AND SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSERS IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—The Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8901 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“SEC. 10. MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS THAT EVADE SANCTIONS IMPOSED WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

“(a) **IN GENERAL.**—The President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to a foreign person if the President determines that the foreign person knowingly, on or after the date of the enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017—

“(1) materially violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of any license, order, regulation, or prohibition contained in or issued pursuant to any covered Executive order; or

“(2) facilitates significant deceptive or structured transactions for or on behalf of—

“(A) any person subject to sanctions imposed by the United States with respect to the Russian Federation; or

“(B) any child, spouse, parent, or sibling of an individual described in subparagraph (A).

“(b) **SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.**—The sanctions described in this subsection are the exercise of all powers granted to the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of a person determined by the President to be subject to subsection (a) if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

“(c) **IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.**—

“(1) **IMPLEMENTATION.**—The President may exercise all authorities provided to the President under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers

Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out subsection (b).

“(2) **PENALTIES.**—A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of subsection (b) or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out subsection (b) shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section.

“(d) **APPLICATION OF NEW SANCTIONS.**—The President may waive the initial application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a person only if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

“(1) a written determination that the waiver—

“(A) is in the vital national security interests of the United States; or

“(B) will further the enforcement of this Act;

“(2) in the case of sanctions imposed under this section in connection with a covered Executive order described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D) of subsection (f)(1), a certification that the Government of the Russian Federation is taking steps to implement the Minsk Agreement to address the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, signed in Minsk, Belarus, on February 11, 2015, by the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany, the Minsk Protocol, which was agreed to on September 5, 2014, and any successor agreements that are agreed to by the Government of Ukraine; and

“(3) in the case of sanctions imposed under this section in connection with a covered Executive order described in subparagraphs (E) or (F) of subsection (f)(1), a certification that the Government of the Russian Federation has made significant efforts to reduce the number and intensity of cyber intrusions conducted by that Government.

“(e) **TERMINATION.**—Subject to section 216 of the Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017, the President may terminate the application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a person if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

“(1) a notice of and justification for the termination; and

“(2) a notice that—

“(A) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and

“(B) the President has received reliable assurances that the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to sanctions under subsection (a) in the future.

“(f) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section:

“(1) **COVERED EXECUTIVE ORDER.**—The term “covered Executive order” means any of the following:

“(A) Executive Order 13660 (79 Fed. Reg. 13493; relating to blocking property of certain persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine).

“(B) Executive Order 13661 (79 Fed. Reg. 15535; relating to blocking property of additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine).

“(C) Executive Order 13662 (79 Fed. Reg. 16169; relating to blocking property of additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine).

“(D) Executive Order 13685 (79 Fed. Reg. 77357; relating to blocking property of certain persons and prohibiting certain transactions with respect to the Crimea region of Ukraine).

“(E) Executive Order 13694 (80 Fed. Reg. 18077; relating to blocking the property of

certain persons engaging in significant malicious cyber-enabled activities).

“(F) Executive Order 13757 (82 Fed. Reg. 1; relating to taking additional steps to address the national emergency with respect to significant malicious cyber-enabled activities).

“(2) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term ‘foreign person’ has the meaning given such term in section 595.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (as in effect on the date of the enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017).

“(3) STRUCTURED.—The term ‘structured’, with respect to a transaction, has the meaning given the term ‘structure’ in paragraph (xx) of section 1010.100 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation or ruling).

“SEC. 11. MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.

“(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to a foreign person if the President determines that the foreign person, based on credible information, on or after the date of the enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017—

“(1) is responsible for, complicit in, or responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission of serious human rights abuses in any territory forcibly occupied or otherwise controlled by the Government of the Russian Federation;

“(2) materially assists, sponsors, or provides financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to, a foreign person described in paragraph (1); or

“(3) is owned or controlled by, or acts or purports to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, a foreign person described in paragraph (1).

“(b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—

“(1) ASSET BLOCKING.—The exercise of all powers granted to the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of a person determined by the President to be subject to subsection (a) if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

“(2) EXCLUSION FROM THE UNITED STATES AND REVOCATION OF VISA OR OTHER DOCUMENTATION.—In the case of an alien determined by the President to be subject to subsection (a), denial of a visa to, and exclusion from the United States of, the alien, and revocation in accordance with section 221(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(i)), of any visa or other documentation of the alien.

“(c) APPLICATION OF NEW SANCTIONS.—The President may waive the initial application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a person only if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

“(1) a written determination that the waiver—

“(A) is in the vital national security interests of the United States; or

“(B) will further the enforcement of this Act; and

“(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian Federation has made efforts to reduce serious human rights abuses in territory forcibly occupied or otherwise controlled by that Government.

“(d) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—

“(1) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may exercise all authorities provided to the President under sections 203 and 205 of the

International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out subsection (b)(1).

“(2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of subsection (b)(1) or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out subsection (b)(1) shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section.

“(e) TERMINATION.—Subject to section 216 of the Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017, the President may terminate the application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a person if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

“(1) a notice of and justification for the termination; and

“(2) a notice—

“(A) that—

“(i) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and

“(ii) the President has received reliable assurances that the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to sanctions under subsection (a) in the future; or

“(B) that the President determines that insufficient basis exists for the determination by the President under subsection (a) with respect to the person.”.

(b) DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—Section 2(2) of the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8901(2)) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (A), by inserting “the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,” before “the Committee on Foreign Relations”; and

(2) in subparagraph (B), by inserting “the Committee on Financial Services” before “the Committee on Foreign Affairs”.

SEC. 229. NOTIFICATIONS TO CONGRESS UNDER UKRAINE FREEDOM SUPPORT ACT OF 2014.

(a) SANCTIONS RELATING TO DEFENSE AND ENERGY SECTORS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.—Section 4 of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8923) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsections (g) and (h) as subsections (h) and (i), respectively;

(2) by inserting after subsection (f) the following:

“(g) NOTIFICATIONS AND CERTIFICATIONS TO CONGRESS.—

“(1) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—The President shall notify the appropriate congressional committees in writing not later than 15 days after imposing sanctions with respect to a foreign person under subsection (a) or (b).

“(2) TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO RUSSIAN PRODUCERS, TRANSFERORS, OR BROKERS OF DEFENSE ARTICLES.—Subject to section 216 of the Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017, the President may terminate the imposition of sanctions under subsection (a)(2) with respect to a foreign person if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

“(A) a notice of and justification for the termination; and

“(B) a notice that—

“(i) the foreign person is not engaging in the activity that was the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and

“(ii) the President has received reliable assurances that the foreign person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to

sanctions under subsection (a)(2) in the future.”; and

(3) in subparagraph (B)(ii) of subsection (a)(3), by striking “subsection (h)” and inserting “subsection (i)”.

(b) SANCTIONS ON RUSSIAN AND OTHER FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—Section 5 of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8924) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsections (e) and (f) as subsections (f) and (g), respectively;

(2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following:

“(e) NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS ON IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—The President shall notify the appropriate congressional committees in writing not later than 15 days after imposing sanctions with respect to a foreign financial institution under subsection (a) or (b).”; and

(3) in subsection (g), as redesignated by paragraph (1), by striking “section 4(h)” and inserting “section 4(i)”.

SEC. 230. STANDARDS FOR TERMINATION OF CERTAIN SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) SANCTIONS RELATING TO UNDERMINING THE PEACE, SECURITY, STABILITY, SOVEREIGNTY, OR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF UKRAINE.—Section 8 of the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8907) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and

(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:

“(d) TERMINATION.—Subject to section 216 of the Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017, the President may terminate the application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a person if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees a notice that—

“(1) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and

“(2) the President has received reliable assurances that the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to sanctions under subsection (a) in the future.”.

(b) SANCTIONS RELATING TO CORRUPTION.—Section 9 of the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8908) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and

(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:

“(d) TERMINATION.—Subject to section 216 of the Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017, the President may terminate the application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a person if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees a notice that—

“(1) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and

“(2) the President has received reliable assurances that the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to sanctions under subsection (a) in the future.”.

SEC. 231. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS ENGAGING IN TRANSACTIONS WITH THE INTELLIGENCE OR DEFENSE SECTORS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—On and after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section 235 with respect to a person the President determines knowingly, on or after such date of enactment, engages in a significant

transaction with a person that is part of, or operates for or on behalf of, the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation, including the Main Intelligence Agency of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation or the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation.

(b) **APPLICATION OF NEW SANCTIONS.**—The President may waive the initial application of sanctions under subsection (a) with respect to a person only if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

(1) a written determination that the waiver—

(A) is in the vital national security interests of the United States; or

(B) will further the enforcement of this title; and

(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian Federation has made significant efforts to reduce the number and intensity of cyber intrusions conducted by that Government.

SEC. 232. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF PIPELINES IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—The President may impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section 235 with respect to a person if the President determines that the person knowingly, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, makes an investment described in subsection (b) or sells, leases, or provides to the Russian Federation, for the construction of Russian energy export pipelines, goods, services, technology, information, or support described in subsection (c)—

(1) any of which has a fair market value of \$1,000,000 or more; or

(2) that, during a 12-month period, have an aggregate fair market value of \$5,000,000 or more.

(b) **INVESTMENT DESCRIBED.**—An investment described in this subsection is an investment that directly and significantly contributes to the enhancement of the ability of the Russian Federation to construct energy export pipelines.

(c) **GOODS, SERVICES, TECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION, OR SUPPORT DESCRIBED.**—Goods, services, technology, information, or support described in this subsection are goods, services, technology, information, or support that could directly and significantly facilitate the maintenance or expansion of the construction, modernization, or repair of energy pipelines by the Russian Federation.

SEC. 233. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO INVESTMENT IN OR FACILITATION OF PRIVATIZATION OF STATE-OWNED ASSETS BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—The President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section 235 if the President determines that a person, with actual knowledge, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, makes an investment of \$10,000,000 or more (or any combination of investments of not less than \$1,000,000 each, which in the aggregate equals or exceeds \$10,000,000 in any 12-month period), or facilitates such an investment, if the investment directly and significantly contributes to the ability of the Russian Federation to privatize state-owned assets in a manner that unjustly benefits—

(1) officials of the Government of the Russian Federation; or

(2) close associates or family members of those officials.

(b) **APPLICATION OF NEW SANCTIONS.**—The President may waive the initial application of sanctions under subsection (a) with respect to a person only if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

(1) a written determination that the waiver—

(A) is in the vital national security interests of the United States; or

(B) will further the enforcement of this title; and

(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian Federation is taking steps to implement the Minsk Agreement to address the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, signed in Minsk, Belarus, on February 11, 2015, by the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany, the Minsk Protocol, which was agreed to on September 5, 2014, and any successor agreements that are agreed to by the Government of Ukraine.

SEC. 234. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE TRANSFER OF ARMS AND RELATED MATERIEL TO SYRIA.

(a) **IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The President shall impose on a foreign person the sanctions described in subsection (b) if the President determines that such foreign person has, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, knowingly exported, transferred, or otherwise provided to Syria significant financial, material, or technological support that contributes materially to the ability of the Government of Syria to—

(A) acquire or develop chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or related technologies;

(B) acquire or develop ballistic or cruise missile capabilities;

(C) acquire or develop destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons;

(D) acquire significant defense articles, defense services, or defense information (as such terms are defined under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.)); or

(E) acquire items designated by the President for purposes of the United States Munitions List under section 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)).

(2) **APPLICABILITY TO OTHER FOREIGN PERSONS.**—The sanctions described in subsection (b) shall also be imposed on any foreign person that—

(A) is a successor entity to a foreign person described in paragraph (1); or

(B) is owned or controlled by, or has acted for or on behalf of, a foreign person described in paragraph (1).

(b) **SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.**—The sanctions to be imposed on a foreign person described in subsection (a) are the following:

(1) **BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.**—The President shall exercise all powers granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (except that the requirements of section 202 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of the foreign person if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(2) **ALIENS INELIGIBLE FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.**—

(A) **EXCLUSION FROM THE UNITED STATES.**—If the foreign person is an individual, the Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude from the United States, the foreign person.

(B) **CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.**—

(i) **IN GENERAL.**—The issuing consular officer, the Secretary of State, or the Secretary of Homeland Security (or a designee of one of such Secretaries) shall revoke any visa or other entry documentation issued to the foreign person regardless of when issued.

(ii) **EFFECT OF REVOCATION.**—A revocation under clause (i) shall take effect immediately and shall automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the possession of the foreign person.

(c) **WAIVER.**—Subject to section 216, the President may waive the application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a person if the President determines that such a waiver is in the national security interest of the United States.

(d) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section:

(1) **FINANCIAL, MATERIAL, OR TECHNOLOGICAL SUPPORT.**—The term “financial, material, or technological support” has the meaning given such term in section 542.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation or ruling).

(2) **FOREIGN PERSON.**—The term “foreign person” has the meaning given such term in section 594.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation or ruling).

(3) **SYRIA.**—The term “Syria” has the meaning given such term in section 542.316 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation or ruling).

SEC. 235. SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.

(a) **SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.**—The sanctions to be imposed with respect to a person under section 224(a)(2), 231(b), 232(a), or 233(a) are the following:

(1) **EXPORT-IMPORT BANK ASSISTANCE FOR EXPORTS TO SANCTIONED PERSONS.**—The President may direct the Export-Import Bank of the United States not to give approval to the issuance of any guarantee, insurance, extension of credit, or participation in the extension of credit in connection with the export of any goods or services to the sanctioned person.

(2) **EXPORT SANCTION.**—The President may order the United States Government not to issue any specific license and not to grant any other specific permission or authority to export any goods or technology to the sanctioned person under—

(A) the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 4601 et seq.) (as continued in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.));

(B) the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.);

(C) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.); or

(D) any other statute that requires the prior review and approval of the United States Government as a condition for the export or reexport of goods or services.

(3) **LOANS FROM UNITED STATES FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.**—The President may prohibit any United States financial institution from making loans or providing credits to the sanctioned person totaling more than \$10,000,000 in any 12-month period unless the person is engaged in activities to relieve human suffering and the loans or credits are provided for such activities.

(4) **LOANS FROM INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.**—The President may direct the United States executive director to each international financial institution to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose any loan from the international financial institution that would benefit the sanctioned person.

(5) **PROHIBITIONS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.**—The following prohibitions may be imposed against the sanctioned person if that person is a financial institution:

(A) **PROHIBITION ON DESIGNATION AS PRIMARY DEALER.**—Neither the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System nor the Federal Reserve Bank of New York may designate, or permit the continuation of any prior designation of, the financial institution as a primary dealer in United States Government debt instruments.

(B) **PROHIBITION ON SERVICE AS A REPOSITORY OF GOVERNMENT FUNDS.**—The financial institution may not serve as agent of the

United States Government or serve as repository for United States Government funds.

The imposition of either sanction under subparagraph (A) or (B) shall be treated as 1 sanction for purposes of subsection (b), and the imposition of both such sanctions shall be treated as 2 sanctions for purposes of subsection (b).

(6) **PROCUREMENT SANCTION.**—The United States Government may not procure, or enter into any contract for the procurement of, any goods or services from the sanctioned person.

(7) **FOREIGN EXCHANGE.**—The President may, pursuant to such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange that are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and in which the sanctioned person has any interest.

(8) **BANKING TRANSACTIONS.**—The President may, pursuant to such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any transfers of credit or payments between financial institutions or by, through, or to any financial institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and involve any interest of the sanctioned person.

(9) **PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS.**—The President may, pursuant to such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any person from—

(A) acquiring, holding, withholding, using, transferring, withdrawing, transporting, importing, or exporting any property that is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and with respect to which the sanctioned person has any interest;

(B) dealing in or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to such property; or

(C) conducting any transaction involving such property.

(10) **BAN ON INVESTMENT IN EQUITY OR DEBT OF SANCTIONED PERSON.**—The President may, pursuant to such regulations or guidelines as the President may prescribe, prohibit any United States person from investing in or purchasing significant amounts of equity or debt instruments of the sanctioned person.

(11) **EXCLUSION OF CORPORATE OFFICERS.**—The President may direct the Secretary of State to deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security to exclude from the United States, any alien that the President determines is a corporate officer or principal of, or a shareholder with a controlling interest in, the sanctioned person.

(12) **SANCTIONS ON PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICERS.**—The President may impose on the principal executive officer or officers of the sanctioned person, or on persons performing similar functions and with similar authorities as such officer or officers, any of the sanctions under this subsection.

(b) **SANCTIONED PERSON DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “sanctioned person” means a person subject to sanctions under section 224(a)(2), 231(b), 232(a), or 233(a).

SEC. 236. EXCEPTIONS, WAIVER, AND TERMINATION.

(a) **EXCEPTIONS.**—The provisions of this part and amendments made by this part shall not apply with respect to the following:

(1) Activities subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.), or any authorized intelligence activities of the United States.

(2) The admission of an alien to the United States if such admission is necessary to comply with United States obligations under the Agreement between the United Nations and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, under the Con-

vention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna April 24, 1963, and entered into force March 19, 1967, or under other international agreements.

(b) **EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF GOODS.**—No requirement to impose sanctions under this part or an amendment made by this part shall include the authority to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.

(c) **WAIVER OF SANCTIONS THAT ARE IMPOSED.**—Subject to section 216, if the President imposes sanctions with respect to a person under this part or the amendments made by this part, the President may waive the application of those sanctions if the President determines that such a waiver is in the national security interest of the United States.

(d) **TERMINATION.**—Subject to section 216, the President may terminate the application of sanctions under section 224, 231, 232, 233, or 234 with respect to a person if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

(1) a notice of and justification for the termination; and

(2) a notice that—

(A) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and

(B) the President has received reliable assurances that the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to sanctions under this part in the future.

SEC. 237. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

Nothing in this part or the amendments made by this part shall be construed—

(1) to supersede the limitations or exceptions on the use of rocket engines for national security purposes under section 1608 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113–291; 128 Stat. 3626; 10 U.S.C. 2271 note), as amended by section 1607 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92; 129 Stat. 1100) and section 1602 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328; 130 Stat. 2582); or

(2) to prohibit a contractor or subcontractor of the Department of Defense from acquiring components referred to in such section 1608.

PART III—REPORTS

SEC. 241. REPORT ON OLIGARCHS AND PARASTATAL ENTITIES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a detailed report on the following:

(1) Senior foreign political figures and oligarchs in the Russian Federation, including the following:

(A) An identification of the most significant senior foreign political figures and oligarchs in the Russian Federation, as determined by their closeness to the Russian regime and their net worth.

(B) An assessment of the relationship between individuals identified under subparagraph (A) and President Vladimir Putin or other members of the Russian ruling elite.

(C) An identification of any indices of corruption with respect to those individuals.

(D) The estimated net worth and known sources of income of those individuals and their family members (including spouses, children, parents, and siblings), including assets, investments, other business interests, and relevant beneficial ownership information.

(E) An identification of the non-Russian business affiliations of those individuals.

(2) Russian parastatal entities, including an assessment of the following:

(A) The emergence of Russian parastatal entities and their role in the economy of the Russian Federation.

(B) The leadership structures and beneficial ownership of those entities.

(C) The scope of the non-Russian business affiliations of those entities.

(3) The exposure of key economic sectors of the United States to Russian politically exposed persons and parastatal entities, including, at a minimum, the banking, securities, insurance, and real estate sectors.

(4) The likely effects of imposing debt and equity restrictions on Russian parastatal entities, as well as the anticipated effects of adding Russian parastatal entities to the list of specially designated nationals and blocked persons maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury.

(5) The potential impacts of imposing secondary sanctions with respect to Russian oligarchs, Russian state-owned enterprises, and Russian parastatal entities, including impacts on the entities themselves and on the economy of the Russian Federation, as well as on the economies of the United States and allies of the United States.

(b) **FORM OF REPORT.**—The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

(c) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section:

(1) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

(2) **SENIOR FOREIGN POLITICAL FIGURE.**—The term “senior foreign political figure” has the meaning given that term in section 1010.605 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation or ruling).

SEC. 242. REPORT ON EFFECTS OF EXPANDING SANCTIONS TO INCLUDE SOVEREIGN DEBT AND DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing in detail the potential effects of expanding sanctions under Directive 1 (as amended), dated September 12, 2014, issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control under Executive Order 13662 (79 Fed. Reg. 16169; relating to blocking property of additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine), or any successor directive, to include sovereign debt and the full range of derivative products.

(b) **FORM OF REPORT.**—The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

(c) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 243. REPORT ON ILLICIT FINANCE RELATING TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not later than the end of each one-year period thereafter until 2021, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing interagency efforts in the United States to combat illicit finance relating to the Russian Federation.

(b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection (a) shall contain a summary of efforts by the United States to do the following:

(1) Identify, investigate, map, and disrupt illicit financial flows linked to the Russian Federation if such flows affect the United States financial system or those of major allies of the United States.

(2) Conduct outreach to the private sector, including information sharing efforts to strengthen compliance efforts by entities, including financial institutions, to prevent illicit financial flows described in paragraph (1).

(3) Engage and coordinate with allied international partners on illicit finance, especially in Europe, to coordinate efforts to uncover and prosecute the networks responsible for illicit financial flows described in paragraph (1), including examples of that engagement and coordination.

(4) Identify foreign sanctions evaders and loopholes within the sanctions regimes of foreign partners of the United States.

(5) Expand the number of real estate geographic targeting orders or other regulatory actions, as appropriate, to degrade illicit financial activity relating to the Russian Federation in relation to the financial system of the United States.

(6) Provide support to counter those involved in illicit finance relating to the Russian Federation across all appropriate law enforcement, intelligence, regulatory, and financial authorities of the Federal Government, including by imposing sanctions with respect to or prosecuting those involved.

(7) In the case of the Department of the Treasury and the Department of Justice, investigate or otherwise develop major cases, including a description of those cases.

(c) BRIEFING.—After submitting a report under this section, the Secretary of the Treasury shall provide briefings to the appropriate congressional committees with respect to that report.

(d) COORDINATION.—The Secretary of the Treasury shall coordinate with the Attorney General, the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Secretary of State in preparing each report under this section.

(e) FORM.—Each report submitted under this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

(f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

(2) ILLICIT FINANCE.—The term “illicit finance” means the financing of terrorism, narcotics trafficking, or proliferation, money laundering, or other forms of illicit financing domestically or internationally, as defined by the President.

Subtitle B—Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia**SEC. 251. FINDINGS.**

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Government of the Russian Federation has sought to exert influence throughout Europe and Eurasia, including in the former states of the Soviet Union, by providing resources to political parties, think tanks, and civil society groups that sow distrust in democratic institutions and actors, promote xenophobic and illiberal views, and otherwise undermine European unity. The Government of the Russian Federation has also engaged in well-documented corruption practices as a means toward undermining and buying influence in European and Eurasian countries.

(2) The Government of the Russian Federation has largely eliminated a once-vibrant Russian-language independent media sector and severely curtails free and independent media within the borders of the Russian Federation. Russian-language media organizations that are funded and controlled by the Government of the Russian Federation and disseminate information within and outside of the Russian Federation routinely traffic in anti-Western disinformation, while few independent, fact-based media sources provide objective reporting for Russian-speaking audiences inside or outside of the Russian Federation.

(3) The Government of the Russian Federation continues to violate its commitments under the Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Budapest December 5, 1994, and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act, concluded at Helsinki August 1, 1975 (commonly referred to as the “Helsinki Final Act”), which laid the ground-work for the establishment of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, of which the Russian Federation is a member, by its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, its illegal occupation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia in 2008, and its ongoing destabilizing activities in eastern Ukraine.

(4) The Government of the Russian Federation continues to ignore the terms of the August 2008 ceasefire agreement relating to Georgia, which requires the withdrawal of Russian Federation troops, free access by humanitarian groups to the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and monitoring of the conflict areas by the European Union Monitoring Mission.

(5) The Government of the Russian Federation is failing to comply with the terms of the Minsk Agreement to address the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, signed in Minsk, Belarus, on February 11, 2015, by the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany, as well as the Minsk Protocol, which was agreed to on September 5, 2014.

(6) The Government of the Russian Federation is—

(A) in violation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, signed at Washington December 8, 1987, and entered into force June 1, 1988 (commonly known as the “INF Treaty”); and

(B) failing to meet its obligations under the Treaty on Open Skies, done at Helsinki March 24, 1992, and entered into force January 1, 2002 (commonly known as the “Open Skies Treaty”).

SEC. 252. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the Government of the Russian Federation bears responsibility for the continuing

violence in Eastern Ukraine, including the death on April 24, 2017, of Joseph Stone, a citizen of the United States working as a monitor for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe;

(2) the President should call on the Government of the Russian Federation—

(A) to withdraw all of its forces from the territories of Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova;

(B) to return control of the borders of those territories to their respective governments; and

(C) to cease all efforts to undermine the popularly elected governments of those countries;

(3) the Government of the Russian Federation has applied, and continues to apply, to the countries and peoples of Georgia and Ukraine, traditional uses of force, intelligence operations, and influence campaigns, which represent clear and present threats to the countries of Europe and Eurasia;

(4) in response, the countries of Europe and Eurasia should redouble efforts to build resilience within their institutions, political systems, and civil societies;

(5) the United States supports the institutions that the Government of the Russian Federation seeks to undermine, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union;

(6) a strong North Atlantic Treaty Organization is critical to maintaining peace and security in Europe and Eurasia;

(7) the United States should continue to work with the European Union as a partner against aggression by the Government of the Russian Federation, coordinating aid programs, development assistance, and other counter-Russian efforts;

(8) the United States should encourage the establishment of a commission for media freedom within the Council of Europe, modeled on the Venice Commission regarding rule of law issues, that would be chartered to provide governments with expert recommendations on maintaining legal and regulatory regimes supportive of free and independent media and an informed citizenry able to distinguish between fact-based reporting, opinion, and disinformation;

(9) in addition to working to strengthen the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union, the United States should work with the individual countries of Europe and Eurasia—

(A) to identify vulnerabilities to aggression, disinformation, corruption, and so-called hybrid warfare by the Government of the Russian Federation;

(B) to establish strategic and technical plans for addressing those vulnerabilities;

(C) to ensure that the financial systems of those countries are not being used to shield illicit financial activity by officials of the Government of the Russian Federation or individuals in President Vladimir Putin’s inner circle who have been enriched through corruption;

(D) to investigate and prosecute cases of corruption by Russian actors; and

(E) to work toward full compliance with the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (commonly referred to as the “Anti-Bribery Convention”) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development; and

(10) the President of the United States should use the authority of the President to impose sanctions under—

(A) the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 (title IV of Public Law 112–208; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note); and

(B) the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note).

SEC. 253. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

The United States, consistent with the principle of *ex injuria jus non oritur*, supports the policy known as the “Stimson Doctrine” and thus does not recognize territorial changes effected by force, including the illegal invasions and occupations of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, and Transnistria.

SEC. 254. COORDINATING AID AND ASSISTANCE ACROSS EUROPE AND EURASIA.

(a) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—There are authorized to be appropriated for the Countering Russian Influence Fund \$250,000,000 for fiscal years 2018 and 2019.

(b) **USE OF FUNDS.**—Amounts in the Countering Russian Influence Fund shall be used to effectively implement, prioritized in the following order and subject to the availability of funds, the following goals:

(1) To assist in protecting critical infrastructure and electoral mechanisms from cyberattacks in the following countries:

(A) Countries that are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Union that the Secretary of State determines—

(i) are vulnerable to influence by the Russian Federation; and

(ii) lack the economic capability to effectively respond to aggression by the Russian Federation without the support of the United States.

(B) Countries that are participating in the enlargement process of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Union, including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, Kosovo, Serbia, and Ukraine.

(2) To combat corruption, improve the rule of law, and otherwise strengthen independent judiciaries and prosecutors general offices in the countries described in paragraph (1).

(3) To respond to the humanitarian crises and instability caused or aggravated by the invasions and occupations of Georgia and Ukraine by the Russian Federation.

(4) To improve participatory legislative processes and legal education, political transparency and competition, and compliance with international obligations in the countries described in paragraph (1).

(5) To build the capacity of civil society, media, and other nongovernmental organizations countering the influence and propaganda of the Russian Federation to combat corruption, prioritize access to truthful information, and operate freely in all regions in the countries described in paragraph (1).

(6) To assist the Secretary of State in executing the functions specified in section 1287(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) for the purposes of recognizing, understanding, exposing, and countering propaganda and disinformation efforts by foreign governments, in coordination with the relevant regional Assistant Secretary or Assistant Secretaries of the Department of State.

(c) **REVISION OF ACTIVITIES FOR WHICH AMOUNTS MAY BE USED.**—The Secretary of State may modify the goals described in subsection (b) if, not later than 15 days before revising such a goal, the Secretary notifies the appropriate congressional committees of the revision.

(d) **IMPLEMENTATION.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The Secretary of State shall, acting through the Coordinator of United States Assistance to Europe and Eurasia (authorized pursuant to section 601 of the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989 (22 U.S.C. 5461) and section 102 of the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5812)),

and in consultation with the Administrator for the United States Agency for International Development, the Director of the Global Engagement Center of the Department of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, coordinate and carry out activities to achieve the goals described in subsection (b).

(2) **METHOD.**—Activities to achieve the goals described in subsection (b) shall be carried out through—

(A) initiatives of the United States Government;

(B) Federal grant programs such as the Information Access Fund; or

(C) nongovernmental or international organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the National Endowment for Democracy, the Black Sea Trust, the Balkan Trust for Democracy, the Prague Civil Society Centre, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, the European Endowment for Democracy, and related organizations.

(3) **REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION.**—

(A) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than April 1 of each year, the Secretary of State, acting through the Coordinator of United States Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the programs and activities carried out to achieve the goals described in subsection (b) during the preceding fiscal year.

(B) **ELEMENTS.**—Each report required by subparagraph (A) shall include, with respect to each program or activity described in that subparagraph—

(i) the amount of funding for the program or activity;

(ii) the goal described in subsection (b) to which the program or activity relates; and

(iii) an assessment of whether or not the goal was met.

(e) **COORDINATION WITH GLOBAL PARTNERS.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—In order to maximize cost efficiency, eliminate duplication, and speed the achievement of the goals described in subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall ensure coordination with—

(A) the European Union and its institutions;

(B) the governments of countries that are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Union; and

(C) international organizations and quasi-governmental funding entities that carry out programs and activities that seek to accomplish the goals described in subsection (b).

(2) **REPORT BY SECRETARY OF STATE.**—Not later than April 1 of each year, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes—

(A) the amount of funding provided to each country referred to in subsection (b) by—

(i) the European Union or its institutions;

(ii) the government of each country that is a member of the European Union or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and

(iii) international organizations and quasi-governmental funding entities that carry out programs and activities that seek to accomplish the goals described in subsection (b); and

(B) an assessment of whether the funding described in subparagraph (A) is commensurate with funding provided by the United States for those goals.

(f) **RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.**—Nothing in this section shall be construed to apply to or limit United States foreign assistance not provided using amounts available in the Countering Russian Influence Fund.

(g) **ENSURING ADEQUATE STAFFING FOR GOVERNANCE ACTIVITIES.**—In order to ensure that the United States Government is properly focused on combating corruption, improving rule of law, and building the capacity of civil society, media, and other nongovernmental organizations in countries described in subsection (b)(1), the Secretary of State shall establish a pilot program for Foreign Service officer positions focused on governance and anticorruption activities in such countries.

SEC. 255. REPORT ON MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS CONTROLLED AND FUNDED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes a description of media organizations that are controlled and funded by the Government of the Russian Federation, and any affiliated entities, whether operating within or outside the Russian Federation, including broadcast and satellite-based television, radio, Internet, and print media organizations.

(b) **FORM OF REPORT.**—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 256. REPORT ON RUSSIAN FEDERATION INFLUENCE ON ELECTIONS IN EUROPE AND EURASIA.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on funds provided by, or funds the use of which was directed by, the Government of the Russian Federation or any Russian person with the intention of influencing the outcome of any election or campaign in any country in Europe or Eurasia during the preceding year, including through direct support to any political party, candidate, lobbying campaign, nongovernmental organization, or civic organization.

(b) **FORM OF REPORT.**—Each report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

(c) **RUSSIAN PERSON DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “Russian person” means—

(1) an individual who is a citizen or national of the Russian Federation; or

(2) an entity organized under the laws of the Russian Federation or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of the Russian Federation.

SEC. 257. UKRAINIAN ENERGY SECURITY.

(a) **STATEMENT OF POLICY.**—It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to support the Government of Ukraine in restoring its sovereign and territorial integrity;

(2) to condemn and oppose all of the destabilizing efforts by the Government of the Russian Federation in Ukraine in violation of its obligations and international commitments;

(3) to never recognize the illegal annexation of Crimea by the Government of the Russian Federation or the separation of any portion of Ukrainian territory through the use of military force;

(4) to deter the Government of the Russian Federation from further destabilizing and invading Ukraine and other independent countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Caucasus;

(5) to assist in promoting reform in regulatory oversight and operations in Ukraine's energy sector, including the establishment and empowerment of an independent regulatory organization;

(6) to encourage and support fair competition, market liberalization, and reliability in Ukraine's energy sector;

(7) to help Ukraine and United States allies and partners in Europe reduce their dependence on Russian energy resources, especially natural gas, which the Government of the Russian Federation uses as a weapon to coerce, intimidate, and influence other countries;

(8) to work with European Union member states and European Union institutions to promote energy security through developing diversified and liberalized energy markets that provide diversified sources, suppliers, and routes;

(9) to continue to oppose the NordStream 2 pipeline given its detrimental impacts on the European Union's energy security, gas market development in Central and Eastern Europe, and energy reforms in Ukraine; and

(10) that the United States Government should prioritize the export of United States energy resources in order to create American jobs, help United States allies and partners, and strengthen United States foreign policy.

(b) **PLAN TO PROMOTE ENERGY SECURITY IN UKRAINE.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development and the Secretary of Energy, shall work with the Government of Ukraine to develop a plan to increase energy security in Ukraine, increase the amount of energy produced in Ukraine, and reduce Ukraine's reliance on energy imports from the Russian Federation.

(2) **ELEMENTS.**—The plan developed under paragraph (1) shall include strategies for market liberalization, effective regulation and oversight, supply diversification, energy reliability, and energy efficiency, such as through supporting—

(A) the promotion of advanced technology and modern operating practices in Ukraine's oil and gas sector;

(B) modern geophysical and meteorological survey work as needed followed by international tenders to help attract qualified investment into exploration and development of areas with untapped resources in Ukraine;

(C) a broadening of Ukraine's electric power transmission interconnection with Europe;

(D) the strengthening of Ukraine's capability to maintain electric power grid stability and reliability;

(E) independent regulatory oversight and operations of Ukraine's gas market and electricity sector;

(F) the implementation of primary gas law including pricing, tariff structure, and legal regulatory implementation;

(G) privatization of government owned energy companies through credible legal frameworks and a transparent process compliant with international best practices;

(H) procurement and transport of emergency fuel supplies, including reverse pipeline flows from Europe;

(I) provision of technical assistance for crisis planning, crisis response, and public outreach;

(J) repair of infrastructure to enable the transport of fuel supplies;

(K) repair of power generating or power transmission equipment or facilities; and

(L) improved building energy efficiency and other measures designed to reduce energy demand in Ukraine.

(3) **REPORTS.**—

(A) **IMPLEMENTATION OF UKRAINE FREEDOM SUPPORT ACT OF 2014 PROVISIONS.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report detailing the status of im-

plementing the provisions required under section 7(c) of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8926(c)), including detailing the plans required under that section, the level of funding that has been allocated to and expended for the strategies set forth under that section, and progress that has been made in implementing the strategies developed pursuant to that section.

(B) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report detailing the plan developed under paragraph (1), the level of funding that has been allocated to and expended for the strategies set forth in paragraph (2), and progress that has been made in implementing the strategies.

(C) **BRIEFINGS.**—The Secretary of State, or a designee of the Secretary, shall brief the appropriate congressional committees not later than 30 days after the submission of each report under subparagraph (B). In addition, the Department of State shall make relevant officials available upon request to brief the appropriate congressional committees on all available information that relates directly or indirectly to Ukraine or energy security in Eastern Europe.

(D) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.**—In this paragraph, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(E) **SUPPORTING EFFORTS OF COUNTRIES IN EUROPE AND EURASIA TO DECREASE THEIR DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIAN SOURCES OF ENERGY.**—

(1) **FINDINGS.**—Congress makes the following findings:

(A) The Government of the Russian Federation uses its strong position in the energy sector as leverage to manipulate the internal politics and foreign relations of the countries of Europe and Eurasia.

(B) This influence is based not only on the Russian Federation's oil and natural gas resources, but also on its state-owned nuclear power and electricity companies.

(2) **SENSE OF CONGRESS.**—It is the sense of Congress that—

(A) the United States should assist the efforts of the countries of Europe and Eurasia to enhance their energy security through diversification of energy supplies in order to lessen dependencies on Russian Federation energy resources and state-owned entities; and

(B) the Export-Import Bank of the United States and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation should play key roles in supporting critical energy projects that contribute to that goal.

(3) **USE OF COUNTERING RUSSIAN INFLUENCE FUND TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.**—Amounts in the Countering Russian Influence Fund pursuant to section 254 shall be used to provide technical advice to countries described in subsection (b)(1) of such section designed to enhance energy security and lessen dependence on energy from Russian Federation sources.

(4) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—There is authorized to be appropriated for the Department of State a total of \$30,000,000 for fiscal years 2018 and 2019 to carry out the strategies set forth in subsection (b)(2) and other activities under this section related to the promotion of energy security in Ukraine.

(e) **RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.**—Nothing in this section shall be construed as affecting the responsibilities required and authorities

provided under section 7 of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8926).

SEC. 258. TERMINATION.

The provisions of this subtitle shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 259. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.

Except as otherwise provided, in this subtitle, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

Subtitle C—Combating Terrorism and Illicit Financing

PART I—NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORIST AND OTHER ILLICIT FINANCING

SEC. 261. DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL STRATEGY.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—The President, acting through the Secretary, shall, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, and the appropriate Federal banking agencies and Federal functional regulators, develop a national strategy for combating the financing of terrorism and related forms of illicit finance.

(b) **TRANSMITTAL TO CONGRESS.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive national strategy developed in accordance with subsection (a).

(2) **UPDATES.**—Not later than January 31, 2020, and January 31, 2022, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees updated versions of the national strategy submitted under paragraph (1).

(c) **SEPARATE PRESENTATION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL.**—Any part of the national strategy that involves information that is properly classified under criteria established by the President shall be submitted to Congress separately in a classified annex and, if requested by the chairman or ranking member of one of the appropriate congressional committees, as a briefing at an appropriate level of security.

SEC. 262. CONTENTS OF NATIONAL STRATEGY.

The strategy described in section 261 shall contain the following:

(1) **EVALUATION OF EXISTING EFFORTS.**—An assessment of the effectiveness of and ways in which the United States is currently addressing the highest levels of risk of various forms of illicit finance, including those identified in the documents entitled “2015 National Money Laundering Risk Assessment” and “2015 National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment”, published by the Department of the Treasury and a description of how the strategy is integrated into, and supports, the broader counter terrorism strategy of the United States.

(2) **GOALS, OBJECTIVES, AND PRIORITIES.**—A comprehensive, research-based, long-range, quantifiable discussion of goals, objectives, and priorities for disrupting and preventing illicit finance activities within and

transiting the financial system of the United States that outlines priorities to reduce the incidence, dollar value, and effects of illicit finance.

(3) **THREATS.**—An identification of the most significant illicit finance threats to the financial system of the United States.

(4) **REVIEWS AND PROPOSED CHANGES.**—Reviews of enforcement efforts, relevant regulations and relevant provisions of law and, if appropriate, discussions of proposed changes determined to be appropriate to ensure that the United States pursues coordinated and effective efforts at all levels of government, and with international partners of the United States, in the fight against illicit finance.

(5) **DETECTION AND PROSECUTION INITIATIVES.**—A description of efforts to improve, as necessary, detection and prosecution of illicit finance, including efforts to ensure that—

(A) subject to legal restrictions, all appropriate data collected by the Federal Government that is relevant to the efforts described in this section be available in a timely fashion to—

(i) all appropriate Federal departments and agencies; and

(ii) as appropriate and consistent with section 314 of the International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 (31 U.S.C. 5311 note), to financial institutions to assist the financial institutions in efforts to comply with laws aimed at curbing illicit finance; and

(B) appropriate efforts are undertaken to ensure that Federal departments and agencies charged with reducing and preventing illicit finance make thorough use of publicly available data in furtherance of this effort.

(6) **THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE FINANCIAL SECTOR IN PREVENTION OF ILLICIT FINANCE.**—A discussion of ways to enhance partnerships between the private financial sector and Federal departments and agencies with regard to the prevention and detection of illicit finance, including—

(A) efforts to facilitate compliance with laws aimed at stopping such illicit finance while maintaining the effectiveness of such efforts; and

(B) providing guidance to strengthen internal controls and to adopt on an industry-wide basis more effective policies.

(7) **ENHANCEMENT OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION.**—A discussion of ways to combat illicit finance by enhancing—

(A) cooperative efforts between and among Federal, State, and local officials, including State regulators, State and local prosecutors, and other law enforcement officials; and

(B) cooperative efforts with and between governments of countries and with and between multinational institutions with expertise in fighting illicit finance, including the Financial Action Task Force and the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units.

(8) **TREND ANALYSIS OF EMERGING ILLICIT FINANCE THREATS.**—A discussion of and data regarding trends in illicit finance, including evolving forms of value transfer such as so-called cryptocurrencies, other methods that are computer, telecommunications, or Internet-based, cyber crime, or any other threats that the Secretary may choose to identify.

(9) **BUDGET PRIORITIES.**—A multiyear budget plan that identifies sufficient resources needed to successfully execute the full range of missions called for in this section.

(10) **TECHNOLOGY ENHANCEMENTS.**—An analysis of current and developing ways to leverage technology to improve the effectiveness of efforts to stop the financing of terrorism and other forms of illicit finance, including better integration of open-source data.

PART II—ENHANCING ANTITERRORISM TOOLS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

SEC. 271. IMPROVING ANTITERROR FINANCE MONITORING OF FUNDS TRANSFERS.

(a) **STUDY.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—To improve the ability of the Department of the Treasury to better track cross-border fund transfers and identify potential financing of terrorist or other forms of illicit finance, the Secretary shall carry out a study to assess—

(A) the potential efficacy of requiring banking regulators to establish a pilot program to provide technical assistance to depository institutions and credit unions that wish to provide account services to money services businesses serving individuals in Somalia;

(B) whether such a pilot program could be a model for improving the ability of United States persons to make legitimate funds transfers through transparent and easily monitored channels while preserving strict compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act (Public Law 91-508; 84 Stat. 1114) and related controls aimed at stopping money laundering and the financing of terrorism; and

(C) consistent with current legal requirements regarding confidential supervisory information, the potential impact of allowing money services businesses to share certain State examination information with depository institutions and credit unions, or whether another appropriate mechanism could be identified to allow a similar exchange of information to give the depository institutions and credit unions a better understanding of whether an individual money services business is adequately meeting its anti-money laundering and counter-terror financing obligations to combat money laundering, the financing of terror, or related illicit finance.

(2) **PUBLIC INPUT.**—The Secretary should solicit and consider public input as appropriate in developing the study required under subsection (a).

(b) **REPORT.**—Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report that contains all findings and determinations made in carrying out the study required under subsection (a).

SEC. 272. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION REGARDING TERRORIST FINANCING INTELLIGENCE.

It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Crimes, should intensify work with foreign partners to help the foreign partners develop intelligence analytic capacities, in a financial intelligence unit, finance ministry, or other appropriate agency, that are—

(1) commensurate to the threats faced by the foreign partner; and

(2) designed to better integrate intelligence efforts with the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing regimes of the foreign partner.

SEC. 273. EXAMINING THE COUNTER-TERROR FINANCING ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY IN EMBASSIES.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services

and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report that contains—

(1) a list of the United States embassies in which a full-time Department of the Treasury financial attaché is stationed and a description of how the interests of the Department of the Treasury relating to terrorist financing and money laundering are addressed (via regional attachés or otherwise) at United States embassies where no such attachés are present;

(2) a list of the United States embassies at which the Department of the Treasury has assigned a technical assistance advisor from the Office of Technical Assistance of the Department of the Treasury;

(3) an overview of how Department of the Treasury financial attachés and technical assistance advisors assist in efforts to counter illicit finance, to include money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing; and

(4) an overview of patterns, trends, or other issues identified by the Department of the Treasury and whether resources are sufficient to address these issues.

SEC. 274. INCLUSION OF SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Section 101(c)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021(c)(1)) is amended by inserting “the Secretary of the Treasury,” before “and such other officers”.

(b) **RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.**—The amendment made by subsection (a) may not be construed to authorize the National Security Council to have a professional staff level that exceeds the limitation set forth under section 101(e)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021(e)(3)).

SEC. 275. INCLUSION OF ALL FUNDS.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Section 5326 of title 31, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in the heading of such section, by striking “coin and currency”;

(2) in subsection (a)—

(A) by striking “subtitle and” and inserting “subtitle or to”; and

(B) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking “United States coins or currency (or such other monetary instruments as the Secretary may describe in such order)” and inserting “funds (as the Secretary may describe in such order),”;

(3) in subsection (b)—

(A) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking “coins or currency (or monetary instruments)” and inserting “funds”; and

(B) in paragraph (2), by striking “coins or currency (or such other monetary instruments as the Secretary may describe in the regulation or order)” and inserting “funds (as the Secretary may describe in the regulation or order)”.

(b) **CLERICAL AMENDMENT.**—The table of contents for chapter 53 of title 31, United States Code, is amended in the item relating to section 5326 by striking “coin and currency”.

PART III—DEFINITIONS

SEC. 281. DEFINITIONS.

In this subtitle—

(1) the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, Committee on Armed Services, Committee on the Judiciary, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on the Judiciary, Committee on Homeland Security, and the Permanent Select Committee

on Intelligence of the House of Representatives;

(2) the term “appropriate Federal banking agencies” has the meaning given the term in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813);

(3) the term “Bank Secrecy Act” means—

(A) section 21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1829b);

(B) chapter 2 of title I of Public Law 91–508 (12 U.S.C. 1951 et seq.); and

(C) subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, United States Code;

(4) the term “Federal functional regulator” has the meaning given that term in section 509 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (15 U.S.C. 6809);

(5) the term “illicit finance” means the financing of terrorism, narcotics trafficking, or proliferation, money laundering, or other forms of illicit financing domestically or internationally, as defined by the President;

(6) the term “money services business” has the meaning given the term under section 1010.100 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations;

(7) the term “Secretary” means the Secretary of the Treasury; and

(8) the term “State” means each of the several States, the District of Columbia, and each territory or possession of the United States.

Subtitle D—Rule of Construction

SEC. 291. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

Nothing in this title or the amendments made by this title (other than sections 216 and 236(b)) shall be construed to limit the authority of the President under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).

Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, I just want to say to my colleague, the Democratic leader, that I think this is a good example of the Senate at its best. We all know this has been a period of rather partisan sparring back and forth on a variety of different things, but both sides were able to put that aside and deal with two important issues in a very significant way. I think it is good for the Senate and good for the country, and I thank the Democratic leader for his comments.

COUNTERING IRAN'S DESTABILIZING ACTIVITIES ACT OF 2017

Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate resume consideration of S. 722.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The clerk will report the bill.

The senior assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 722) to impose sanctions with respect to Iran in relation to Iran's ballistic missile program, support for acts of international terrorism, and violations of human rights, and for other purposes.

Pending:

McConnell (for Crapo) amendment No. 232, as modified, to impose sanctions with respect to the Russian Federation and to combat terrorism and illicit financing.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.

U.S. TRAVEL TO CUBA

Mr. FLAKE. Mr. President, rumor has it that on Friday the President will announce a change in U.S. policy to-

ward Cuba. There are lots of different rumors about what that might entail. I thought I would talk for just a couple of minutes about the consequences of such action, what has been accomplished in Cuba, what our goals are, and what I think our goals should be.

We have had a long policy of isolation with regard to Cuba. For more than 50 years, we tried to isolate the island and hoped the government would change somehow. It didn't. For more than 50 years, we have prohibited Americans from freely traveling to Cuba. We have had periods that the restrictions have gone down a bit and then up again, but by and large Americans have been prohibited, unless they fall into certain classes, to travel to Cuba. Then, when they are in Cuba, their travel around the island, the activities they undertake, are specifically prescribed by the U.S. Government.

I always thought that certainly there is a place for economic sanctions. Sometimes they can help nudge countries or push countries toward a desired outcome—but a travel ban? You only impose a travel ban under extreme circumstances, such as when national security reasons dictate, and there hasn't, for a long time, been national security reasons for a travel ban. I have always thought that as an American citizen that if somebody is going to limit my travel, it ought to be a Communist, somebody from another country that wouldn't let me in, not my own government to tell me where I can and cannot travel. I think most Americans feel that way.

I think we ought to first consider whom these sanctions are on. The sanctions we have had for so many years have not really been on Cubans; they have been on Americans. Gratefully, the previous administration lessened these restrictions or lessened the impact around them. Around 2008 or 2009, the last administration said that Cuban Americans should be able to travel freely at least. Prior to that, we had instances where Cuban Americans would have to decide, if their parents, for example, were still in Cuba and were aging, maybe their mother was infirm—they had to decide if my mother passes away, do I attend her funeral or if my father passes away within 3 years—see, it used to be that Cuban Americans were limited to travel to the island just once every 3 years. They had to decide whether to attend their mother's funeral or their father's funeral. What a terrible thing for our government to tell American citizens, that they have to choose whether to attend their father's funeral or their mother's funeral. What kind of a country is that? Why would we do that? Yet we did for a number of years.

Gratefully, the last administration lifted restrictions on Cuban-American travel and at the same time lifted considerable restrictions on remittances, allowing money to flow more freely to relatives and others on the island. That

coincided with the time the Cuban Government realized they couldn't employ every Cuban, not even at \$20 a month, so they said: Go ahead and find another line of work in the private sector, run a bed and breakfast, have a private restaurant, have an auto repair facility or a beauty shop. Hundreds of thousands of Cubans have done so over the past 5 years, largely with seed capital provided by travel from Americans, particularly Cuban-American travel and remittances.

So there was a situation where virtually no Cuban was employed in the private sector 5 years ago, but today as much as 25 percent of the Cuban workforce is now in the private sector. They have obviously more economic freedom. The average waiter in a Cuban private restaurant brings in \$40 to \$50 a day, while the average Cuban working for the Cuban Government brings in \$20 to \$30 a month. So there is significantly more economic freedom for those in the private sector in Cuba but also significantly more personal freedom as well. That is a good thing. That stands with the policy and goal we always had to increase freedom for the Cuban people.

Now we hear that the administration may want to turn back some of that progress and say that Americans shouldn't be able to travel as freely or as frequently to Cuba. Some of the rumors say they will limit travel to once a year. We don't know if that will be for Cuban Americans or all Americans. By the way, it seems rather strange to have a policy that is ethnically based, where we say: You are a Cuban American, you can travel, but if you are another type of American, you can't. That just seems pretty un-American. We can't get back into a situation where a Cuban American, living in the United States, will have to choose whether they can attend their mother or their father's funeral. I hope we don't get back into that time.

Another thing we ought to consider is that when Americans travel more freely, as they have been able to do under what is called a general license for individual travelers—that was one of the changes that was made in just the past couple of years—then individual American travelers tend to go to Cuba and stay in a bed and breakfast run by a private Cuban citizen, travel in private taxi cabs, frequent a private restaurant. My own family has done that.

If we go back to the time when American travelers have to travel under a specific license or as a group, then those travelers will be pushed toward the Cuban hotels which are owned by the Cuban Government or military. Therefore, you have aided the Cuban Government more than the Cuban people. Under no system will you be able to cut off money completely from the Cuban Government or the private sector. There is leakage everywhere. That is how economies work. Why in the world do we have a policy where we directly benefit the Cuban Government

by pushing American travelers to the hotels they own rather than the private homes owned by private Cuban citizens? It seems to me these policies, if they are going to come forward—and it seems that they might be—just go against the policies and the goals we have.

Another thing we need to consider is that in the old times, when we had more restrictive policies on travel on Americans, those had to be enforced somehow. That falls upon the Office of Foreign Assets Control at Treasury.

OFAC, you may have heard recently, is the office we charge to enforce our sanctions on Iran. We are putting new sanctions on Iran. They will be charged with enforcing those. They will be charged with enforcing sanctions on Russia and new sanctions on Russia as well. Sanctions on North Korea, again, falls to OFAC. Yet we are telling OFAC that now they are going to have to spend a considerable amount of time and resources and manpower tracking down people going to Cuba to see if they stick to their designated, approved itinerary, whatever that might be, whatever we think they ought to be doing there, rather than what they want to be doing there. That just seems foolish to me and a waste of money, time and resources, and wrong-headed priorities with regard to other priorities that we have on sanctions.

We had situations in previous years that would simply be laughable if they weren't true, but I think the administration ought to consider that when we have a restrictive policy on travel, we are going to have situations that are just flat embarrassing to us. If that sounds crazy, it doesn't sound crazy to Joan Slote of San Diego, who traveled to Cuba in the year 2000 at the age of 72 with a Canadian company that organized cycling tours. She was fined \$7,500 in the United States because she hadn't preapproved the itinerary and didn't follow the guidelines. She went through a Canadian company to do that. The subsequent fees totaled nearly \$10,000. I think it was settled for something less, but why in the world are we sanctioning and fining a 72-year-old woman who went on a biking tour in Cuba.

Consider the case of Cevin Allen in the State of Washington. He spent part of his childhood in Cuba, where his parents were missionaries. They built an Assembly of God Church in a town in southeastern Cuba. His parents died in 1987 in a house fire. Ten years later, Allen traveled to Cuba to scatter the ashes of his parents at the church they had built. He also brought a family Bible to give to the church's pastor. Cevin returned to the United States via Nassau, Bahamas, where he told U.S. agents he had just been to Cuba. He told them the reasons for his travel. His initial fine was \$7,500.

Do we really want to be fining people who are scattering the ashes of their parents? These aren't isolated incidents. This went on for a while.

A woman from Indiana was fined for distributing Bibles in Cuba because her itinerary didn't include a trip to the beach. She went to the beach, I am told, to participate or to watch a baptism that was happening at that time. Why in the world would we try to limit that kind of travel? Yet that is what we would be doing if we go back to restricting travel.

Maybe these rumors are overblown. Maybe we will not be imposing new restrictions on travel, but if we are, I hope the administration will consider these things.

There is another rumor out there that we know that if we diminish American travel, therefore diminishing the amount of money that goes to these Cuban entrepreneurs who are running bed and breakfasts and private restaurants, then we can make up for it somehow by having some of our government agencies teach entrepreneurship classes. Anybody who has been in Cuba understands that Cubans who have survived on \$20 a month for decades are more entrepreneurial than we will ever be. They don't need lessons in entrepreneurship, they need customers, and by denying Americans the freedom to travel to Cuba, we will be denying them customers, and they will be worse off. Their political freedom will be diminished. Their economic freedom will be diminished. Their personal freedom will be diminished. That is not what we want.

Obviously, we want the Cuban Government to change. It has been disappointing, the rate of change. Why would we take it out on the Cuban people? Don't they have it tough enough with a Communist government that wants to control and keep that control as long as they can? Why don't we continue to help the Cuban people as they have been helped over the past couple of years? We also want to consider the cooperation we have with the Cuban Government with regard to issues such as drug interdiction, environmental cooperation, immigration enforcement. In the past couple of years, we had a lot of Cubans rafting to South Florida because of the wet foot, dry foot policy. We have had tens of thousands of Cubans crossing the Mexican border to make it to Arizona or Texas or California or New Mexico to claim or to be paroled into our system and ultimately perhaps to get citizenship. Because of agreements we have had and the diplomatic cooperation we have had over the past couple of years, and specifically over the past couple of months, we have been able to reach an agreement where we don't have that kind of migration and those kinds of issues. So there are tangible benefits to the diplomatic cooperation we have had. I am told we are not going to touch that; that we are not going to roll back. We have diplomatic relations and that is a good thing.

We don't want to go back to the time where instead of an embassy, we had a special interests section in Cuba and

the Cubans had one here. I hope the President of the United States and his Cabinet will consider these things as they make decisions on what to do on Cuba. There are changes to policy we can make, but I would argue they would be more in terms of further liberalizing travel. We have a bill that has been filed in the Senate with 55 cosponsors. It is a bipartisan bill to completely lift the travel ban and get rid of it completely. If such a measure is brought to the floor, I am confident there will be between 65 and 70 votes—maybe more—for such a bill. Instead, we seem to be going in the other direction or the administration is talking about going in the other direction. I hope they will reconsider.

I yield the floor.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TOOMEY). The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AMENDMENT NO. 232, AS MODIFIED

Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, Russia remains a hostile, recalcitrant power that deploys its military, its cyber espionage activities, and its economic tactics to harm the United States of America—to drive a wedge between us and our allies.

President Obama began to impose tough sanctions for Russia's cyber attacks, its cyber intrusion, its illegal annexation of Crimea, and its continuing aggression in Ukraine and Syria. Congress joined in that effort by enacting two measures to tighten and broaden those sanctions. Lifting and relaxing those sanctions now would only reward Russia's attempts to undermine our democracy.

The administration continues to exercise a policy of strategic ambiguity when it comes to Russia, and the President, putting it mildly, has sent mixed signals. Just last month, Gary Cohn, the President's senior economic adviser, seemed to suggest that the United States could relax sanctions on Russia, and, as press reports confirmed 2 weeks ago, in its early days, the Trump administration considered removing all measures against Russia, according to former administration officials. Think of that.

We all hear the discussion—maybe collusion, maybe not—about the Russians' friendship with the administration, whether the Trump family or the Trump businesses or the Trump White House has had some kind of relationships—almost everybody here thinks—with the oilmen, with the oligarchs, with the Kremlin, maybe even Putin himself. And to think that soon after taking office, before the public and the rest of us began to start learning more about Trump's ties with Russia, the administration considered the removal of any kind of measures punishing Russia.

This amendment, written by Senators CRAPO, CORKER, CARDIN, me, and our offices and our staffs, sends an unambiguous message that the United States will not accept Russia's continued aggression, will adopt tough measures to both punish its past actions and deter future aggression against our country and our allies.

Over the last week, the chairs and ranking members of key Senate committees conducted intense negotiations over a package of tough and meaningful reforms and expansions to our current Russia sanctions regime. We have had good, positive, productive, bipartisan conversations. Last night we reached agreement on this broad package of new measures that substantially expands sanctions on Russia in response to its malicious cyber attacks, efforts to undermine democracy, and continuing aggression in Syria and in eastern Ukraine. This package assures Congress and the people we represent that we have more of a say in this critical national security debate.

The amendment would do a number of things. It would codify and strengthen six existing Obama administration Executive orders on Russia and Ukraine and on Russian cyber activities and the sanctions flowing from them.

It would provide for strict congressional review of any effort by the President to relax and suspend and terminate or waive Russian sanctions patterned after the Iran Review Act.

It would require mandatory imposition of sanctions on malicious cyber activity against the United States, on corrupt Russian actors around the world, on foreign sanctions evaders violating the Russia, Ukraine, and cyber-related sanctions controls, on those involved in serious human rights abuses in territories forcibly controlled by Russia, and on special Russian crude oil projects around the world.

It would authorize broad new sanctions on key sectors of Russia's economy, including mining, metals, shipping, and railways, as well as new investments in energy pipelines.

It would crack down on anyone investing in corrupt privatization efforts in Russia—something we have seen a lot of over 20 years.

It would broaden the Treasury Department's authority to impose geographic targeting orders, allowing investigators to obtain ATM and wire transfer records so Treasury can better target illicit activity of Russian oligarchs in the United States.

It would require Treasury to provide Congress with a study on the tangled web of senior government officials from Russia and their family members and any current U.S. economic exposures to Russian oligarchs and their investments, and that includes real estate.

It would require the administration to assess and report to Congress on extending secondary sanctions to additional Russian oligarchs and state-owned and related enterprises.

Since 2014, Congress has worked together—Republicans and Democrats—to craft increasingly tougher sanctions to hold Russia accountable for a long line of misdeeds. It is a long line indeed, from Russia's violations of international law and of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, to its role in the brutal repression in the war in Syria, to the cyber attacks that we are learning more and more about on Americans.

The Ukrainian community in my State—vibrant, successful, progressive—and around the world knows firsthand the dangers of unchecked Russian aggression. We should strengthen—not weaken, not relax, not peel back—Russian sanctions.

I urge my colleagues here and in the House to support this amendment, and I will urge the President to sign it into law. We must continue to vigorously enforce and strengthen sanctions against Russia to send a message to its leaders and the world that the United States of America will not tolerate efforts to undermine democracy around the world.

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

Mr. President, our democracy is founded on checks and balances—and not just among the branches of government. Our Founders enshrined the freedom of the press in the Bill of Rights for a reason. We can't have a functioning democracy without freedom of the press. That is why last week the Newseum marked its annual Day Without News to remind Americans what our country would be—what we would be like, what we would look like, how we would act—without a free press.

Journalists' entire job is to ask tough questions and to challenge powerful interests. While in church, we comfort the afflicted, journalists afflict the comfortable. Reporters put their safety and far too often their lives on the line, whether it is covering floods and hurricanes at home or traversing the globe to bring us the stories of our troops. We depend on reporters in Ohio and around the world to both bring us the stories that impact our day-to-day lives and to tell the stories that simply otherwise might not be told.

Supporting a vibrant, independent, proactive press corps has rarely been more important in our country. Yet, too often we see reporters restricted, vilified, attacked, and even physically threatened, all for doing the jobs for which they were hired.

Today brought news in this body that some people in this building—some Members of the Senate—are trying to bar reporters from asking Senators questions. This is outrageous. If Senators can't handle tough questions from reporters about their plans to take healthcare away from millions of Americans, maybe they should change the bill, not restrict the reporters.

We remember that Oval Office meeting with Russian officials. We have seen the pictures of the President of

the United States with the Russian Foreign Minister, with the Russian Ambassador. We have seen those pictures, but what we need to remember about those pictures—those photos that ran on front pages around this country and all over the world—those photos weren't taken by American journalists. The President of the United States threw them out of the Oval Office. Those pictures were taken by the Russian state media.

The Russian state media was allowed to be in the room with the President of the United States in the Oval Office—hallowed ground in our democracy—while the American press was thrown out. The Russian state media, the old Soviet news agency, TASS, the remnants of the old Soviet propaganda machine, was allowed in, while the American press was barred. When you hide from the press, you hide from the American people.

On November 16, a group representing more than a dozen journalist organizations sent a letter to the President-elect. They wrote: "This isn't about access for the press itself, it's about access for Americans in diverse communities around the country."

Having a strong, independent White House and congressional press corps isn't just important for those reporters' stories. Think about the signal it sends to mayors and city council members and State legislators. If the Members of Congress—the President, by throwing press out of the Oval Office and bringing in the old Soviet news agency TASS, or the Senate, by throwing reporters out of the Senate—if they don't have to be accountable, why should a mayor, why should a city council person, why should a Governor think they should be accountable?

It is not just Washington reporters who are vital to democracy. It is reporters in Ohio telling us the stories, bringing us the faces of the opioid epidemic that devastates families and communities. It is Ohio's editorial pages highlighting how important the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative is to our drinking water and our State's economy. It has enabled Senator PORTMAN and me and bipartisan Senators all over the Great Lakes, from New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota—Senators from both parties fighting back and stopping the cuts that would have destroyed so much of the progress in cleaning up the Great Lakes. It is journalists in every corner of my State highlighting the devastation that the proposed budget would have on our schools and our housing and rural communities. It is emphasizing again that 200,000 Ohioans right now are getting opioid treatment because they have insurance from the Affordable Care Act. It is reminding politicians in Ohio of both parties that those people need insurance. That is what a free press does.

Parenthetically, I would add, my wife is a journalist. She is a Pulitzer Prize

winner. She is a columnist. She is soon to be a novelist. She clearly has outspoken views about this, as I do. She is a member of the press. I am a Member of this body. We both believe in a free press. We both believe in a free democracy.

We answer to journalists in this body because they are the eyes and ears of the people we serve. If you can't understand—if none of us are strong enough and articulate enough and gutsy enough to stand before reporters who ask tough questions about your positions, then maybe you ought to rethink your positions.

We need diligent, courageous reporters to dig up their stories. We need independent editors to put them on front pages. We need media organizations willing to hold the powerful accountable.

The American people have a right to know what is going on in their own government, from the White House down to the city council office.

The behavior today of the Rules Committee—the Rules Committee decision to ban reporters—television reporters specifically—from this body is just reprehensible. Thomas Jefferson said, "Our liberty depends on the freedom of the press, and that cannot be limited without being lost." That is as true today as it was more than 200 years ago at the time of our country's founding.

To all of the reporters out there, thank you.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.

AMENDMENT NO. 232, AS MODIFIED

Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I am glad to be down here with our ranking member, Senator BEN CARDIN from Maryland. I want to thank him and his staff for working until 10:20 last night to complete negotiations on a Russia amendment. I want to thank Senator CRAPO and his staff and Senator BROWN and his staff for the work they did on the sanctions component, where over the last 5 months they have worked with our counterparts around the world to make sure that what we did in this piece of legislation was something that was workable. Truly, I think it has been a great effort by four different offices. I am glad that cloture has been filed on that amendment, and I understand we are going to vote on it tomorrow at 2 o'clock.

I will be very brief. Senator CARDIN and I are here on the floor together, and I know he wants to make some comments about this. Let me just give a brief summary, if I could.

The amendment enhances Congress's role in determining sanctions policy on Russia. It provides for the President to use a national security waiver or sanctions termination after giving Congress 30 days to review the proposed action.

I think everyone here knows I am a strong proponent of congressional review. We began that under President Obama. To me, it gets us in a place where we are playing an appropriate role in foreign policy.

The amendment codifies existing sanctions on Russia for their activities in Ukraine and cyber space.

The amendment strengthens and expands existing conduct-based sanctions by requiring the imposition of sanctions on actors undermining cyber security, supplying arms to Syria, human rights abusers, and those involved in corrupt privatization of government-owned assets.

It mandates sanctions on Russian deep-water, Arctic, and shale projects worldwide and yet allows for waivers to be made based on national security interests of the United States.

This amendment prioritizes U.S. foreign assistance to allies in their fight against Russian aggression. This is something I know Senator CARDIN worked hard on, and I appreciate his efforts.

It authorizes \$250 million to establish the Countering Russian Influence Fund to implement programs in EU and NATO member countries—Senator PORTMAN played a role in this as well, and I appreciate his efforts—as well as candidate nations, to combat Russian interference, with a priority given to programs that develop cyber security, address public corruption, respond to humanitarian crises, counter disinformation, and support democratic institutions.

It requires the State Department and other Federal agencies to collaborate and develop a plan to reduce Ukraine's dependence on Russian energy imports, which we know Russia has used to extort Ukraine.

I think it is a very good piece of legislation. I appreciate the contributions of many Members here. I know Senator MCCAIN, Senator GRAHAM, Senator RUBIO, and so many people here have been involved in wanting to produce legislation that pushes back in this way. We have tried to utilize the best of many bills that have been put forth.

Again, I cannot thank the ranking member and his staff enough for the way they have worked with us to get us to this point.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.

Mr. CARDIN. Mr. President, I just want to follow up briefly with Chairman CORKER. The two of us became friends in 2007, when we were both elected to the U.S. Senate the same year and were part of the same class. But I think the two of us really became close friends a little over 2 years ago, when we were confronted with how Congress should deal with the nuclear agreement being negotiated by President Obama with Iran and our European friends, along with Russia and China.

As the two of us worked around the clock to try to develop an appropriate review process so that Congress could play a constructive role—we recognize that we are the legislative branch, and we have oversight functions, but there is an appropriate role for us with regard to Executive actions—we came

out with something that no one expected could be done; that is, nearly unanimous support in this body for a review statute in regard to the Iran negotiations.

Chairman CORKER has taken this same template and has now used that to apply to Russia in the removal of sanctions on Russia. It started with a bill that was put together by Senator GRAHAM and me. It has been modified through the negotiations we have had, as Senator CORKER has commented, with Senator BROWN and Senator CRAPO. But it does, in effect, provide that there will be notice to Congress before the administration can give any sanction relief to Russia, so there can be transparency and a discussion and a debate. Then there is a process by which Congress, if we feel strongly and can get the necessary support, can disapprove of sanction relief.

I think that is the proper way for us to deal with one of the most important bilateral relationships in the world—between the United States and Russia—and it is appropriate that it is going to be an amendment to the Iran sanctions bill because the review process came out of the Iran agreement.

The review process would be triggered if there is action taken by the President to give relief, but the legislation also includes additional sanctions, as the chairman pointed out, with Russia. It does this in a way that codifies the President's Executive orders so that there is now congressional support for Executive orders. It expands those sanctions in the area of cyber, as the chairman pointed out, and for energy projects, financial institutions facilitating transactions, Russian arms and related materiel to Syria, the corrupt privatization of government-owned assets.

I particularly thank the chairman for the way he was able to recognize that, in Russia, what we don't want to see us contribute to is corruption, and we concentrate on the corruption issue, not the business issue. It is the area of corruption that becomes the important thing.

We tighten up a lot of the different sanctions. Then we set up a process where there needs to be certified progress made; otherwise, these are mandatory sanctions the President must impose.

As the chairman pointed out, negotiations included aspects of legislation that was first introduced by Senator MCCAIN and me on sanctions, by Senator GRAHAM and me on review of sanction relief, by Senators CRAPO and BROWN on proposed legislation dealing with sanctions, and Chairman CORKER had significant drafting issues that he brought to the table in our negotiations. So it was a free discussion, and the end result is—I said this before but I want to underscore this—the Banking Committee brought some very helpful suggestions to make sure the financial sanctions worked. It is one thing that we want to make sure there are penalties, but we have to make sure they

work right, and I compliment the work of the Banking Committee in making sure that we use the right standards and that this will meet international muster. It is absolutely essential that this template be one in which our European allies can follow our leadership. If we didn't do that, we could have been isolated, which would not have had the same impact as I think these sanctions will have in working with our European allies.

The chairman mentioned several of our colleagues on the committee. I need to mention Senator SHAHEEN and Senator MENENDEZ, who played very, very important roles in our caucus. Senator DURBIN and Senator SCHUMER also played roles in this, and I acknowledge their contributions.

Included in this bill is the democracy initiative, which deals with providing more unified support with our allies in Europe in fighting Russia's propaganda and attacks on our democratic institutions. Senator PORTMAN made major contributions to that, as the chairman has also acknowledged, and then, brought to us mainly through the Banking bill, we have a strategy to trace terrorism and financing in terrorism, which I think is very important to be included in the amendment.

We will have a chance to vote on this amendment at 2 o'clock tomorrow. I encourage my colleagues to adopt this. Senator CORKER and I expect to be back on the floor tomorrow as we manage the underlying bill, at which time I will want to comment on the importance of our passing the Iran sanctions bill, which is vitally important because of Iranian activities taking place today.

For all of those reasons, I encourage my colleagues to please read the amendment that has been filed in a bipartisan effort to deal with this challenge that Russia has provided through their activities in attacking our democratic institutions, in their continued aggression in Ukraine, and their human rights violations in Syria.

I might add that Senator MENENDEZ's provisions on human rights sanctions are included in this amendment. It really does, I think, capture the essence of the broad consensus of the U.S. Senate and is worthy of our support.

I yield the floor.

Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I thank my friend for his comments. Again, I wish to reiterate that the Banking staff, Senator CRAPO and his staff, and Senator BROWN and his staff did an outstanding job of focusing on sanctions that would work in the appropriate way, as was just laid out, and really brought out the best of the two committees to come up with the legislation that we have.

I hope we will have a very strong vote tomorrow. I think this very much supports U.S. foreign policy. I look forward to that taking place tomorrow at 2 o'clock.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.

Ms. KLOBUCHAR. Mr. President, I thank my colleagues, Senator CORKER and Senator CARDIN, for their fine work on the Countering Iran's Destabilizing Activities Act, of course, and then this Russia amendment that so many of us have been pushing for so long. I especially thank Senator CARDIN for his leadership on that, as well as Senator BROWN and Senator CRAPO—and the work that Senator MCCONNELL and Senator SCHUMER did, as well as a lot of members of the Foreign Relations Committee, who care a lot about this.

As I look at this, I look first at the Iranian part of the underlying bill. We have had many disagreements in the last few years on the Iranian nuclear agreement, but it is now critical. This is the time for those who opposed the agreement and those who supported it to come together to ensure that all of the parties to the agreement are upholding their obligations.

When the United States and our allies agreed to the Iranian nuclear agreement, we made it clear that we will continue to hold Iran accountable for its nefarious activities outside of the four corners of the agreement. We must hold Iran accountable for missile tests, for financing terrorism, and human rights violations. That is our job, and that is why I was an early cosponsor of the legislation before the Senate today.

The Countering Iran's Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017 imposes mandatory sanctions on those involved with Iran's ballistic missile program, as well as those who fund terrorist organizations and commit human rights violations. Iran's ballistic missile program is a threat to regional and global security, and United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 makes it illegal for Iran to develop ballistic missiles that could carry a nuclear weapon. Any person or business involved in helping Iran obtain illegal weapons should be banned from doing business with the United States, have their assets immediately frozen, and their travel restricted.

Minimizing the threat Iran poses also means holding it accountable for funding terrorist groups that threaten Israel and seek to destabilize the region. We should be doing everything in our power to better track terrorist financing so we can stop the flow of money that funds suicide bombers and illicit weapons.

Our mission here is clear: We must protect our own citizens and our allies by enacting strong legislation to ensure that Iran does not cheat on its international commitment. Iran must know that if it violates the rules, it will be held accountable.

Democrats and Republicans have come together to get this done, and it is my hope that we can pass the legislation this week, including the amendment imposing strong sanctions against Russia, which is essential to

protecting our democracy from foreign interference.

Seventeen United States intelligence agencies have confirmed that Russia tried to interfere in the 2016 election. That is not all. We know Russia is using covert cyber attacks, espionage, and harmful propaganda to try to undermine our democracy. They launched cyber attacks against local election systems, a U.S. voting systems software company, and the emails of more than 100 local election officials. Russian-backed criminals hacked into Yahoo and stole data from 500 million accounts. They repeatedly harassed American diplomats in Moscow.

The former Director of Intelligence, James Clapper, recently testified that Russia will continue to interfere in our political system. This is what he said:

I believe [Russia is] now emboldened to continue such activities in the future both here and around the world and to do so even more intensely. If there has ever been a clarion call for vigilance and action against a threat to the very foundation of our democratic political system, this episode is it.

Vigilance—that is what we need right now. That is why I joined a bipartisan group of my colleagues to introduce the Countering Russian Hostilities Act, legislation that would impose strong sanctions against Russia. These sanctions would address Russia's cyber attacks, its human rights violations, and its illegal annexation of land in Ukraine and Georgia.

I am also the cosponsor of the Russia Sanctions Review Act, bipartisan legislation that would require congressional review if sanctions against Russia are rolled back.

The Russia sanctions amendment offered today contains essential portions of both of these pieces of legislation.

After those 17 intelligence agencies confirmed that Russia interfered in our elections, President Obama enacted important sanctions against officials in the Russian Government and hackers conducting malicious cyber activity on behalf of the Russian Government. The amendment before us today would codify those sanctions. The amendment also strengthens sanctions against Russia's energy sector, corrupt Russian officials, and those who supply weapons to the Assad regime.

The day the Obama administration was imposing these additional sanctions on Russia, I was actually with Senators MCCAIN and GRAHAM in Eastern Europe. The goal of our trip was to reinforce support for NATO and our allies in the face of increased Russian aggression. On the trip, we went to the Baltics, Ukraine, and Georgia, countries on the frontlines of these fights. They know Russia's playbook well.

In our meetings with Presidents and Prime Ministers of these countries, it was increasingly evident that if we don't stop Russia now, cyber attacks against governments, political parties, newspapers, and companies will only get worse. We heard about websites being shut down and internet access

limited when one government—the Government of Estonia—simply had the audacity to move a bronze statue from a public square to a cemetery. It was of a Russian fighter. The Russian Government didn't like it, so they cut down their internet access.

Also, there were members of the Ukrainian Parliament who were invited to Lithuania. What happened to the Lithuanians in the Parliament? They were hacked into. Ukraine itself was targeted by Russian hackers more than 6,500 times over a 2-month period.

Most recently, Russia tried to undermine elections in France.

For years, our allies have been subjected to Russian aggression and invasion. But they are undeterred, unwilling to give up on that which they fought so hard for—independence, freedom, democracy.

So this is not just about defending our own democracy, as we look at these Russia sanctions that are before us today, as we look at the investigation that is ongoing and looking into the interference into our election. It is about defending a democratic way of life and democracies across the world. It is not just about the simple word “election” or the simple word “democracy.” It is not just about one candidate or one political party. As Senator RUBIO has noted, the next time it will be the other party.

No, this is about our Constitution. It is about our own independence from foreign powers. It is about freedom and the rights guaranteed to us in our own Constitution. If that is undermined, if foreign governments are allowed to come in and handpick who their candidate is based on either propaganda or cyber attacks, then we lose our constitutional rights because we the people are no longer determining who our representatives are. Other countries are.

The world continues to look to America for our steadfast leadership. The United States—a beacon for freedom and democracy—must continue to stand up against Russian aggression, not just in word but in deed. That is why it is so important that the Senate is coming together today to pass strong sanctions against the Russian Government. We want the Russian people to be able to have a democracy. We want them to be able to have a democracy that doesn't do things like bring down planes in Ukraine, that doesn't do things like try to influence other countries' elections. That is why these sanctions are so important.

We know that the Russian Government today is actively working to undermine our democracy and hurt American businesses. This is part of the cyber war. We know that this unprecedented interference has been orchestrated by the Kremlin so that Americans actually lose faith in our own political system. Over time, Russia has grown more determined in its effort to weaken democracies in its expanded sphere of influence. Now, more than

ever, Americans are looking to the Senate for leadership. We must stand strong and united so that Russia and other nations know that attacks against our democracy must not go unchecked. The amendment before us on the sanctions is an important step in doing just that.

I yield the floor.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. STRANGE). The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. TOOMEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

U.S.-MEXICO SUGAR AGREEMENT

Mr. TOOMEY. Mr. President, I rise this afternoon to express my considerable disappointment with the U.S.-Mexico sugar agreement that was announced just last week. This deal was concluded recently. The fact is that this is a bad deal for the United States. I am completely mystified as to why our Commerce Department would agree to it. It is a bad deal for U.S. consumers, and we are all consumers. It is a bad deal for American workers.

It completely fails to address the high price of sugar that we have in America today. In fact, it makes the problem worse. It increases the price that we all have to pay for sugar. It reduces choices for consumers, and it absolutely threatens jobs in the many food-producing industries that we have across our country. What it does is that it continues the protectionist policies that favor a handful of big sugar producers and refiners.

These are large, agribusiness companies, generally, already subsidized by domestic agricultural policies that force American consumers to pay artificially inflated prices for their products. It also limits imports, and the fact is that the agreement should be doing just the opposite. It should be giving us a free market in sugar so that American consumers can shop for the best deal available in the world, and that is exactly what it does not do.

Unfortunately, what they did at the Commerce Department is they failed to prioritize the concerns of ordinary American consumers, ordinary American workers. The fact is that the United States is a significant net importer of sugar. We are a huge country, and we don't produce as much sugar as we consume. So we import the difference. Mexico happens to be the No. 1 source of imported sugar. We get about 35 percent of our imported sugar from Mexico. The NAFTA trade agreement provided for free trade in sugar. It took a long time to get there, but it contemplated an arrangement where Mexico could sell to American consumers—like my wife, when she goes shopping at the store, and all of our families—without duties, without tariffs, without taxes, without obstacles.

But that didn't work out so well for some of the sugar producers. So they

went to court, and they accused Mexico of dumping sugar.

In order to avoid tariffs, the Mexican Government agreed to what they call the suspension agreement. It is an agreement that basically sets a minimum price.

So that is what we do. That is our sugar policy. The government dictates it, essentially, in conjunction with foreign governments. It is the American Government that has all the leverage here. We set prices. We fix prices. We don't have a free market. We establish, by central government fiat, what the price will be.

We also establish import quotas. We decide how much of foreign sugar an American will be permitted to buy, reminiscent of “Moscow on the Mississippi.” This is not how you have a free market that allows consumers to have the choices and the benefits from lower competition.

I was concerned about where this negotiation was heading. So Senator JEANNE SHAHEEN, a Democratic Senator from New Hampshire, and I sent a letter to Commerce Secretary Ross to urge him to consider the impact on consumers—which is all of us, I will reiterate—in negotiating this deal. There was a similar letter from House Members. Unfortunately, it apparently did not persuade our Commerce Department. In fact, this new agreement—as I think I mentioned—leaves us with a policy that is worse than it was before. This new so-called suspension agreement increases the already-inflated price of sugar—2 percent higher for raw sugar and 8 percent higher for refined sugar if it is imported from Mexico.

How does it help the 320 million Americans? How does it help ordinary Americans to be forced to pay more for the sugar that we all have to buy? It is a staple in our food. The answer is that it doesn't help. It hurts the single mom who is going to the grocery store to buy cereal for her kids when she has to pay approximately twice the price of the global price for sugar. Where does that money go? It goes straight out of her pocket and straight into the pockets of this handful of wealthy sugar producers in America. So it is absolutely bad policy for American consumers.

Make no mistake about it. Higher prices for Mexican sugar mean higher prices for American consumers—all of us. The Coalition for Sugar Reform estimates that the new agreement—just the new agreement—will cost U.S. consumers an additional billion dollars a year. That goes straight to the growers, the producers. As I said, U.S. sugar prices are already almost double the world prices, generally, because of the ridiculous agricultural policy we have with respect to sugar. The American Enterprise Institute reports that they believe that the current policy already costs U.S. consumers \$3 billion a year. So you have the \$3 billion a year from this flawed policy we used to have. Now we just added another billion dollars a

year in costs to our consumers by virtue of this suspension agreement. What the Commerce Department should be doing in these contexts is described as to reduce and eliminate this mandatory price fixing, eliminate these barriers to trade, and put U.S. consumers as the first priority.

I will point out that it is not only Americans as consumers who are harmed by this, but it is also Americans as workers. There are industries that use sugar as a component in their food products. My State of Pennsylvania, in particular, has a lot of these companies—200 confectioners. We have the most in any State. Our sugar-using industries employ nearly 40,000 workers across our Commonwealth. We have 600,000 workers across the country in the various food and beverage industries that make products that we all consume that use sugar. Guess what. Higher sugar prices jeopardize those well-paying food manufacturing jobs. About 120,000 such jobs have been lost over the last 2 decades because what happens is that American food producers just can't compete. American food producers are forced to buy artificially expensive sugar. Their foreign competitors don't have to do that. Their foreign competitors can buy sugar on the world market at about half the price. So guess what? An American candy maker or cereal maker or other food maker is at a huge competitive disadvantage. We have been losing them, in part, because we force them to pay these artificially high prices.

Our own Commerce Department—the very same Commerce Department that negotiated this deal—did a study. This is their work, not mine. They estimate that when you artificially prop up the price of sugar, you might save some jobs in the sugar-growing industry, but for every job you save there, you lose three jobs in the food processing and manufacturing industry—in the sugar consumption industry. What a terrible trade. What a terrible arrangement.

I am very disappointed to learn about this. The Commerce Department clearly failed to negotiate an agreement that would put consumers first and consumers' pocketbooks first. Instead, we have increased prices above the already artificially high levels. We have restrictions on sugar trade, and, apparently, we have decided to pursue protectionist policies that advance the interests of a small handful of wealthy growers at the expense of several hundred million American consumers. This strikes me as crony capitalism, and it is a huge mistake.

I hope that this is not a sign of what is to come in trade negotiations. We are told that the administration is going to be reevaluating and renegotiating various agreements, including NAFTA and others. As they are being reconsidered, I hope we will not go down this protectionist road of favoring a handful of the privileged few at the expense of the many, as we apparently did in this agreement.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in morning business for up to 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

CLIMATE CHANGE

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Mr. President, however loud, persistent, and powerful the climate denial operation has been, we have to remember that it has always been built on lies. It is a huge fortress of lies stacked upon lies—lies about the science, lies about the scientists, lies about doubt, lies about costs, lies through phony front groups, and lies about where the money comes from and who is pulling the strings.

This fortress of lies protects a subsidy to the fossil fuel industry that the International Monetary Fund puts at \$700 billion per year. For big, big money, you can do big, big lies, and they do. These have been the biggest lies of our generation. But to paraphrase the great reggae singer Jimmy Cliff: "The bigger you lie, the harder you fall." To paraphrase the "Game of Thrones," "The fall is coming." In the last few weeks, there has been news that has shaken this fortress of lies and moves us toward that fall. Shareholders are rising up.

For as long as there have been shareholder resolutions to fossil fuel companies about climate change, there has been resolute opposition from management to every vote. Hundreds of shareholder resolutions went down to defeat until now.

Occidental Petroleum shareholders last month won the first victory against management, and a week later mighty ExxonMobil was defeated by its shareholders. This new reporting that shareholders have demanded will help clear away the lies. The fall is coming.

There are even lies within the lies. To fend off this latest shareholder resolution to try to make the company look less irresponsible, ExxonMobil's CEO repeated the company's claim that it knows climate change is real and supports a carbon fee—but it doesn't.

As everyone in this building knows, ExxonMobil maintains a massive lobbying apparatus in Washington, and that massive apparatus is and always has been resolutely opposed to any such thing as a carbon fee or any serious climate action whatsoever, for that matter, unless maybe ExxonMobil doesn't know what its own vast lobbying apparatus is doing. Maybe ExxonMobil spends that enormous amount of money to exert its influence in Washington to stop any climate action, and the CEO is unaware of that going on. I doubt that. You be the judge of whether that is credible.

It is not just shareholders rising up; attorneys general are starting to win. The attorney general of New York has just filed pleadings in State court in New York asserting that ExxonMobil's

climate reporting has been a "sham"—to use the word from his filing; that, in the oldest of accounting tricks, ExxonMobil kept two sets of books assessing carbon pollution risk. After fierce opposition by ExxonMobil lawyers using every trick in the book to delay and snarl the New York attorney general, it looks now as if ExxonMobil may have lied to its investors and its shareholders. If ExxonMobil has lied to its shareholders, that is a violation of law, and that fall comes hard indeed.

Secretary of State Tillerson evidently knew of and approved the two sets of carbon pollution books when he was CEO of ExxonMobil. We will see where this goes, but of all the people around Trump who might be indicted, now we might add the Secretary of State.

The Attorney General of Massachusetts is also pursuing ExxonMobil against equally fierce tactics by ExxonMobil lawyers. To try to get away from the Massachusetts attorney general, the lawyers even went so far as to claim—get this—that ExxonMobil was not doing business in Massachusetts; that it didn't have the minimum contacts with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts necessary for the State even to assert jurisdiction. Well, the judge virtually laughed that argument out of court, but it shows how desperate ExxonMobil must be feeling as it tries to wriggle away from having to answer questions under oath.

Nothing turns a big lie into a hard fall better than having to put that right hand up and give truthful testimony and face cross-examination under penalty of perjury.

Will the Securities and Exchange Commission take a look at this sham reporting, too, or has the Federal government, under Trump, degenerated into such a fossil fuel banana republic that no Federal agency will do its job against that industry or might it even chime in on the side of industry Pruitt-style?

Do you remember the question of whether the fossil fuel climate denial operation merits investigation under Federal civil racketeering laws? The tobacco industry was sued under Federal civil racketeering laws by the U.S. Department of Justice so there is a model. You may remember that the question as to the fossil fuel climate denial operation was referred by Attorney General Lynch to the FBI—or so she testified.

One wonders, did the FBI ever take an honest look? What was the outcome? Was there ever a report? Are they still looking at it?

Remember that the Department of Justice won its civil racketeering case against the tobacco industry, they won it at trial, and they won again on appeal. The woman who won that case for the Department of Justice, the lead trial attorney for the Department, has said publicly that this climate denial operation also merits investigation as fraud. That would seem to be a knowledgeable opinion from the woman who

won the last case, an opinion perhaps worth heeding, but did anything happen? Will anything happen?

Forget too big to fail or too big to jail. Is the power of the fossil fuel industry now so great that it is too big even to investigate, even by the Department of Justice? Does it now take State attorneys general to do the job because the Federal government is so owned now by the fossil fuel industry?

Think about it. What if the FBI reported to the Attorney General that there was a meritorious fraud case arising out of all the lies propping up climate denial? Who believes Attorney General Sessions would allow that case to go forward against his party's biggest backer?

Well, the bigger the lie, ultimately, the harder the fall. One way or the other, this fact remains constant and true. There always will come a day of reckoning. With these shareholder victories and with these attorneys general victories, that day of reckoning is closing in—the day when they have to put that right hand up and testify truthfully and under oath, not just send out spin through front groups and operatives but testify truthfully under penalty of perjury.

It is long overdue for truth to have its day.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.

AMENDMENT NO. 232, AS MODIFIED

Mr. CRAPO. Mr. President, I rise to speak on the Crapo-Brown-Corker-Cardin Countering Russian Aggression and Cyber Attacks Act of 2017. This bill, filed as an amendment, was filed as amendment No. 232 to the Iran sanctions bill late last night.

Yesterday, the Senate Banking and Foreign Relations Committees concluded their work on a groundbreaking piece of legislation regarding Russia sanctions. I say groundbreaking because the legislation not only ratchets up pressure against the Russian Federation for its illegal invasion and annexation of Crimea, continuing escalation of violence in eastern Ukraine, and its cyber activities against businesses and citizens of the United States, but it also, importantly, provides Congress with a strong oversight process over almost any termination or suspension of these sanctions.

Senators CORKER, BROWN, CARDIN, and their staffs spent many hours to ensure that we put together a thoughtful and measured product, and I thank them for their work.

Senator BROWN and I have worked together for months to try to craft a responsible Russia sanctions package, and Senator CORKER has been a tireless champion of this measure as has Senator CARDIN. I also would be remiss if I did not recognize the work of Senators MCCAIN, BROWN, SHAHEEN, and the many others who have worked to develop much of what has ended up in this legislation. All of us appreciate the leadership of Majority Leader

McCONNELL and Senator SCHUMER, who worked with us as we came to our final agreement.

The need for this legislation was underlined by the fact that many Americans have deep concerns about Russia's behavior over the past few years. Since coming to power, Russian President Putin has become increasingly belligerent, nationalistic, and autocratic.

Currently, the United States has imposed sanctions on Russia for Russia's invasion and annexation of Crimea and its role in supporting the separatist movements in eastern Ukraine, Russia's increasing cyber attacks and cyber espionage against the United States, Russia's support for the Assad regime in Syria, and Russia's complicity for corruption.

Although this is not an exhaustive list, it demonstrates the lengths to which Russia will go to seize power and influence in the international arena.

Unfortunately, Putin's desire to increase Russia's political influence is not driven by a desire to raise the standard of living for Russians. Instead, it is driven by a craving to enrich and empower himself and his cronies.

Over the course of the past 3 months, the Senate Banking Committee has held hearings assessing the impacts of the current sanctions regime against Russia. We examined the existing Russian sanctions architecture in terms of its effectiveness and its economic impact. The Russians have largely learned to live within the economic confines of the existing sanctions regime.

In Putin's calculation, the cost of the sanctions do not outweigh the benefits of occupying Crimea and contributing to unrest in Ukraine, to continuing to support the Assad regime's assault on civilians in Syria, and conducting cyber attacks on people, companies, and institutions around the globe.

Many of us on both sides of the aisle feel the United States needs to be much stronger in its response. Americans want to see the United States stand firm in the defense of our long-held values, which include respect for territorial integrity, human rights, and liberty.

At this point, the only way to change Putin's cost-benefit analysis is to increase the pressure which we apply directly through sanctions.

The Crapo-Brown-Corker-Cardin amendment is an effective way to increase the pressure on Russia for its irresponsible conduct. Our legislation signals to the world the unflinching commitment of the United States to the sanctity of territorial integrity, human rights, and good governance. Our amendment also demonstrates our resolve in responding to cyber attacks against U.S. citizens and entities and against our allies.

In summary, the Crapo-Brown-Corker-Cardin amendment does four things: It escalates and expands the current sanctions regime against Rus-

sia; it creates new sanctions against Russia; it engages Congress at a higher level than before by providing a mechanism for Congress to vote before lifting any sanctions on Russia; and it increases the Treasury Department's ability to track illicit finance, including illicit flows linked to Russia.

We escalate and expand the current sanctions regime against Russia by codifying and modifying six current Executive orders. Four of these orders relate to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and two relate to Russia's malicious cyber activity.

We expand the sanctions under the Ukraine-related Executive orders to reach Russian deep-water, Arctic, and shale projects worldwide. We also permit the President to apply these sanctions to Russian railway, shipping, and metals and mining sectors.

The amendment also creates several new sanctions against Russia. There are new sanctions for those who are engaged in significant activities undermining cyber security. These sanctions also apply to those providing material support for such malicious cyber actors.

We also impose mandatory sanctions on entities engaged in special Russian energy projects and on foreign financial institutions facilitating transactions in response to Russia's continued aggression in Ukraine.

The amendment includes tough sanctions on Russian Government officials, their relatives, and close associates responsible for significant corruption in Russia or elsewhere.

It sanctions people who help others evade sanctions and people responsible for human rights violations in any territory controlled by Russia.

Additionally, it sanctions those who work for or on behalf of the Russian defense and intelligence sectors, those who invest or support the construction of Russian energy export pipelines, and corrupt government officials who enrich themselves after making deals to privatize state-owned assets.

Finally, it sanctions those who help the Assad regime acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons technology, ballistic or cruise missile capabilities, or destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons.

The Crapo-Brown-Corker-Cardin amendment will result in some very powerful new sanctions on Russia. Part of our agreement includes congressional review language to ensure Congress exerts proper oversight on the use of these powerful sanctions. We require the President to notify Congress when imposing certain types of sanctions, and we will have the opportunity to review any attempts to lift sanctions with regard to Russia. We intend to use this review model on all sanctions regimes moving forward, and I intend to work to apply it to sanctions on Iran.

Amendment No. 232 is more than just the sanctions and congressional review;

this legislation also includes important counterterrorism financing provisions adopted by the House and Senate during the 114th Congress. It requires the creation of a national strategy for combatting the financing of terrorism and related forms of illicit finance. This strategy ensures that the United States pursues a coordinated and effective fight against illicit finance at all levels of the Russian Government.

Our measure requires the strategy to enhance public-private partnerships to prevent and detect illicit finance. The measure also requires the Treasury Department to report on its efforts to identify illicit finance flows linked to Russia affecting the U.S. financial system or the financial system of our allies. We must engage all of our allies, particularly our trading partners, to work with us so that we achieve our objectives without collateral damage, which is so often the case. It is important that our trading partners be with us on this issue rather than being the victims of the actions we take.

This is a strong bipartisan measure that in important respects represents the next step forward. Of course, this will not be the last step if Russia does not begin to demonstrate verifiable steps toward reducing its course of aggression on multiple fronts. Make no mistake—the sanctions currently in place and those submitted in our amendment last night are Putin's fault and not a result of Putin's confused notions of Russian power and pride.

Even though unilateral actions are not the best option, America must lead on this issue and encourage others to follow since the most successful sanctions result from a united front of United States and European Union cooperation.

Since the unlawful annexation of Crimea, the years of destabilizing eastern Ukraine through relentless war, the global spread of cyber intrusions, and Putin's indefensible support of Assad's leadership of Syria, particularly in light of its recent chemical attack, fewer are left in Europe to defend Putin's policies. The times call for clarity of purpose and a correct amount of pressure. We have that in this amendment.

Again, thank you to Senators CORKER, BROWN, and CARDIN for your hard work and support and to each of the other Senators from both sides of the aisle who have worked to help develop and pursue the policies adopted in this legislation. Thank you to Leader MCCONNELL and Senator SCHUMER for all of your help and support.

I look forward to passing this measure in short order, and I encourage all of my colleagues to support this bipartisan amendment.

With that, Mr. President, I yield the floor.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. JOHNSON). The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, today, I speak in favor of the Iran sanctions bill. I am an original cosponsor of the bill, so it should come as no surprise that I support it. My only concern is that we did not pass it sooner.

As I stand here today, I cannot help but feel that this moment highlights the folly of the last 8 years of President Obama's foreign policy. For 8 years, President Obama did everything he could to curry favor with the Ayatollahs in Tehran. He ignored popular protests, known as the Green Movement, and the thousands of Iranians who cried out for something more than sham elections. He lectured our Gulf Arab allies on the need to "share" the Middle East with their sworn enemy in some kind of cold peace. He insisted on putting daylight between us and our friend Israel. He dallied and dithered as the regime helped its client Bashar al-Assad help tear apart his own country in a brutal civil war. Most infamously, he traded away billions of dollars in sanctions relief for a flimsy, one-sided nuclear deal—a deal that did not prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon so much as ultimately guarantee it in just a few years.

What do we have to show for all of this? What did we get for looking the other way for 8 years? Not a more reasonable Iran, not a more open, tolerant, democratic Iran, not a friendlier Iran, but an emboldened Iran—one that continues to launch ballistic missiles in willful defiance of United Nations Security Council resolutions. For everything we have done to mollify the ayatollahs and their sensitivities, they have gone out of their way to inflame ours. What did President Obama do? Nothing but appease them.

But we should not lay these failures solely on the last President's doorstep, because he represents a mindset that is too widely shared. It is one that sees Iran's obvious imperial aggression in the Middle East and yet still considers America the aggressor. It is one that tries to compartmentalize and haggle with a regime whose leaders shout "death to Israel" and "death to America" virtually every Friday. It is one that refuses to call a spade a spade and say to the Ayatollahs that enough is enough.

But today we are changing course—and not a moment too soon. This legislation will finally hold the regime and Tehran accountable for their brazen attempts to bully their neighbors and assert supremacy throughout the Middle East. It will put heavy sanctions on anyone who is involved in helping Iran develop ballistic missiles, circumvent our arms embargo, or spread terrorism throughout the world.

I know there are those who consider this kind of a move to be provocative, but I would say that it is the Iranian

regime's aggression that has been provocative. All of these sanctioned activities are things that the regime and Tehran should not be doing in the first place. I do not think it is provocative to hold our enemies to the same standards as our friends. I do not think it is unreasonable to do what we can to protect our friends and ourselves from Iranian-supported terrorism and from a regime that is responsible for killing hundreds of American troops in the Middle East. Instead, I think it is long overdue.

Today, I am glad to see the Senate finally prepared to rectify these grave mistakes.

I yield the floor.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

REAUTHORIZING THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I rise to discuss the bipartisan legislation that will reauthorize the National Flood Insurance Program. I wish to speak a little bit about flood insurance first before I talk about our much needed legislation.

As most people know—but unfortunately some folks don't know or maybe they forget—if you have homeowners insurance on your home and you have a flood, you are not covered. Homeowners insurance does not cover flooding. In order to be covered for flooding, you have to have a separate policy, and about the only place you can go to get flood insurance is from the Federal program—the National Flood Insurance Program. Now, that is a bit of an overstatement. It is possible to buy flood insurance from a private insurer—and certainly we want to encourage private insurers to participate more in the flood insurance market—but today, for the most part, if you want to carry flood insurance, you have to get it through the Federal program, and that is called the National Flood Insurance Program. It is administered by FEMA.

It is hard to overstate the importance of flood insurance to the American people. It is even harder to overstate the importance of flood insurance to the people of Louisiana. The gross domestic product in my State is about \$220 billion to \$230 billion a year. If you add up all the goods and services that we as Louisianians produce every year, it comes out to between \$220 billion and \$230 billion. Without flood insurance, you can cut that figure in half. We would have to, in effect, turn out the lights.

There are 450,000 flood insurance policies in my State. Many of those people have to have flood insurance; it is a condition of their mortgage. So the

Flood insurance program and, more specifically, the National Flood Insurance Program, is extraordinarily important to America, but it is even more extraordinarily important to the people of Louisiana.

We are introducing a bipartisan bill to reauthorize the National Flood Insurance Program. The current program expires in September. If we don't reauthorize it, most Americans who have flood insurance at the present time will no longer be able to access it. It is critical that the U.S. Congress act and act immediately.

The bill we are introducing—and I will explain in a moment whom I mean by “we”—is bipartisan legislation.

Now, there are a lot of issues that divide Congress today, and reasonable people are entitled to disagree over some of these very difficult issues, but there are also issues we can come together on, and I respectfully suggest that flood insurance is one of them.

We have put together a bipartisan coalition, including Senator BOB MENENDEZ from New Jersey, who happens to be a Democrat; and Senator CORY BOOKER from New Jersey, who happens to be a Democrat; Senator THAD COCHRAN, chairman of our Appropriations Committee in the Senate, from Mississippi, who is a Republican; Senator MARCO RUBIO from Florida, who is a Republican; Senator BILL NELSON from Florida, who is a Democrat; Senator VAN HOLLEN from Maryland, who happens to be a Democrat; and more Senators are coming on board.

We are introducing a bill called the SAFE National Flood Insurance Program Reauthorization Act. SAFE, of course, is an acronym. It refers to sustainable, affordable, fair, and efficient—SAFE—the SAFE National Flood Insurance Program Reauthorization Act.

Let me briefly tell my colleagues what it does. I will start with cost. It doesn't do a bit of good to offer someone insurance if they can't afford it, and too many times that has been the case with flood insurance. Right now, under the current program, the National Flood Insurance Program is allowed to raise a homeowner's flood insurance premium by 18 percent—not 10 percent, not 12 percent but by a staggering 18 percent—and to do that every year. If you are insuring a second home—let's suppose you have a vacation home—or if you are a businesswoman or a businessman and insuring a commercial establishment, the national program can raise your premiums every year by 25 percent. Nobody can pay those kinds of increases.

No. 1, our bill would cap the amount the Flood Insurance Program can raise someone's premium at 10 percent annually. I wish we could tap it at zero percent annually, but 10 percent is certainly a lot better for our people than 18 percent and 25 percent, respectively. If FEMA properly implements some other provisions of our act, which I will talk about in a moment, there will not be any increases.

No. 2, our bill, the SAFE National Flood Insurance Program Reauthorization Act, would extend the National Flood Insurance Program by 6 years. I wish we could extend it longer. I wish we could do 10 years or 15 years or 20 years, but it is necessary for us, as the Presiding Officer knows, to get unified, bipartisan support on this legislation, and we think 6 years—a 6-year authorization is probably the best we can do to pass this bill.

No. 3, our bill will save about \$750 million a year. Let me say that again. Our bill will save about \$750 million each and every year to be used in the Flood Insurance Program. Here is how our legislation would do it.

First, as we know, the Flood Insurance Program has a deficit. We have had a large number of natural disasters, including floods, over the past several years in our country, unfortunately. We had Hurricane Sandy. We had Hurricane Katrina. In my State in Louisiana, last year we had two horrible floods, both in the northern part of my State and in the southern part of my State. In a couple of instances, we had 23 inches of rain in 2 days. I don't care if you live on Mount Everest, if you get 23 inches of rain in 2 days, you are going to flood. Those floods were very expensive.

Those catastrophes and many others caused the National Flood Insurance Program to operate at a deficit. The deficit is \$25 billion. Another way of stating that is, the program owes \$25 billion in debt, but we owe it to ourselves. We don't owe it to a bank, we don't owe it to a foreign country, we don't owe it to any private entity; we owe it to ourselves, and we have been paying interest to ourselves out of the premiums—the cashflow, if you will—of the Flood Insurance Program every year. That 10 percent—10 cents out of every dollar that comes into the National Flood Insurance Program—is devoted to just paying the interest on this debt that we owe ourselves.

Our bill would suspend those interest payments for 6 years. That will free up about \$400 million a year.

We are also saving money by asking those who work with us in implementing the National Flood Insurance Program to sharpen their pencils. Let me explain what I mean by that. FEMA is in charge of the National Flood Insurance Program, but FEMA doesn't run the program. It doesn't run the insurance company that administers the policies. FEMA hires private insurers in the private sector to actually run the program. We call that the “write your own” program.

For the most part, those private insurers that administer the program do a good job, but they don't have any risk. They have zero risk, none, nada. The risk is on the National Flood Insurance Program—the Federal government—and therefore the American taxpayer. We just hire the private insurers to administer the program—to collect the premiums, to sell the policies, to

adjust the claims. So they have no risk. Yet we are paying them 31 cents out of every dollar that the program would take in.

Our bill respectfully suggests that is too much money. While we appreciate the cooperation we get and the good work we get from the private insurers who help us administer this program, we are going to ask them—actually, we are going to tell them—to reduce their compensation from 31 cents out of every dollar. That is going to save about \$350 million a year. So we just saved about \$750 million a year for the National Flood Insurance Program.

What are we going to do with the money? First, mitigation. With flooding—and it is inevitable that we are going to have floods. I don't know why bad things happen to good people, but they do. You can pay a little bit up front or you can pay a whole lot later, and this is what I mean by that.

If we spend the money on mitigation to protect against the flooding that we know will inevitably happen, we will save money for the American taxpayer in the long run, and we will use a portion of that \$750 million in savings to mitigate against flood risk. By mitigation, I mean offering low- or no-interest loans to homeowners to elevate their homes so they will not flood—building levees, building flood walls. Our bill does not say specifically what mitigation measures should be taken, and it does not say which mitigation projects will be built, but it does say that mitigation is the answer, not the complete answer but part of the answer. We haven't done enough of it. Now we are going to have the resources to do it.

The second way we are going to use that money is to try to do a better job with maps. We set rates in the National Flood Insurance Program based on the likelihood that someone will be flooded. We determine that likelihood by using maps drawn by experts using computer models. We are not using the most up-to-date, state-of-the-art technology to draw those maps, but if our bill passes, we will, including but not limited to a new technology called LIDAR. I confess, I don't understand the technology, but it is called LIDAR, Light Detection and Ranging technology. It can be used to draw more accurate flood maps to more accurately assess someone's propensity to flood.

Why is that important? You might be in a high-risk flood zone right now and paying a large premium. With state-of-the-art technology, you may be put into a lower risk flood zone and pay less. I am not guaranteeing that result, but it is certainly possible. In any event, we need to as accurately as possible assess the risk, and the only way to do that is through proper mapping.

Our bill would also include a provision that will allow Congress to provide better and greater oversight of FEMA in administering the program. Let me say specifically what it will do.

The very able Administrator at FEMA who handles the Flood Insurance Program testified before the Banking Committee a few months ago that if one of these private insurance companies that administers the Flood Insurance Program for us has lawyers or consultants who are not doing their jobs, FEMA doesn't have the authority to fire them. This bill will give FEMA the authority to fire those consultants, and here is why this is important: Most of the lawyers, engineers, and other consultants private insurance companies hire to help them administer the program on behalf of the National Flood Insurance Program do a pretty good job, but some of them do not. There have been recorded instances both in New Jersey and in Louisiana where certain people, engineers and lawyers, have seen it as their mission to do anything they possibly can to keep a homeowner who has paid his or her hard-earned money to buy insurance from getting the money they deserve if they flood, and that is just wrong.

If you are trying to defraud the National Flood Insurance Program, we need to fight you like a tiger. But if you have paid your premiums and, unfortunately, you have flooded, you are entitled to get your money. You should not be required to fight some engineer or some lawyer who is throwing up obstacle after obstacle after obstacle. Our bill says that if there are consultants who do that and the private insurance companies don't want to fire them, then, by God, FEMA will, and we are going to hold FEMA accountable.

A couple more points I will mention: This bill will also extend coverage limits. Right now, the most flood insurance a homeowner can buy is \$250,000. While that is a lot of money, that doesn't cover some homes, given the rate of inflation in America today, and our bill would expand coverage limits to \$500,000 for homes and \$1.5 million for commercial establishments.

I have talked to some of my colleagues in the Senate and in the House, and some of them, whom I am happy for, represent States that haven't had any major floods, and I hope they never do. But if we have learned anything in the last few years in terms of flooding, we have learned that just when men and women think they can control everything in this world and can control their destiny, they can't control God and Mother Nature. Flooding can happen at any time.

Let me say it again. You can live in a mountain State. You can live on top of a mountain. But if you get 23 inches of rain in 2 days, you are going to flood, and that is why you need flood insurance. That is why this bill is not just important to coastal States like Louisiana, Mississippi, Florida, New Jersey, and Maryland; it is important to all Americans.

This is a bipartisan bill. Have I mentioned that? I think I did. This is a bipartisan bill. It is supported by many

Democrats. It is supported by many Republicans. It is a bill that is not only important for our economy, but it is important for the peace of mind of the American people. I hope we will not let politics get in the way of doing what we know to be right.

Once again, the bill is called the SAFE—which stands for Sustainable, Affordable, Fair, and Efficient—National Flood Insurance Program Reauthorization Act. I hope this body will come together as one and support this much needed legislation.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CRUZ). The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BOOZMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. RUBIO). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BOOZMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to speak as in morning business for up to 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

HONORING LIEUTENANT PATRICK WEATHERFORD

Mr. BOOZMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to pay respect to a law enforcement officer in my home State of Arkansas who lost his life in the line of duty yesterday, Monday, June 12, 2017.

Lieutenant Patrick Weatherford of the Newport Police Department joined other officers in responding to the call of a vehicle break-in when he was shot. Sadly, Lieutenant Weatherford passed away later that evening.

Lieutenant Weatherford served on the Newport police force for 15 years and recently graduated from the FBI Academy. He was also a graduate of ASU-Newport and the University of Arkansas at Little Rock.

Lieutenant Weatherford was recognized as the 2016 Jackson County Officer of the Year by Arkansas attorney general Leslie Rutledge.

His colleagues had great respect and admiration for him, and he was known as an officer who performed his duties with professionalism and skill.

This is the second Arkansas law enforcement officer we have lost in 2017. Any occasion when someone who is sworn to protect and serve their community does not return home to the loved ones waiting for them is incredibly sad and heartbreaking. Arkansans value the men and women who volunteer to help ensure and enhance public safety knowing the risks involved.

We are devastated by the loss of another law enforcement officer in our State, and we thank all of those who sacrifice so much to protect us.

I want to encourage my colleagues to pass the Honoring Hometown Heroes Act to allow Governors to order the American flag to fly at half-staff in recognition of the sacrifice of first responders like Lieutenant Weatherford who make the ultimate sacrifice.

My thoughts and prayers go out to Lieutenant Weatherford's family and friends, as well as the community he served, which will no doubt miss him dearly. I pray they will all find comfort during such a difficult time as this.

I also stand with all Arkansans in expressing our gratitude for Lieutenant Weatherford's service and commit to honoring the sacrifice he and others have made to protect us.

With that, I yield the floor.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

CLOTURE MOTION

Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I send a cloture motion to the desk for the committee substitute amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The cloture motion having been presented under rule XXII, the Chair directs the clerk to read the motion.

The bill clerk read as follows:

CLOTURE MOTION

We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, do hereby move to bring to a close debate on the committee-reported substitute amendment to Calendar No. 110, S. 722, a bill to impose sanctions with respect to Iran in relation to Iran's ballistic missile program, support for acts of international terrorism, and violations of human rights, and for other purposes.

Mitch McConnell, Roger F. Wicker, Mike Crapo, Mike Rounds, Tom Cotton, Bob Corker, Steve Daines, John Barrasso, Rob Portman, Jeff Flake, Dan Sullivan, John Hoeven, James M. Inhofe, John Cornyn, John Thune, Cory Gardner, Ron Johnson.

CLOTURE MOTION

Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I send a cloture motion to the desk for the underlying bill, S. 722.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The cloture motion having been presented under rule XXII, the Chair directs the clerk to read the motion.

The bill clerk read as follows:

CLOTURE MOTION

We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, do hereby move to bring to a close debate on Calendar No. 110, S. 722, a bill to impose sanctions with respect to Iran in relation to Iran's ballistic missile program, support for acts of international terrorism, and violations of human rights, and for other purposes.

Mitch McConnell, Mike Crapo, Jeff Flake, Roger F. Wicker, Mike Rounds, Tom Cotton, Bob Corker, Steve Daines, Dan Sullivan, John Hoeven, James M. Inhofe, John Cornyn, John Thune, Cory Gardner, John Barrasso, Ron Johnson, Rob Portman.

Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the mandatory quorum calls with respect to the cloture motions be waived.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate be in a period of morning business, with Senators permitted to speak therein for up to 10 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

TRIBUTE TO CAROLYN LERNER AND MARK COHEN

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Mr. President, today I wish to recognize the service of Special Counsel Carolyn Lerner. Ms. Lerner's term as the leader of the U.S. Office of Special Counsel, OSC, has expired. By many accounts, she has been the most successful leader of that office in the agency's 40 year history.

This office has a critical mission, one that is more important now than ever. It protects government whistleblowers and helps to eliminate government waste, fraud, and abuse. It is also responsible for the enforcement of the Hatch Act, which keeps the Federal workplace free from improper partisan politics.

Special Counsel Lerner was confirmed unanimously by the Senate in June 2011. During her tenure, she restored the integrity of the Office of Special Counsel after a difficult period. Moreover, she reestablished the OSC as a safe and effective office to defend government whistleblowers.

Moreover, I would also like to recognize the exemplary service of her principal deputy, Mark Cohen, who is leaving government service as well. The OSC played a critical role in protecting hundreds of whistleblowers at the Department of Veterans Affairs. They worked with these courageous employees to improve care for veterans at hospitals across the country, including efforts to improve conditions for veterans in the Baltimore VA.

Under Ms. Lerner and Mr. Cohen's leadership, the OSC worked with Homeland Security whistleblowers to end an improper overtime program, saving the taxpayers \$100 million a year according to the Congressional Budget Office.

These and many, many other victories for whistleblowers and taxpayers set a new standard in terms of effectiveness for this important office.

As my colleague and friend from Maryland, Congressman CUMMINGS, stated in a recent Washington Post article, "Ms. Lerner turned the Office of Special Counsel 'into a model agency and set the bar as the head of that office.'" I ask unanimous consent to have this article printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

As Senator GRASSLEY, a longtime champion of government whistleblowers, stated in the same article, "Her leadership should be a road map for future leaders of this office."

Given the office's important good government role, the OSC enjoyed broad, bipartisan support under Lerner

and Cohen's leadership. I concur with my colleagues and encourage the next leaders of that office to follow their lead as I pay tribute to their government service.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, June 7, 2017]

SPECIAL COUNSEL LERNER LEAVES OFFICE AS TRUMP REJECTS HIGHLY PRAISED WHISTLEBLOWER ADVOCATE

(By Joe Davidson)

The defining moment for the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) after Carolyn Lerner became head of the agency was a gruesome one about body parts and a dismembered Marine.

It's not the usual fare for the office on M Street NW that deals with Hatch Act violations and prohibited personnel practices. But protecting whistleblowers is where OSC makes its reputation—as in the 2011 case involving the Defense Department's Port Mortuary in Dover, Del.

Soon this little but powerful office will have a new special counsel. Rejecting the advice of Republicans and Democrats to keep Lerner, President Trump has nominated Henry Kerner to take her place. He is a former Republican congressional staffer and currently assistant vice president at the Cause of Action Institute, a small-government advocacy organization.

Lerner, who leaves office on June 14, had been on the job only a few months when she revealed reports by federal employees of grisly transgressions at the morgue operated by the Air Force. Body parts were lost in two cases, and in another, the office reported that the mangled body of a Marine "was dismembered with a saw in order to make the body fit inside a military uniform, without the consent or notification of the family."

With a staff that wouldn't begin to fill one Pentagon hallway, Lerner humbled and embarrassed the Defense Department, the government's largest agency. Lawmakers were appalled. The Air Force secretary at the time expressed his sincere "regret" for "lapses in our standards at Dover," a non-apologetic understatement.

The action of the Office of Special Counsel—no relation to a special prosecutor or to Robert S. Mueller III, the special counsel investigating Russian meddling in the 2016 presidential election—secured mortuary reforms and protected the employees who were targets of Air Force retaliation.

"I think that we have sent the federal community a message that whistleblowers should be valued," Lerner said Monday in her office overlooking St. Matthew's Cathedral. "Whistleblowers now feel comfortable coming forward, and that is helping our government."

The Port Mortuary case "really helped the federal community understand that OSC was robust enforcer of whistleblower laws," she added.

Considering the widespread retaliation against federal whistleblowers, her assessment of their comfort might be optimistic, but there is no doubt that the Office of Special Counsel is a more robust agency than the moribund place they found before she got there.

It moved "from last-resort option to first choice for getting relief for whistleblowers," said Tom Devine, legal director of the Government Accountability Project, a whistleblower advocacy organization.

Relief for individual whistleblowers also can mean systemic improvements for federal agencies and taxpayers. The Department of Veterans Affairs is the obvious example.

Congress approved VA improvements following a 2014 scandal over the coverup of long patient wait times, which was revealed by whistleblowers. Whistleblower disclosures also led to a new overtime pay system for Border Patrol agents. Lerner's office was instrumental in both.

Devine's strong praise for OSC is not unqualified. "The bad news is they operate at a molasses pace" in some instances, he said. He added that he would like Lerner to be more aggressive about taking legal action against federal agencies that violate whistleblower rights.

Despite the slow pace, agency statistics show impressive gains. There were "276 favorable actions for whistleblowers and other victims of PPPs [prohibited personnel practices] this past year, more than double the annual average," the office said in its budget justification to Congress. "In the last two years, OSC has achieved five times the number of favorable actions in whistleblower retaliation complaints than in any prior two-year period in agency history. . . . In FY 2016, for the second straight year, OSC received upwards of 6,000 new matters, a 25 percent increase over the prior two-year period."

The increased caseload leads to bigger backlogs, but it also demonstrates that employees are more willing to trust the office with sensitive cases.

Ironical criticism comes from James J. Wilson, the agency's chief human capital officer. He filed a whistleblower retaliation complaint against Lerner with the Merit Systems Protection Board after failing to find success before the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Regarding his complaints to the council, Wilson, who previously filed grievances against former employers at two other agencies, signed an affidavit saying, "I received final decisions closing these four matters with no further action being taken."

Whatever the criticism of Lerner, it is outweighed by praise from whistleblowers and Members of Congress.

"She's fearless," Robert MacLean, an air marshal whistleblower, told me earlier this year. His was the first federal whistleblower case heard by the Supreme Court and MacLean credits his victory largely to work done by OSC.

Unusual in this era of hyper-polarization, she is lauded by both sides of the aisle.

"Leading the Office of Special Counsel requires a deep appreciation for the patriotic work that whistleblowers do to shine a light on fraud or misconduct in government. Carolyn Lerner has been a steadfast advocate for government whistleblowers, and I am grateful for her service at OSC," said Sen. Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa), chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee. "Her leadership should be a road map for future leaders of this office."

The Senate Whistleblower Protection Caucus, founded by Grassley and Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), had urged the Trump administration to retain Lerner.

"I am disappointed the president chose not to take Sen. Grassley's and my recommendation to renominate Carolyn Lerner, who is an experienced leader with bipartisan support," said Wyden.

It's also bicameral. Before Trump's decision, Rep. Rod Blum (Iowa), Republican chairman of the House Whistleblower Protection Caucus, led a bipartisan House letter saying Lerner deserved another term. Among those who signed was Rep. Elijah Cummings (Md.), the ranking Democrat on the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee.

Lerner turned the Office of Special Counsel "into a model agency and set the bar as the

head of that office," Cummings said by email Monday. "She served with independence and tenacity to hold agency officials accountable when they retaliated against whistleblowers."

TRIBUTE TO BETSY HUMPHREYS

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Mr. President, as a Member of the Senate who supports efforts to build support for biomedical research and improved public health, I would like to pay tribute to a great public servant and the first woman and first librarian to lead the National Library of Medicine, NLM, the world's largest biomedical library and a part of the National Institutes of Health. Ms. Humphreys recently announced that she will retire at the end of June after 44 years of extraordinary leadership and distinguished public service.

On May 9, the board of regents of the National Library of Medicine approved and presented the following resolution to congratulate, commend, and thank Betsy Humphreys for her 44 years of service to the NLM. I would like to share that resolution with my colleagues and join the NLM board of regents in paying tribute to Betsy Humphreys, a public servant who has had a profound and lasting impact on the NLM, the United States, and the global community.

I ask unanimous consent to have the text of the resolution printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Ms. Betsy L. Humphreys has served NLM, the United States, and the global community with distinction since 1973, culminating in her appointment as the NLM Deputy Director in 2005, a post she continues to occupy today, and serving as NLM Acting Director from April 1, 2015 to August 14, 2016—the first woman and first librarian to lead the Library.

In a career that could be called one long highlight reel, she directed the groundbreaking Unified Medical Language System project, which produces knowledge sources to support advanced processing, retrieval, and integration of information from disparate electronic information sources, and which is used around the world. In the process, she developed unique knowledge and experience with the content and format of many biomedical terminologies, health vocabularies, and clinical classifications that would serve her well in all endeavors to follow.

She was a key contributor to interagency efforts to advance standardization of electronic health data, which resulted in the development, promotion, and implementation of mechanisms for designating US standards for health data exchange. She was also a major contributor to the Federal regulation setting the standards for use in electronic interchange of administrative health data.

Taking a broader view, she led US government efforts to remove major barriers to the use of standard clinical terminologies in electronic health records (EHRs). Before there was an Office of the National Coordinator (ONC) for Health Information Technology within HHS, she negotiated the world's first nationwide license for a clinical terminology, SNOMED CT, with usage terms favorable to the US. This became a model for

other countries and was adopted by the International Health Terminology Standards Development Organisation (IHTSDO) when it was formed to put ownership of SNOMED CT in an international entity. She was IHTSDO's founding Chair and has served with distinction as its US member.

With the establishment of the ONC, she led NLM's substantial and ongoing collaboration with that body to develop, support, and disseminate for free US use the key clinical terminologies required for certification of EHR products and use of EHRs by Medicare and Medicaid providers and hospitals. She also directed the development and dissemination of many tools, including mappings, subsets, browsers, etc., and innovative systems, including the NLM Value Set Authority Center and NIH Common Data Element Repository, to support the use of standards in health care, quality measurement, and in research.

She directed the legislatively mandated expansion of ClinicalTrials.gov to encompass registration of additional trials and submission of summary results information. This multi-year, multi-faceted process involved numerous partners and stakeholders, showcasing her ability to grasp and solve complex problems and her considerable skill at consensus building. ClinicalTrials.gov is the largest and most heavily used international clinical trials registry.

She worked tirelessly and creatively to expand and enhance access to research publications, data, and high quality health information for scientists, health professionals, system and product developers, information professionals, and the general public. This often involved building and maintaining strong partnerships across the Federal government to adapt and rebrand strategies to changes in Administrations and priorities and to capitalize on emerging opportunities.

She oversaw the expansion of PubMed Central to include direct deposits of articles from many publishers, manuscript submissions from investigators of publications resulting from NIH-funded research and research funded by other Federal agencies and private funders, including the Gates Foundation, and digitized articles from back issues of biomedical journals, through a partnership with the Wellcome Trust.

She led a collaboration with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to make drug information and device registrations submitted to the FDA by product manufacturers available to the public via NLM's heavily used DailyMed system. In addition, she guided the creation of the AccessGUDID database, which provides public access to registration data for medical devices.

Under her enthusiastic direction, NLM became an early implementer of application programming interfaces and download sites for its many heavily used data and information resources, flinging open the gates and allowing their use by other computer systems and by innovative product developers.

As NLM Acting Director, even in the face of hiring restrictions, she enhanced the quality and efficiency of NLM's high-volume operations, ensured reliable 24/7 availability of electronic information services that are essential to research, health care, and public health worldwide, and advanced major initiatives, including the re-competition of NLM's Informatics Research Training Grants and the re-competition and migration from contracts to cooperative agreement grants of the Regional Medical Libraries in the National Network of Libraries of Medicine.

Throughout her career, in an exemplary fashion, she demonstrated creativity, adaptability, and resilience in partnering with stakeholders inside and outside of NLM. She

leads by fostering employee development, diversity, teamwork, and making optimal use of human, financial, and information resources.

Throughout NLM, she is respected and indeed beloved for her kindness, her resourcefulness, and her can-do spirit. Truly a treasure as a human being and as a public servant, she demonstrated a career-long commitment to interagency collaboration and harnessing government resources for the public good.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

A message from the President of the United States was communicated to the Senate by Ms. Ridgway, one of his secretaries.

PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES

REPORT ON THE CONTINUATION OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY THAT WAS ORIGINALLY DECLARED IN EXECUTIVE ORDER 13405 OF JUNE 16, 2006, WITH RESPECT TO BELARUS—PM 9

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the following message from the President of the United States, together with an accompanying report; which was referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs:

To the Congress of the United States:

Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)) provides for the automatic termination of a national emergency unless, within 90 days of the anniversary date of its declaration, the President publishes in the *Federal Register* and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date. In accordance with that provision, I have sent to the *Federal Register* for publication the enclosed notice stating that the national emergency with respect to the actions and policies of certain members of the Government of Belarus and other persons to undermine democratic processes or institutions of Belarus that was declared in Executive Order 13405 of June 16, 2006, is to continue in effect beyond June 16, 2017.

The actions and policies of certain members of the Government of Belarus and other persons to undermine democratic processes or institutions of Belarus, to commit human rights abuses related to political repression, and to engage in public corruption continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. For this reason, I have determined that it is necessary to continue the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13405 with respect to Belarus.

DONALD J. TRUMP.
THE WHITE HOUSE, June 13, 2017.

MESSAGES FROM THE HOUSE

At 10:27 a.m., a message from the House of Representatives, delivered by

Mrs. Cole, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House has passed the following bills, in which it requests the concurrence of the Senate: ;

H.R. 338. An act to promote a 21st century energy and manufacturing workforce.

H.R. 446. An act to extend the deadline for commencement of construction of a hydroelectric project.

H.R. 447. An act to extend the deadline for commencement of construction of a hydroelectric project.

H.R. 627. An act to amend the Energy Policy and Conservation Act to provide for the dissemination of information regarding available Federal programs relating to energy efficiency projects for schools, and for other purposes.

H.R. 951. An act to extend the deadline for commencement of construction of a hydroelectric project.

H.R. 1109. An act to amend section 203 of the Federal Power Act.

H.R. 2122. An act to reinstate and extend the deadline for commencement of construction of a hydroelectric project involving Jennings Randolph Dam.

H.R. 2274. An act to amend the Federal Power Act to provide for extended periods relating to preliminary permits and commencement of construction, and for other purposes.

H.R. 2292. An act to extend a project of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission involving the Cannonsville Dam.

H.R. 2457. An act to extend the deadline for commencement of construction of certain hydroelectric projects.

At 5:00 p.m., a message from the House of Representatives, delivered by Mrs. Cole, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House has passed the following bill, without amendment:

S. 1094. An act to amend title 38, United States Code, to improve the accountability of employees of the Department of Veterans Affairs, and for other purposes.

MEASURES REFERRED

The following bills were read the first and the second times by unanimous consent, and referred as indicated:

H.R. 10. An act to create hope and opportunity for investors, consumers, and entrepreneurs by ending bailouts and Too Big to Fail, holding Washington and Wall Street accountable, eliminating red tape to increase access to capital and credit, and repealing the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that make America less prosperous, less stable, and less free, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

H.R. 338. An act to promote a 21st century energy and manufacturing workforce; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

H.R. 627. An act to amend the Energy Policy and Conservation Act to provide for the dissemination of information regarding available Federal programs relating to energy efficiency projects for schools, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

H.R. 1109. An act to amend section 203 of the Federal Power Act; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

H.R. 2457. An act to extend the deadline for commencement of construction of certain hydroelectric projects; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

MEASURES PLACED ON THE CALENDAR

The following bills were read the first and second times by unanimous consent, and placed on the calendar:

H.R. 446. An act to extend the deadline for commencement of construction of a hydroelectric project.

H.R. 447. An act to extend the deadline for commencement of construction of a hydroelectric project.

H.R. 951. An act to extend the deadline for commencement of construction of a hydroelectric project.

H.R. 2122. An act to reinstate and extend the deadline for commencement of construction of a hydroelectric project involving Jennings Randolph Dam.

H.R. 2274. An act to amend the Federal Power Act to provide for extended periods relating to preliminary permits and commencement of construction, and for other purposes.

H.R. 2292. An act to extend a project of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission involving the Cannonsville Dam.

EXECUTIVE AND OTHER COMMUNICATIONS

The following communications were laid before the Senate, together with accompanying papers, reports, and documents, and were referred as indicated:

EC-1869. A communication from the Director of the Regulatory Management Division, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Triclopyr; Pesticide Tolerances for Emergency Exemptions" (FRL No. 9961-29) received in the Office of the President of the Senate on June 7, 2017; to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry.

EC-1870. A communication from the Director of the Regulatory Management Division, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Pesticides; Certification of Pesticide Applicators Rule; Delay of Effective Date" (FRL No. 9963-34) received in the Office of the President of the Senate on June 7, 2017; to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry.

EC-1871. A communication from the Secretary of Defense, transmitting the report of twelve (12) officers authorized to wear the insignia of the grade of rear admiral (lower half), in accordance with title 10, United States Code, section 777; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC-1872. A communication from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting, pursuant to law, a six-month periodic report on the national emergency that was declared in Executive Order 13712 of November 22, 2015, with respect to Burundi; to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

EC-1873. A communication from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting, pursuant to law, a six-month periodic report on the national emergency with respect to the Western Balkans that was declared in Executive Order 13219 of June 26, 2001; to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

EC-1874. A communication from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting, pursuant to law, a six-month periodic report on the national emergency with respect to North Korea that was declared in Executive Order 13466 of June 26, 2008; to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

EC-1875. A communication from the Chair of the Board of Governors, Federal Reserve

System, transmitting, pursuant to law, the 103rd Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board covering operations for calendar year 2016; to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

EC-1876. A communication from the Assistant General Counsel for Legislation, Regulation and Energy Efficiency, Department of Energy, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Dedicated-Purpose Pool Pumps" ((RIN1904-AD52) (Docket No. EERE-2015-BT-STD-0008)) received in the Office of the President of Senate on June 7, 2017; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

EC-1877. A communication from the Assistant General Counsel for Legislation, Regulation and Energy Efficiency, Department of Energy, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Dedicated-Purpose Pool Pumps" ((RIN1904-AD52) (Docket No. EERE-2015-BT-STD-0008)) received in the Office of the President of Senate on June 7, 2017; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

EC-1878. A communication from the Assistant General Counsel for Legislation, Regulation and Energy Efficiency, Department of Energy, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Ceiling Fans" ((RIN1904-AD28) (Docket No. EERE-2012-BT-STD-0045)) received in the Office of the President of Senate on June 7, 2017; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

EC-1879. A communication from the Assistant General Counsel for Legislation, Regulation and Energy Efficiency, Department of Energy, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Residential Central Air Conditioners and Heat Pumps" ((RIN1904-AD37) (Docket No. EERE-2014-BT-STD-0048)) received in the Office of the President of Senate on June 7, 2017; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

EC-1880. A communication from the Assistant General Counsel for Legislation, Regulation and Energy Efficiency, Department of Energy, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Miscellaneous Refrigeration Products" ((RIN1904-AD51) (Docket No. EERE-2011-BT-STD-0043)) received in the Office of the President of Senate on June 7, 2017; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

EC-1881. A communication from the Assistant General Counsel for Legislation, Regulation and Energy Efficiency, Department of Energy, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Ceiling Fans" ((RIN1904-AD28) (Docket No. EERE-2012-BT-STD-0045)) received in the Office of the President of Senate on June 7, 2017; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

EC-1882. A communication from the Assistant General Counsel for Legislation, Regulation and Energy Efficiency, Department of Energy, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Miscellaneous Refrigeration Products" ((RIN1904-AD51) (Docket No. EERE-2011-BT-STD-0043)) received in the Office of the President of Senate on June 7, 2017; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

EC-1883. A communication from the Assistant General Counsel for Legislation, Regulation and Energy Efficiency, Department of

Energy, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled “Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Residential Central Air Conditioners and Heat Pumps” (RIN1904-AD37) (Docket No. EERE-2014-BT-STD-0048) received in the Office of the President of the Senate on June 7, 2017; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

EC-1884. A communication from the Director of the Regulatory Management Division, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled “Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; State of California; Coachella Valley; Attainment Plan for 1997 8-Hour Ozone Standards” (FRL No. 9962-54-Region 9) received in the Office of the President of the Senate on June 7, 2017; to the Committee on Environment and Public Works.

EC-1885. A communication from the Director of the Regulatory Management Division, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled “Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Texas; Revisions to the General Definitions for Texas Air Quality Rules” (FRL No. 9962-23-Region 6) received in the Office of the President of the Senate on June 7, 2017; to the Committee on Environment and Public Works.

EC-1886. A communication from the Director of the Regulatory Management Division, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled “Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Texas Control of Air Pollution from Motor Vehicles with Mobile Source Incentive Programs” (FRL No. 9962-47-Region 6) received in the Office of the President of the Senate on June 7, 2017; to the Committee on Environment and Public Works.

EC-1887. A communication from the Director of the Regulatory Management Division, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled “Air Plan Approval; CT; Approval of Single Source Orders; Correction” (FRL No. 9962-83-Region 1) received during adjournment of the Senate in the Office of the President of the Senate on June 2, 2017; to the Committee on Environment and Public Works.

EC-1888. A communication from the Director of the Regulatory Management Division, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled “Air Plan Approval; Nevada, Lake Tahoe; Second 10-Year Carbon Monoxide Limited Maintenance Plan” (FRL No. 9963-25-Region 9) received during adjournment of the Senate in the Office of the President of the Senate on June 2, 2017; to the Committee on Environment and Public Works.

EC-1889. A communication from the Director of the Regulatory Management Division, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled “Approval and Promulgation of State Plans for Designated Facilities and Pollutants: Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming; Negative Declarations” (FRL No. 9963-21-Region 8) received during adjournment of the Senate in the Office of the President of the Senate on June 2, 2017; to the Committee on Environment and Public Works.

EC-1890. A communication from the Director of the Regulatory Management Division, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled “Approval of California Air Plan Revisions, Imperial County Air Pollution Control District” (FRL No. 9960-07-Region 9) received during adjournment of the Senate in the Office of the President of the Senate on

June 2, 2017; to the Committee on Environment and Public Works.

EC-1891. A communication from the Director of the Regulatory Management Division, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled “Approval of Nevada Air Plan Revisions, Clark County Department of Air Quality and Washoe County Health District” (FRL No. 9963-43-Region 9) received during adjournment of the Senate in the Office of the President of the Senate on June 2, 2017; to the Committee on Environment and Public Works.

EC-1892. A communication from the Director of the Regulatory Management Division, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled “Approval of Tennessee’s Request to Relax the Federal Reid Vapor Pressure Gasoline Volatility Standard for Davidson,utherford, Sumner, Williamson, and Wilson Counties; and Minor Technical Corrections for Federal Reid Vapor Pressure Gasoline Volatility Standards in Other Areas” (FRL No. 9963-54-OAR) received during adjournment of the Senate in the Office of the President of the Senate on June 2, 2017; to the Committee on Environment and Public Works.

EC-1893. A communication from the Chief of the Publications and Regulations Branch, Internal Revenue Service, Department of the Treasury, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled “Administrative, Procedural, and Miscellaneous” (Rev. Proc. 2017-38) received in the Office of the President of the Senate on June 6, 2017; to the Committee on Finance.

EC-1894. A communication from the Acting Assistant Secretary for Legislation, Department of Health and Human Services, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report entitled “Child Welfare Outcomes 2010-2014: Report to Congress”; to the Committee on Finance.

EC-1895. A communication from the Secretary of Labor, transmitting, pursuant to law, the Department of Labor’s Semiannual Report of the Inspector General for the period from October 1, 2016 through March 31, 2017; to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

EC-1896. A communication from the Acting Director of the Peace Corps, transmitting, pursuant to law, the Office of Inspector General’s Semiannual Report for the period of October 1, 2016 through March 31, 2017; to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

EC-1897. A communication from the Secretary of Education, transmitting, pursuant to law, the Department of Education’s Semiannual Report of the Inspector General for the period from October 1, 2016 through March 31, 2017; to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

EC-1898. A communication from the Acting Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, transmitting, pursuant to law, the Semiannual Report of the Inspector General for the period from October 1, 2016 through March 31, 2017; to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

EC-1899. A communication from the Deputy Archivist of the United States, National Archives and Records Administration, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled “Presidential Records” (RIN3095-AB87) received during adjournment of the Senate in the Office of the President of the Senate on June 9, 2017; to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

EC-1900. A communication from the Acting Chief Financial Officer, Department of Homeland Security, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report entitled “U.S. Department of Homeland Security Annual Performance Re-

port for Fiscal Years 2016-2018”; to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

EC-1901. A communication from the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy, Department of Labor, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled “Department of Homeland Security and Department of Labor Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Annual Adjustments for the H-2B Temporary Non-agricultural Worker Program” (RIN1235-AA16 and RIN1615-AC10) received in the Office of the President of the Senate on June 6, 2017; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

EC-1902. A communication from the Deputy Assistant Administrator of the Office of Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Agency, Department of Justice, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled “Schedules of Controlled Substances: Placement of Acetyl Fentanyl Into Schedule I” (Docket No. DEA-413) received in the Office of the President of the Senate on June 7, 2017; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

EC-1903. A communication from the Secretary, Judicial Conference of the United States, transmitting, a report relative to Article III judgeship recommendations and corresponding draft legislation for the 115th Congress; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

EC-1904. A communication from the Acting Deputy Director, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, Department of Commerce, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled “Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska; Pacific Cod by Catcher Vessels Less Than 60 Feet (18.3 Meters) Length Overall Using Hook-and-Line or Pot Gear in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Management Area” (RIN0648-XF204) received in the Office of the President of the Senate on June 6, 2017; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

EC-1905. A communication from the Acting Deputy Director, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, Department of Commerce, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled “Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska; Sablefish in the Bering Sea Subarea of the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Management Area” (RIN0648-XF449) received in the Office of the President of the Senate on June 7, 2017; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

EC-1906. A communication from the Acting Deputy Director, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, Department of Commerce, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled “Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska; Exchange of Flatfish in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Management Area” (RIN0648-XF458) received in the Office of the President of the Senate on June 7, 2017; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

EC-1907. A communication from the Acting Deputy Director, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, Department of Commerce, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled “Fisheries of the Northeastern United States; Northeast Multispecies Fishery; Trip Limit Increase for the Small Vessel Category of the Common Pool Fishery” (RIN0648-XF313) received in the Office of the President of the Senate on June 7, 2017; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

EC-1908. A communication from the Acting Deputy Director, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, Department of Commerce, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled “Atlantic Highly Migratory Species; Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Fisheries” (RIN0648-XF413) received in the Office of the President of the Senate on June 7, 2017; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

EC-1909. A communication from the Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator for Regulatory Programs, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, Department of Commerce, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "International Fisheries; Pacific Tuna Fisheries; 2017 and 2018 Commercial Fishing Restrictions for Pacific Bluefin Tuna in the Eastern Pacific Ocean" (RIN0648-BG41) received in the Office of the President of the Senate on June 7, 2017; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

EC-1910. A communication from the Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator for Regulatory Programs, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, Department of Commerce, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Magnuson-Stevens Act Provisions; Fisheries of the Northeastern United States; Northeast Multispecies Fishery; 2017 and 2018 Sector Operations Plans and 2017 Allocation of Northeast Multispecies Annual Catch Entitlements" (RIN0648-XF138) received in the Office of the President of the Senate on June 7, 2017; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

EC-1911. A communication from the Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator for Regulatory Programs, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, Department of Commerce, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act Provisions; Fisheries of the Northeastern United States; Northern Red Hake Accountability Measure" (RIN0648-BG63) received in the Office of the President of the Senate on June 7, 2017; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

EC-1912. A communication from the Deputy Chief of the Mobility Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Review of the Commission's Part 95 Personal Radio Services Rules; Petition for Rulemaking of Garmin International, Incorporated; Petitions for Rulemaking of Omnitronics, Limited Liability Company" ((WT Docket No. 10-119; RM No. 10762; RM No. 10844) (FCC 17-57)) received in the Office of the President of the Senate on June 8, 2017; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS

The following petitions and memorials were laid before the Senate and were referred or ordered to lie on the table as indicated:

POM-41. A resolution adopted by the Senate of the State of Florida opposing United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334 and requesting its repeal or fundamental alteration; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

SENATE RESOLUTION NO. 574

Whereas, the United States has long supported a negotiated settlement leading to a sustainable two-state solution with the democratic, Jewish state of Israel and a demilitarized, democratic Palestinian state living side-by-side in peace and security; and

Whereas, since 1993, the United States has facilitated direct, bilateral negotiations between both parties toward achieving a two-state solution and ending all outstanding claims; and

Whereas, it is the long-standing policy of the United States that a peaceful resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will only come through direct, bilateral negotiations between the two parties; and

Whereas, it was the long-standing position of the United States to oppose and, if nec-

essary, veto United Nations Security Council resolutions dictating additional binding parameters on the peace process; and

Whereas, it was also the long-standing position of the United States to oppose and, if necessary, veto one-sided or anti-Israel United Nations Security Council resolutions; and

Whereas, the United States has stood in the minority internationally over successive administrations in defending Israel in international forums, including vetoing one-sided resolutions in 1995, 1997, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006, and 2011 before the United Nations Security Council; and

Whereas, the United States recently signed a new memorandum of understanding with the Israeli government regarding security assistance, consistent with long-standing support for Israel among successive administrations and Congresses and representing an important United States commitment toward Israel's qualitative military edge; and

Whereas, on November 29, 2016, the United States House of Representatives unanimously passed House Concurrent Resolution 165, expressing and reaffirming long-standing United States policy in support of a direct, bilaterally negotiated settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and in opposition to United Nations Security Council resolutions that impose a solution to the conflict; and

Whereas, on December 23, 2016, the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations disregarded House Concurrent Resolution 165 and departed from long-standing United States policy by abstaining and permitting United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334 to be adopted under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter; and

Whereas, the United States' abstention on United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334 contradicts the Oslo Accords and its associated process that is predicated on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict between the parties through direct, bilateral negotiations; and

Whereas, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334 claims that "the establishment by Israel of settlements in the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, has no legal validity and constitutes a flagrant violation under international law and a major obstacle to the achievement of the two-State solution and a just, lasting and comprehensive peace;" and

Whereas, by referring to the "4 June 1967 lines" as the basis for negotiations, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334 effectively states that the Jewish Quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem and the Western Wall, Judaism's holiest site, are "occupied territory," thereby equating these sites with outposts in the West Bank which the Israeli government has deemed illegal; and

Whereas, passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334 effectively legitimizes efforts by the Palestinian Authority to impose its own solution through international organizations and unjustified boycotts or divestment campaigns against Israel by calling "upon all States, bearing in mind paragraph 1 of this resolution, to distinguish, in their relevant dealings, between the territory of the State of Israel and the territories occupied since 1967," and will require the United States and Israel to take effective action to counteract the resolution's potential harmful impacts; and

Whereas, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334 did not directly call upon Palestinian leadership to fulfill their obligations toward negotiations or mention that part of the eventual Palestinian state is currently controlled by Hamas, a designated terrorist organization; and

Whereas, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334 sought to impose or unduly influence solutions to final-status issues and is biased against Israel: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate of the State of Florida,
That the Florida Senate finds that:

(1) The passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334 undermined the long-standing position of the United States to oppose and veto United Nations Security Council resolutions that seek to impose solutions to final-status issues or are one-sided and anti-Israel, reversing decades of bipartisan agreement

(2) The passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334 undermines the prospect of Israelis and Palestinians resuming productive, direct, bilateral negotiations.

(3) The passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334 contributes to the politically motivated acts of boycotting, divesting from, and sanctioning Israel and represents a concerted effort to extract concessions from Israel outside of direct, bilateral negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians, which must be actively rejected.

(4) Any future measures taken by any organization, including the United Nations Security Council, to impose an agreement or parameters for an agreement will set back the peace process, harm the security of Israel, contradict the enduring bipartisan consensus on strengthening the United States-Israel relationship, and weaken support for such organizations.

(5) A durable and sustainable peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians is only possible with direct, bilateral negotiations between the parties resulting in a Jewish, democratic state living next to a demilitarized Palestinian state in peace and security.

(6) The United States government should work to facilitate serious, direct, unconditional negotiations between the parties toward a sustainable peace agreement.

(7) The United States government should oppose and veto future one-sided, anti-Israel United Nations Security Council resolutions that seek to impose solutions to final-status issues; and be it further

Resolved, that the Florida Senate opposes and requests the repeal of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334 or the fundamental alteration of the resolution so that it:

(1) Is no longer one-sided and anti-Israel.

(2) Authorizes all final-status issues toward a two-state solution to be resolved through direct, bilateral negotiations between the parties involved; and be it further

Resolved, that copies of this resolution be presented to the President of the United States, the President and Secretary of the United States Senate, the Speaker and Clerk of the United States House of Representatives, and the Israeli Embassy in Washington, D.C., for transmission to the proper authorities of the State of Israel as a tangible token of the sentiments expressed herein.

POM-42. A resolution adopted by the Senate of the State of Florida condemning the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement and the increasing incidence of acts of anti-Semitism; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

SENATE RESOLUTION NO. 1184

Whereas, Floridians have, as a matter of public policy, long opposed bigotry, oppression, discrimination; and

Whereas, Florida and Israel have enjoyed a long history of friendship and are great allies, each supporting the best interests of the other; and

Whereas, the State of Israel, the only democracy in the Middle East, is the greatest

friend and ally of the United States in the region, and

Whereas, the elected representatives of the state recognize the importance of expressing Florida's unwavering support for the Jewish people and the State of Israel's right to exist and right to self-defense, and

Whereas, the incidence of acts of anti-Semitism is increasing throughout the world, including in the United States and in Florida, and is reflected in official hate crime statistics, and

Whereas, the international Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement is one of the main vehicles for spreading anti-Semitic perspectives and advocating the elimination of the Jewish State, and

Whereas, the level of activities promoting BDS against Israel has increased in this state, in communities and on college campuses, and contributes to the promotion of anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist propaganda, and

Whereas, the increase in BDS campaign activities on college campuses nationwide has resulted in an increase in confrontations with, intimidation of, and discrimination against Jewish students, and

Whereas, leaders of the BDS movement express that their goal is to eliminate Israel as the national home of the Jewish people, and

Whereas, the BDS campaign's call for academic and cultural boycotts has been condemned by many of our nation's largest academic associations, more than 250 university presidents, and many other leading scholars as a violation of the bedrock principle of academic freedom: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate of the State of Florida, That the Florida Senate condemns the international Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement against the State of Israel and calls upon the governmental institutions of this state to denounce hatred and discrimination whenever they appear; and be it further

Resolved, that the Florida Senate urges the President of the United States to order withdrawal of the United States Customs and Border Protection statement dated January 23, 2016, entitled "West Bank Country of Origin Marking Requirements," so that goods made in the West Bank can continue to be properly labeled "Made in Israel;" and be it further

Resolved, that copies of this resolution be presented to the President of the United States, the President and Secretary of the United States Senate, and the Speaker and Clerk of the United States House of Representatives, and to the Embassy of Israel in Washington, D.C., for transmission to the proper authorities of the State of Israel as a tangible token of the sentiments expressed herein.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

The following reports of committees were submitted:

By Ms. MURKOWSKI, from the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, with an amendment in the nature of a substitute:

S. 55. A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to conduct a special resource study of Fort Ontario in the State of New York (Rept. No. 115-104).

By Ms. MURKOWSKI, from the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, without amendment:

S. 214. A bill to authorize the expansion of an existing hydroelectric project (Rept. No. 115-105).

S. 566. A bill to withdraw certain land in Okanogan County, Washington, to protect the land, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 115-106).

S. 714. A bill to amend Public Law 103-434 to authorize Phase III of the Yakima River Basin Water Basin Water Enhancement Project for the purposes of improving water management in the Yakima River basin, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 115-107).

INTRODUCTION OF BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

The following bills and joint resolutions were introduced, read the first and second times by unanimous consent, and referred as indicated:

By Mr. THUNE (for himself, Mr. CASEY, Mr. WYDEN, and Mr. ROBERTS):

S. 1343. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code to extend and modify certain charitable tax provisions; to the Committee on Finance.

By Mr. BLUNT (for himself, Mr. REED, Mr. SCOTT, and Mr. MENENDEZ):

S. 1344. A bill to promote the development of local strategies to coordinate use of assistance under sections 8 and 9 of the United States Housing Act of 1937 with public and private resources, to enable eligible families to achieve economic independence and self-sufficiency, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

By Mrs. FISCHER (for herself, Mr. CRAPO, and Mr. BLUNT):

S. 1345. A bill to enhance interstate commerce by creating a national hiring standard for motor carriers, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

By Ms. WARREN (for herself and Mr. SULLIVAN):

S. 1346. A bill to amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice to prohibit the non-consensual distribution of private sexual images and to prohibit harassment, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. WYDEN (for himself, Mr. BENNET, Mr. CARDIN, Mr. MERKLEY, and Mr. WHITEHOUSE):

S. 1347. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to prevent catastrophic out-of-pocket spending on prescription drugs for seniors and individuals with disabilities; to the Committee on Finance.

By Mr. WYDEN (for himself, Mr. CARDIN, Ms. STABENOW, Mrs. GILLIBRAND, Mr. CARPER, and Mr. COONS):

S. 1348. A bill to amend title XI of the Social Security Act to require drug manufacturers to publicly justify unnecessary price increases; to the Committee on Finance.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS

S. 109

At the request of Mr. GRASSLEY, the name of the Senator from Oregon (Mr. MERKLEY) was added as a cosponsor of S. 109, a bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide for coverage under the Medicare program of pharmacist services.

S. 122

At the request of Mr. HELLER, the name of the Senator from Oregon (Mr. MERKLEY) was added as a cosponsor of S. 122, a bill to prevent homeowners from being forced to pay taxes on foregone mortgage loan debt.

S. 170

At the request of Mr. RUBIO, the name of the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. SASSE) was added as a cosponsor

of S. 170, a bill to provide for non-preemption of measures by State and local governments to divest from entities that engage in commerce-related or investment-related boycott, divestment, or sanctions activities targeting Israel, and for other purposes.

S. 251

At the request of Mr. WYDEN, the name of the Senator from Montana (Mr. TESTER) was added as a cosponsor of S. 251, a bill to repeal the Independent Payment Advisory Board in order to ensure that it cannot be used to undermine the Medicare entitlement for beneficiaries.

S. 567

At the request of Ms. HEITKAMP, the name of the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. ROUNDS) was added as a cosponsor of S. 567, a bill to amend the Home Owners' Loan Act to allow Federal savings associations to elect to operate as national banks, and for other purposes.

S. 722

At the request of Mr. CORKER, the names of the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. SASSE) and the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. BURR) were added as cosponsors of S. 722, a bill to impose sanctions with respect to Iran in relation to Iran's ballistic missile program, support for acts of international terrorism, and violations of human rights, and for other purposes.

At the request of Mr. MENENDEZ, the name of the Senator from California (Ms. HARRIS) was added as a cosponsor of S. 722, *supra*.

S. 769

At the request of Mr. CASEY, the name of the Senator from Montana (Mr. TESTER) was added as a cosponsor of S. 769, a bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to align physician supervision requirements under the Medicare program for radiology services performed by advanced level radiographers with State requirements.

S. 829

At the request of Mr. MCCAIN, the name of the Senator from Oregon (Mr. MERKLEY) was added as a cosponsor of S. 829, a bill to reauthorize the Assistance to Firefighters Grants program, the Fire Prevention and Safety Grants program, and the Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response grant program, and for other purposes.

S. 916

At the request of Mr. HOEVEN, his name was added as a cosponsor of S. 916, a bill to amend the Controlled Substances Act with regard to the provision of emergency medical services.

S. 954

At the request of Mrs. MURRAY, the name of the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. WHITEHOUSE) was added as a cosponsor of S. 954, a bill to prevent harassment at institutions of higher education, and for other purposes.

S. 960

At the request of Mr. PETERS, the names of the Senator from New Hampshire (Ms. HASSAN) and the Senator

from Montana (Mr. DAINES) were added as cosponsors of S. 960, a bill to amend title 44, United States Code, to protect open, machine-readable databases.

S. 967

At the request of Ms. STABENOW, the name of the Senator from Vermont (Mr. SANDERS) was added as a cosponsor of S. 967, a bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to increase access to ambulance services under the Medicare program and to reform payments for such services under such program, and for other purposes.

S. 1020

At the request of Ms. BALDWIN, the name of the Senator from Illinois (Ms. DUCKWORTH) was added as a cosponsor of S. 1020, a bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide for the proper tax treatment of personal service income earned in pass-thru entities.

S. 1055

At the request of Mr. CARDIN, the name of the Senator from Michigan (Mr. PETERS) was added as a cosponsor of S. 1055, a bill to restrict the exportation of certain defense articles to the Philippine National Police, to work with the Philippines to support civil society and a public health approach to substance abuse, to report on Chinese and other sources of narcotics to the Republic of the Philippines, and for other purposes.

S. 1099

At the request of Mr. CARPER, the name of the Senator from Illinois (Ms. DUCKWORTH) was added as a cosponsor of S. 1099, a bill to provide for the identification and prevention of improper payments and the identification of strategic sourcing opportunities by reviewing and analyzing the use of Federal agency charge cards.

S. 1109

At the request of Mr. MERKLEY, the name of the Senator from New York (Mrs. GILLIBRAND) was added as a cosponsor of S. 1109, a bill to amend title VIII of the Public Health Service Act to extend advanced education nursing grants to support clinical nurse specialist programs, and for other purposes.

S. 1151

At the request of Mr. BENNET, the name of the Senator from Delaware (Mr. COONS) was added as a cosponsor of S. 1151, a bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide a non-refundable credit for working family caregivers.

S. 1158

At the request of Mr. CARDIN, the name of the Senator from Colorado (Mr. BENNET) was added as a cosponsor of S. 1158, a bill to help prevent acts of genocide and other atrocity crimes, which threaten national and international security, by enhancing United States Government capacities to prevent, mitigate, and respond to such crises.

S. 1169

At the request of Mr. DURBIN, the name of the Senator from Montana

(Mr. TESTER) was added as a cosponsor of S. 1169, a bill to amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to provide States with an option to provide medical assistance to individuals between the ages of 22 and 64 for inpatient services to treat substance use disorders at certain facilities, and for other purposes.

S. 1186

At the request of Ms. BALDWIN, the name of the Senator from Oregon (Mr. MERKLEY) was added as a cosponsor of S. 1186, a bill to authorize the Secretary of Transportation to designate certain entities as centers of excellence for domestic maritime workforce training and education, and for other purposes.

S. 1194

At the request of Mr. CASEY, the name of the Senator from Ohio (Mr. BROWN) was added as a cosponsor of S. 1194, a bill to provide for the coverage of medically necessary food and vitamins for digestive and inherited metabolic disorders under Federal health programs and private health insurance, and for other purposes.

S. 1221

At the request of Mr. CARDIN, the name of the Senator from Ohio (Mr. PORTMAN) was added as a cosponsor of S. 1221, a bill to counter the influence of the Russian Federation in Europe and Eurasia, and for other purposes.

S. 1303

At the request of Mrs. GILLIBRAND, the name of the Senator from Massachusetts (Ms. WARREN) was added as a cosponsor of S. 1303, a bill to prohibit discrimination in adoption or foster care placements based on the sexual orientation, gender identity, or marital status of any prospective adoptive or foster parent, or the sexual orientation or gender identity of the child involved.

S. 1307

At the request of Mrs. FEINSTEIN, the name of the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. FRANKEN) was added as a cosponsor of S. 1307, a bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to expand eligibility to receive refundable tax credits for coverage under a qualified health plan.

S. 1312

At the request of Mr. GRASSLEY, the name of the Senator from Utah (Mr. HATCH) was added as a cosponsor of S. 1312, a bill to prioritize the fight against human trafficking in the United States.

S. 1337

At the request of Mr. MANCHIN, the name of the Senator from Ohio (Mr. BROWN) was added as a cosponsor of S. 1337, a bill to amend the Energy Policy Act of 2005 to make certain strategic energy infrastructure projects eligible for certain loan guarantees, and for other purposes.

S.J. RES. 16

At the request of Mr. WYDEN, the name of the Senator from Montana

(Mr. TESTER) was added as a cosponsor of S.J. Res. 16, a joint resolution approving the discontinuation of the process for consideration and automatic implementation of the annual proposal of the Independent Medicare Advisory Board under section 1899A of the Social Security Act.

S.J. RES. 42

At the request of Mr. MURPHY, the name of the Senator from Massachusetts (Ms. WARREN) was added as a cosponsor of S.J. Res. 42, a joint resolution relating to the disapproval of the proposed export to the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of certain defense articles.

AMENDMENT NO. 232

At the request of Mr. CRAPO, the names of the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. MCCONNELL), the Senator from New York (Mr. SCHUMER), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mrs. SHAHEEN), the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. GRAHAM) and the Senator from Arizona (Mr. MCCAIN) were added as cosponsors of amendment No. 232 proposed to S. 722, a bill to impose sanctions with respect to Iran in relation to Iran's ballistic missile program, support for acts of international terrorism, and violations of human rights, and for other purposes.

STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

By Mr. BLUNT (for himself, Mr. REED, Mr. SCOTT, and Mr. MENENDEZ):

S. 1344. A bill to promote the development of local strategies to coordinate use of assistance under sections 8 and 9 of the United States Housing Act of 1937 with public and private resources, to enable eligible families to achieve economic independence and self-sufficiency, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, today Senator BLUNT and I are reintroducing the Family Self-Sufficiency Act, and we are pleased to be joined in this effort in this Congress by our colleagues, Senators SCOTT and MENENDEZ.

The Family Self-Sufficient, FSS, Program is an existing Department of Housing and Urban Development, HUD, employment and savings incentive initiative for families that use section 8 vouchers or live in public housing. FSS provides participants access to the resources and training that enable them to pursue higher paying employment opportunities and meet financial goals, while putting FSS families in a better position to save by establishing an interest-bearing escrow account for them. Upon graduation from the FSS program, the family can use these savings to pay for job-related expenses, such as additional workforce training or the purchase or maintenance of a car needed for commuting purposes. In short, FSS is all about giving our constituents the incentives and the tools to move up the economic ladder.

Our bipartisan legislation enhances the FSS Program by streamlining the administration of this program, broadening the supportive services that can be provided, and extending the reach of the FSS Program to tenants who live in privately owned properties with project-based assistance. In short, we make the FSS Program easier to administer and more effective.

First, to streamline the FSS Program, our bill would permanently combine two separate but similar FSS Programs into one. Under the existing authorization, HUD is supposed to operate one FSS Program for those families served by the Housing Choice Voucher Program and another for those families served by the Public Housing Program. This is the case even though the purpose of each FSS Program—to increase economic independence and self-sufficiency—is identical. Unfortunately, without a permanent change in the authorization, public housing agencies, PHAs, may at some point in the future have to operate essentially two programs to achieve the same goal. With our bill, PHAs would be relieved of this unnecessary burden permanently.

Second, our legislation broadens the scope of the supportive services that may be offered to include attainment of a high school equivalency certificate, education in pursuit of a postsecondary degree or certification, and financial literacy, such as training in financial management, financial coaching, and asset building. Providing families in need with affordable rental housing is critical, but combining this resource with the support and services to help families get ahead increases the effectiveness of this Federal investment. Our legislation makes it easier for FSS participants to obtain the training necessary to secure employment and the education to make prudent financial decisions to protect and grow their earnings.

Lastly, our bill permanently extends the FSS Program to families who live in privately owned properties subsidized with project-based rental assistance. It shouldn't matter what kind of housing assistance a family gets. Families seeking to achieve self-sufficiency shouldn't be held back by this sort of technicality.

I thank Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Compass Working Capital, Housing Partnership Network, Preservation of Affordable Housing, National Housing Conference, Stewards of Affordable Housing for the Future, National NeighborWorks Association, National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials, Public Housing Authority Directors Association, Public Housing Association of Rhode Island, and Rhode Island Housing for their support. I also thank Senator BLUNT, Senator MENENDEZ, and Senator SCOTT for their partnership and I urge my colleagues to support this bipartisan bill, which will help give those receiving housing assistance a greater chance to build their skills and achieve economic independence.

AMENDMENTS SUBMITTED AND PROPOSED

SA 234. Mr. PERDUE submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 722, to impose sanctions with respect to Iran in relation to Iran's ballistic missile program, support for acts of international terrorism, and violations of human rights, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table.

TEXT OF AMENDMENTS

SA 234. Mr. PERDUE submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 722, to impose sanctions with respect to Iran in relation to Iran's ballistic missile program, support for acts of international terrorism, and violations of human rights, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the appropriate place, insert the following:

SEC. _____. SEMIANNUAL REPORT ON IRAN AND NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC MISSILE COOPERATION.

(a) **FINDINGS.**—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Iran developed a close working relationship with North Korea on many ballistic missile programs, dating back to an acquisition of Scud missiles from North Korea in the mid-1980s.

(2) By the mid-1980s North Korea reverse-engineered Scud B missiles originally received from Egypt, and developed the 500-kilometer range Scud C missile in 1991, and sold both the Scud B and Scud C, as well as missile production technology, to Iran.

(3) In 1992, then-Director of the Central Intelligence Robert Gates, in testimony to Congress, identified Iran as a recipient of North Korean Scud missiles.

(4) In 1993, then-Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey provided more detail, stating that North Korea had sold Iran extended range Scud C missiles and agreed to sell other forms of missile technology.

(5) Annual threat assessments from the intelligence community during the 1990s showed that North Korea's ongoing export of ballistic missiles provided a qualitative increase in capabilities to countries such as Iran.

(6) The same threat assessments noted that Iran was using North Korean ballistic missile goods and services to achieve its goal of self-sufficiency in the production of medium-range ballistic missiles.

(7) The intelligence community assessed in the 1990s that Iran's acquisition of missile systems or key missile-related components could improve Iran's ability to produce an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

(8) Throughout the 2000s, the intelligence community continued to assess that North Korean cooperation with Iran's ballistic missile program was ongoing and significant.

(9) In 2007 a failed missile test in Syria caused the death of Syrian, Iranian, and North Korean experts.

(10) North Korea built the nuclear reactor in Syria that was bombed in 2007. Syria failed to report the construction of the reactor to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which was Syria's obligation under its safeguards agreement with the agency.

(11) Official sources confirm that Iran and North Korea have engaged in various forms of clandestine nuclear cooperation.

(12) North Korea and Iran obtained designs and materials related to uranium enrichment from a clandestine procurement network run by Abdul Qadeer Khan.

(13) In the early 2000s, North Korea exported, with the assistance of Abdul Qadeer Khan, uranium hexafluoride (UF₆) gas to Libya, which was intended to be used in Libya's clandestine nuclear weapons program.

(14) On January 6, 2016, North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear weapons test.

(15) On September 9, 2016, North Korea conducted its fifth nuclear weapons test.

(16) Iranian officials reportedly traveled to North Korea to witness its three previous nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013.

(17) Before North Korea's 2013 test, a senior American official was quoted as saying "it's very possible that North Koreans are testing for two countries".

(18) In September 2012, Iran and North Korea signed an agreement for technological and scientific cooperation.

(19) In an April 2015 interview with CNN, then-Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter said that North Korea and Iran "could be" cooperating to develop a nuclear weapon.

(20) On March 11, 2017, Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats provided written testimony to Congress that stated that Pyongyang's "export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries, including Iran and Syria, and its assistance to Syria's construction of a nuclear reactor . . . illustrate its willingness to proliferate dangerous technologies".

(21) A 2016 Congressional Research Service report confirmed that "ballistic missile technology cooperation between the two [Iran and North Korea] is significant and meaningful".

(22) Admiral Bill Gortney, Commander of United States Northern Command, testified to Congress on April 14, 2016, that "Iran's continuing pursuit of long-range missile capabilities and ballistic missile and space launch programs, in defiance of United Nations Security Council resolutions, remains a serious concern".

(23) Iran has engaged in nuclear technology cooperation with North Korea.

(24) It has been suspected for over a decade that Iran and North Korea are working together on nuclear weapons development.

(25) Since the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112-277) repealed requirements for the intelligence community to provide unclassified annual report to Congress on the "Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions", the number of unclassified reports to Congress on nuclear-weapons issues decreased considerably.

(26) North Korea's cooperation with Iran on nuclear weapon development is widely suspected, but has yet to be detailed by the President to Congress.

(b) **SENSE OF CONGRESS.**—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the ballistic missile programs of Iran and North Korea represent a serious threat to allies of the United States in the Middle East, Europe, and Asia, members of the Armed Forces deployed in those regions, and ultimately the United States;

(2) further cooperation between Iran and North Korea on nuclear weapons or ballistic missile technology is not in the security interests of the United States or our allies;

(3) the testing and production by Iran of ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear device is a clear violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), which was unanimously adopted by the United Nations Security Council and supported by the international community; and

(4) Iran is using its space launch program to develop the capabilities necessary to deploy an intercontinental ballistic missile that could threaten the United States, and

the Director of National Intelligence has assessed that Iran would use ballistic missiles as its "preferred method of delivering nuclear weapons".

(c) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the President, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the heads of other relevant agencies, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on nuclear and ballistic missile cooperation between the Government of Iran and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea, including the identity of Iranian and North Korean persons that have knowingly engaged in or directed the provision of material support or the exchange of information between the Government of Iran and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea on their respective nuclear programs.

(2) FORM.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

(3) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term "appropriate committees of Congress" means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

AUTHORITY FOR COMMITTEES TO MEET

Mr. BURR. Mr. President, I have 9 requests for committees to meet during today's session of the Senate. They have the approval of the Majority and Minority leaders.

Pursuant to Rule XXVI, paragraph 5 (a), of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the following committees are authorized to meet during today's session of the Senate:

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The Committee on Armed Services is authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, June 13, 2017, at 9:30 a.m., in open session.

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS

The Committee on Environment and Public Works is authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, June 13, 2017, at 10 a.m., in room 406 of the Dirksen Senate office building, to conduct a hearing entitled, "Hearing on the Nominations of Kristine Svinicki (Reappointment), Annie Caputo and David Wright to be Members of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Nominations of Susan Bodine to be Assistant Administrator of the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency."

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

The Committee on Foreign Relations is authorized to meet during the ses-

sion of the Senate on Tuesday, June 13, 2017 at 10 a.m., to hold a hearing entitled "Review of the FY 2018 State Department Budget Request."

COMMITTEE ON HEALTH, EDUCATION, LABOR, AND PENSIONS

The Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions is authorized to meet, during the session of the Senate, in order to conduct a hearing entitled "The Cost of Prescription Drugs: How the Drug Delivery System Affects What Patients Pay" on Tuesday, June 13, 2017, at 10 a.m., in room 430 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building.

COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS

The Committee on Indian Affairs is authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, June 13, 2017, in room SD-628 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, at 2:30 p.m., to conduct a legislative hearing.

COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS

The Committee on Indian Affairs is authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, June 13, 2017, in room 628 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, at 2:30 p.m., to conduct a business meeting.

COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is authorized to meet during the session of the 115th Congress of the U.S. Senate on Tuesday, June 13, 2017 from 2:30 p.m.-4:30 p.m., in room SH-216 of the Senate Hart Office Building to hold an open hearing entitled "Open Hearing with Attorney General Jeff Sessions."

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWERS

The Subcommittee on Seapower of the Committee on Armed Services is authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, June 13, 2017, at 2:30 p.m., in open session, to receive testimony on Navy and Marine Corps aviation programs.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA

The Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia is authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, June 13, 2017 at 2:30 p.m., to hold a hearing entitled "State-Sponsored Cyberspace Threats: Recent Incidents and U.S. Policy Response."

PRIVILEGES OF THE FLOOR

Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that privileges of the floor be granted to the following members of my staff: Chris Burdick and Victoria King.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

POLICE OFFICER SCOTT BASHIOUM POST OFFICE BUILDING

Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Sen-

ate proceed to the immediate consideration of Calendar No. 92, S. 831.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the bill by title.

The bill clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 831) to designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 120 West Pike Street in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, as the "Police Officer Scott Bashioum Post Office Building."

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be considered read a third time and passed and the motion to reconsider be considered made and laid upon the table.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The bill (S. 831) was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, was read the third time, and passed, as follows:

S. 831

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. POLICE OFFICER SCOTT BASHIOUM POST OFFICE BUILDING.

(a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States Postal Service located at 120 West Pike Street in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, shall be known and designated as the "Police Officer Scott Bashioum Post Office Building".

(b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the "Police Officer Scott Bashioum Post Office Building".

ORDERS FOR WEDNESDAY, JUNE 14, 2017

Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it adjourn until 10:45 a.m. on Wednesday, June 14; further, that following the prayer and pledge, the morning hour be deemed expired, the Journal of proceedings be approved to date, the time for the two leaders be reserved for their use later in the day, and morning business be closed; finally, that following leader remarks, the Senate resume consideration of S. 722 as under the previous order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 10:45 A.M. TOMORROW

Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate, I ask unanimous consent that it stand adjourned under the previous order.

There being no objection, the Senate, at 6:18 p.m., adjourned until Wednesday, June 14, 2017, at 10:45 a.m.